The lecture was focused on trauma-informed responses to child sexual abuse and delve into understanding the psychological effects of sexual abuse, responding to disclosure, and how lawyers can imbibe trauma-informed practice when working with survivors of abuse.

The petitioner, the mother of a 16-year-old minor girl, approached the court seeking permission for the medical termination of her daughter’s pregnancy. On 07.01.2025, the petitioner learned of her daughter’s pregnancy, which resulted from a relationship with one Dhilip. A criminal case was subsequently registered against him under Sections 5(1), 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. 

The petitioner stated that her daughter, who is currently in the 12th standard, wishes to terminate the pregnancy to continue her education and attend her upcoming board examinations. Due to her anemic condition, the minor underwent a blood transfusion at the Primary Health Centre in Wallajah on 16.01.2025. However, the center lacked the facilities for a medical termination of pregnancy (MTP), leading to her admission at the second respondent hospital. 

Upon evaluation, hospital authorities informed the petitioner that the pregnancy had exceeded 24 weeks and that an MTP could only be performed with specific court approval. Given the urgency of the situation and her daughter’s educational commitments, the petitioner sought the court’s intervention to allow the termination. 

The court’s rationale for allowing the medical termination of pregnancy (MTP) primarily centered on the best interests, bodily autonomy, and reproductive rights of the minor girl. The court emphasized that since the victim is a minor, her consent alone is not legally sufficient, but her mother, as the sole caretaker and guardian under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, is legally authorized to provide consent for the procedure. The court clarified that the definition of ‘guardian’ in the MTP Act should be applied independently and need not align with definitions in other laws such as the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. 

The court also recognized the minor’s right to make decisions regarding her own body, affirming that reproductive autonomy is an essential part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents, the court stressed that a woman’s (including a minor’s) choice to terminate a pregnancy must be given primacy, particularly when there are no medical contraindications to the procedure. Given that the minor girl clearly expressed her desire to terminate the pregnancy before the Magistrate and that medical authorities confirmed the procedure could be safely carried out, the court found no impediment to granting the petition. 

Additionally, the court noted that the pregnancy resulted from an alleged sexual assault, but it did not delve into the criminal liability of the accused, as the matter was under investigation. However, to aid the ongoing investigation, the court directed that the fetus be preserved for DNA or medical testing. The court ruled that MTP should be performed promptly in the best interests of the minor girl while ensuring due process in the related criminal proceedings. 

In this case, the court prioritized the best interests, bodily autonomy, and reproductive rights of the minor girl while ensuring compliance with legal and medical considerations. Recognizing that the minor had unequivocally expressed her desire to terminate the pregnancy and that her mother, as her legal guardian, had consented, the court upheld her right to make decisions about her own body. 

The court directed the Dean of the second respondent Medical College to arrange for the medical termination of the minor girl’s pregnancy as expeditiously as possible, considering her best interests. It also ordered the preservation of the fetus for potential DNA or medical examination in connection with the ongoing criminal investigation under the POCSO Act. With these directions, the writ petition was disposed of. 

Case Title: XYZ v. The Inspector of Police & Ors. 

Citation: W.P.No.2237/2025 

The complainant, the wife of the applicant, filed an FIR on 16.11.2023 based on her application dated 06.11.2023. She alleged that she was married to the applicant six years ago and gave birth to a daughter, which led to her husband’s persistent anger and harassment. He allegedly beat her daily after consuming alcohol, citing insufficient dowry despite adequate dowry being given by her father. After the birth of a girl child, the harassment intensified, with threats to her life, and her in-laws expressed their intent to remarry the applicant. Due to the abuse, she moved to her parental home. 

Additionally, she accused the applicant of abducting her 16-year-old sister from her parental home on 27.02.2023, leading to his arrest and imprisonment. After securing bail, he allegedly lured her younger minor sister from Indian Bank, Mau, on 23.08.2023, attempting to take her towards Prayagraj, but was spotted by her nephew. A complaint regarding this incident was filed on 25.08.2023, but no police action was taken. 

