at Belém, Brazil.” 18 November 2025.

India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 fluently demanded global finance and justice but its own record on coal expansion, underfunded adaptation, and toxic air quality reveals a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. This article argues that India cannot credibly lead on climate justice while failing to deliver its most basic form at home: the right to clean air.

1. Introduction

For many Indians who grew up in the 2000s and 2010s, environmentalism arrived in a neat, schoolfriendly package. “Reduce, Reuse, Recycle” sat at the center of every Earth Day activity. We drew the three chasing arrows on chart paper, pledged to avoid plastic straws, and were praised for bringing steel bottles to class. Climate change, as it was presented to us, floated in a morally uncomplicated space: no villains, no political economy, no reference to the infrastructure that powered our cities. Responsibility lived in our habits, not in the systems around us.

In 2025, this narrative no longer holds. COP30 in Belém is over, and the chasm between India’s global rhetoric and its domestic reality has never been wider. The Indian delegation spoke

fluently about justice, demanding that the Global North meet its climate finance obligations and labeling the existing $100 billion goal “suboptimal.” This critique is diplomatically sound. The rich nations have indeed failed to deliver. However, the singular focus on finance abroad allowed the government to sidestep confronting a lack of ambition at home.

2.���������첵���dzܲԻ�

2.1 Context and History

Three measurable failures mark India’s position at COP30.

The first failure is our 2035 target. The Glasgow agreement set a clear expectation for countries to commit to a strengthened Nationally determined contribution (NDC) which basically stipulates a time bound roadmap for mitigation.¹ Despite our climate strategy being classified as “Highly Insufficient” by the Climate Action Tracker,² India is one of the major players that postponed this submission until after the conference. Our current framework for keeping the global temperature increase below 1.5 degrees celsius is severely lacking.

The second failure is our attitude towards coal. More than 130 nations supported a resolution to phase out fossil fuels, but India insisted on the term “phasing down of unabated coal.” The statistics reveal that India is planning more than 92 GW of new coal capacity in addition to what is currently under construction,³ and official documents outline that the total capacity will reach 307 GW by 2035.⁴ Coal is still the main component of India’s energy policy and no peak has been declared until the middle of the 2030s at least.

Third is regarding adaptation. India often frames its climate vulnerability around adaptation needs. Yet the Union Budget shows that key schemes have declining or zero allocations: the National Adaptation Fund has been given no meaningful budget for a second successive year, and funding to the National Coastal Mission has been cut.⁵ It is difficult to demand global adaptation finance while underfunding resilience at home.

3.�����Բ����������

3.1 Core Argument

What is framed as episodic winter smog, is actually chronic, structural exposure that shapes lung growth, cognitive development, learning outcomes, and long term health. It dictates whether children can play outside, whether workers can work safely, and whether cities remain liveable.

¹United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact

²Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/ ³Global Energy Monitor. (2024). Global Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/

⁴Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

⁵Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.

Despite what we were taught as kids, the fact remains that a crisis of this magnitude cannot be addressed by individual behaviour alone.

The most immediate contradiction is the air itself. The University of Chicago’s Air Quality life report shows us that most of our 1.4 billion live in places where the PM2.5 level is way above the WHO’s safe limit.⁶ Inhaling this toxic air reduces lifespan by an average of 3.5 years. In the Indo Gangetic plain, which includes Delhi NCR, the average loss is approximately 8.3 years.

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility. The world is now showing the consequences of policy decisions made by others. These are decisions made in favor of fossil fuel expansion, urban sprawl, weak industrial enforcement, and underfunded public transport among others.

We breathe the air that is