The court went against the applicant, citing the seriousness of the allegations, the legal presumptions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, and the broader impact of his conduct on family and societal norms. It emphasized that the victim, being a minor aged 17, could not legally consent, making her statements in favor of the applicant irrelevant under the law. Moreover,under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, the burden of proving innocence rests on the accused, meaning that unless the applicant could disprove the allegations, the court must presume his culpability. This legal presumption, combined with the nature of the allegations, weighed heavily against him. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

The court also noted that this was not an isolated incident but a repeated pattern of misconduct. The applicant had previously been accused of enticing the same minor victim on 27.02.2023, leading to an FIR registered under Sections 363 and 366A IPC. Despite facing legal consequences, he allegedly repeated the act on 23.08.2023, further reinforcing concerns about his conduct. The repetition of such offenses indicated a deliberate and sustained course of action rather than an isolated misunderstanding or false implication. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

Furthermore, the court also took note of the implications of the applicant’s actions and the breach of familial trust. As the husband of the victim’s elder sister, the applicant was expected to uphold familial integrity, yet he allegedly engaged in an illicit relationship with his minor sister-in-law. This not only violated his marital responsibilities but also inflicted severe emotional distress on his wife, who had already accused him of harassment and abuse. His conduct also strained the relationship between the two sisters, causing significant familial discord. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

The court highlighted that such behavior disrupts not only individual relationships but also the larger family structure, leading to instability and harm. In addition to these factors, the court considered the applicant’s prior criminal history, including a pending case under Sections 363 and 366A IPC. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

Therefore, the history of his harassment and threats against his wife, along with allegations of repeatedly luring her minor sister, demonstrated a disregard for both legal and moral responsibilities. Given the seriousness of the offense, the severity of potential punishment, and the risk that the applicant might misuse bail if granted, the court found no justification for his release. The bail application was accordingly quashed. 

Case Title: Devideen v. State of U.P. and ors. 

Citation: Crl. M. Bail Appln. 36853/2024 

On 15.07.2024, the victim, ‘S,’ was taken to the house of the accused by his daughter, Sakina. While at the house, the accused called the victim to the terrace under the pretext of needing help. When she arrived, he asked her to remove her clothes. Upon her refusal, he forcibly removed her pajami and touched her inappropriately on her chest. The victim managed to push him away and ran home but did not initially disclose the incident to anyone out of fear or shock. Later, she confided in her school teacher about the incident. The teacher, upon learning of the allegations, informed the school administration, which then called the victim’s mother to the school and relayed the details of the complaint. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

Following this, legal action was initiated. On 24.07.2024, the victim’s statement was officially recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS, where she reiterated her initial complaint and provided further details. She alleged that on the date of the incident, the accused had also removed his own pants, attempted to insert his fingers into her vagina, and tried penile penetration upon her. The accused was arrested on 23.07.2024 in connection with the case. The investigation proceeded based on the victim’s allegations, her statement, and the circumstances surrounding the incident. 

The court found the victim’s testimony credible, as her statements remained consistent and provided a clear sequence of events. The alleged contradictions regarding the presence of other family members did not discredit her testimony, as she had explained that the accused had ensured his wife and daughter were not at home. The court also noted that the delay in filing the FIR was justified, given the victim’s young age and the psychological trauma she endured. It recognized that children in such situations often hesitate to inform their parents and may find it easier to disclose the incident to teachers or school authorities first. 

The severity of the offense and the breach of trust were significant factors in the court’s reasoning. The accused was a trusted neighbor, whom the victim addressed as “chacha,” making the betrayal even more profound. The court underscored that sexual offenses against minors are not just physical violations but also result in severe psychological and emotional trauma, necessitating a strong legal response. Given that the accused resided in the same vicinity as the victim, the court acknowledged the risk of potential interference with witnesses or intimidation, especially since key prosecution witnesses were yet to be examined. 

Emphasizing its duty to protect child victims and ensure justice, the court also commended the responsible actions of the school authorities in promptly reporting the incident. It stressed the importance of institutional support in such cases and the need for a decisive judicial response to deter such offenses. 

The court, after considering the seriousness of the allegations, the young age of the victim, and the potential impact of the crime, found no merit in the accused’s request for bail. The court emphasized that sexual offenses against minors, particularly by individuals in positions of trust, cause severe psychological trauma and must be met with a firm legal response. Given the pending examination of key witnesses and the risk of tampering with evidence, the court determined that granting bail at this stage was not justified. 

Case Title: Subhan Ali v. The State NCT of Delhi and anr 

Citation: Bail Appln. 4422/2024 

The first accused subjected the minor victim to repeated sexual intercourse, leading to charges under IPC Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3), 376(2)(f), and 109, along with Sections 6, 6(1) r/w 5(l), 5(n), and 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act and Section 75 of the JJ Act. 

The second accused, a doctor, examined the victim when she was brought to the hospital for medical attention. At the time of consultation, the victim’s age was recorded as 18 years based on the information provided by the victim and her parents, who accompanied her. There was no indication that the doctor had any reason to question or verify the stated age. The victim was suffering from excessive bleeding and showing symptoms of a miscarriage. The doctor proceeded with medical intervention to stabilize her condition and complete the miscarriage to prevent further health complications. 

According to the medical records, the victim and her parents informed the doctor that she was 18 years old and married, and the doctor had no apparent reason to doubt this information. The abortion was performed as a necessary medical procedure to save the victim’s life, given that she arrived at the hospital already experiencing severe bleeding and signs of a miscarriage. There is no evidence in the records suggesting that the doctor had knowledge that the victim was a minor at the time of treatment. 

Regardless, the doctor faced charges under Section 21 r/w 19 of the POCSO Act for allegedly failing to report the pregnancy of a minor to the authorities, as well as under Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC for performing an abortion without proper consent. &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

The court relied on precedents from the Madras and Karnataka High Courts, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Tessy Jose & Ors. v. State of Kerala, which established that doctors are not required to verify a patient’s age beyond what is disclosed unless there is a clear reason to doubt it. The Supreme Court held that a doctor acts based on the age declared by the patient and is not obligated to conduct further inquiry unless the stated age appears prima facie unconvincing. 

In the present case, the victim’s medical records indicated her age as 18 years, and there was no evidence suggesting that the doctor had reason to suspect otherwise. Since the doctor was not aware that the victim was a minor, the failure to report the pregnancy to the police under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act did not constitute an offense under Section 21. 

Regarding the charges under IPC Sections 312 and 313, the court found that the victim arrived at the hospital with severe bleeding and symptoms of miscarriage. The doctor provided medical treatment in good faith to stabilize her condition and complete the miscarriage, rather than performing an abortion voluntarily. 

Given the absence of evidence establishing the doctor’s knowledge of the victim’s minority and the emergency nature of the medical intervention, the court held that the prosecution lacked sufficient grounds. On this rationale, the case against the doctor was quashed. 

The court observed that doctors are frequently implicated in POCSO cases under Section 21 r/w Section 19 for allegedly failing to report crimes, often without proper scrutiny. It emphasized that doctors have a primary duty to save lives and should not be mechanically charged under Section 19 without a clear, deliberate omission to report a crime. Investigating officers must carefully assess the evidence and ensure that prosecution is justified before implicating doctors. Unwarranted criminal proceedings cause undue mental stress and may hinder doctors from performing their duties effectively. The court directed investigators to exercise caution and avoid implicating doctors in POCSO cases unless there is sufficient material to support such action. 

Case Title: Dr. Ambujakshi v. State of Kerala 

Citation: Crl M.C. No. 4728/2021 

16-year-old boy who was a survivor of an offence under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code has history of facing sexual abuse and admitted to have been a smoker. The accused petitioned to discredit the testimony of the minor on these very grounds and categorised the boy to be of deviant character. The accused also added that the evidence to support the claims of the survivor were insufficient and unsatisfactory.  

The court declared that these accusations hold no truth as there is no reason to believe that the survivor is lying in his testimony as he stated clearly and identified the perpetrators in the statement. It was also further stated by the court that the medical examination on the survivor indicated abuse under the section and therefore greatly added to the case as primary evidence. Therefore, the appeal by the accused is denied by the court.  

[Case Name: Abdul Salam v. State of Kerala (2025)] 

The case revolves around the renewal of the passports of the respondent’s minor daughters amidst a custody battle between the parents. The mother applied for renewal, but the father objected, leading the Passport Office to demand court permission. The petitioners argued for their fundamental right to a passport under Article 21, citing their invitations to Bharat Mahotsav in the UK. The mother submitted Annexure-C, confirming no court prohibition on passport issuance. 

The father’s counsel opposed the plea, alleging false claims and the risk of the children being taken abroad. The court ruled that his objections were irrelevant to passport renewal and ordered the Regional Passport Office to proceed with the renewal and stated that a father’s consent is not required if no prohibitory court order exists. Justice Vinay Saraf referred to Passport Rules, stating a single parent can apply with Annexure-C if the other parent does not consent. 

The court upheld the mother’s right to apply for renewal separately, emphasizing that objections unrelated to passport issuance should be raised before the appropriate family court. By directing the Regional Passport Office to proceed with the renewal, the court reinforced the fundamental right to travel and ensured procedural clarity in similar cases 

[Case Name: X (Minor) D/O Shri Nitish Janardan Bharadwaj And Smt. Smita Nitish Bharadwaj And Others v/s Union Of India]  

It was debated if the age of majority for male applicants should be at the age of 18 or at the age of 21 to trigger the limitation period for annulments. The law dictates a period of limitations upto 2 years after one attains majority till when a child marriage can be annulled by either party. In this case, the husband, who was 12 at the time of the marriage, filed an annulment petition when he was 23 years old. The wife contested the order in furtherance to said petition, that declared the marriage void on the grounds that the limitation period had been exhausted by the time the remedy was sought.  

The Supreme Court allows the wife’s submission as they felt limiting the limitation period for women until they turn 20 (majority at 18), while allowing men to opt till they turn 23 years old was absurd and a violation of the right to equality and therefore, the age of majority for both men and women with respect to the Prohibition of Child Marriages, 2006, must be when they turn 18 years old.  

Thus, the Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the principle of gender equality by ensuring that the limitation period for annulment of child marriages remains uniform for both men and women. By clarifying that the age of majority, for the purposes of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, is 18 for all individuals, the Court eliminates arbitrary distinctions that could lead to discriminatory consequences. This judgment not only upholds the constitutional right to equality but also strengthens the legal framework protecting individuals from the lasting consequences of child marriage, ensuring a more just and equitable application of the law. 

[Case Name: Guddan@ Usha v. Sanjay Chudhary] 

The appeal revolves around a father of a four-year-old girl who had gotten custody of the child during the initial separation from the mother. When the father applied for divorce, the mother sought custody of the girl, which the father challenged. The court observed that the natural guardian will always be the mother till the child is over 5 years of age according to the existing law. In furtherance of this, the court ruled that the mother will be allowed to contest for custody and is likely to be granted the same as well.  

However, the court also took note of the highest principle followed in family law, that is, to ensure the best needs of the child are what are considered. It was finally held that the father was the primary caregiver in the child’s life and shifting guardianship would result in abrupt uprooting and traumatizing the child. Hence, the court ruled to retain custody with the father. However, after much assessment of the mother revealing a stable environment, both parents were granted visitation hours with the child.  

[Case Name: Amit Dhama v. Smt Pooja And 2 Others] 

The petitioner, who is the biological mother of a minor child, filed an application seeking a stay on further proceedings in FIR No. 1236 of 2024, registered at Panjagutta Police Station, under Section 137(2) of the BNS Act, which was filed by the de facto complainant, who alleged violations of a custody order. In defence, the petitioner contends that her actions were driven by maternal instincts and in the best interest of the child. 

The petitioner placed forth the following arguments in favour of their position and sought a stay order. While, on the other hand, It was argued that disputes regarding custody fall within the jurisdiction of the Family Court, and the complainant should have pursued remedies there instead of filing a criminal complaint. The petitioner relied on a. On the other hand, the Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the stay, emphasizing that specific allegations were made against the petitioner. 

The court granted a stay on further proceedings, emphasizing that both the mother and father are natural and lawful guardians of the minor child. The Court relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 552 of 2023, which held that when a natural guardian, such as a father, takes custody of a minor child, it does not amount to an offense under Section 361 of IPC or make them punishable under Section 363 of CrPC, as the child remains under lawful guardianship. Recognizing this legal standing, it was ruled in this case that the petitioner’s act of taking the child into her custody did not amount to an offense under Section 137(2) of the BNS. Furthermore, the court noted that child custody disputes should be addressed in the Family Court, not through criminal complaints. Recognizing the petitioner’s maternal instincts and the lack of criminal intent, the court concluded that her actions were in the child’s best interests and not unlawful, warranting the stay on proceedings. 

 &²Ô²ú²õ±è;

The court observed that when a mother, as a natural and lawful guardian, takes custody of her child from the father, it does not constitute kidnapping. The court emphasized that both parents hold equal legal rights over the guardianship of their minor child, and transferring custody between them does not amount to taking the child out of “lawful guardianship” as per law. 

Case Title: Dr. B. Priyanka vs. The State of Telangana 

Citation: CRLP No. 16187/2024.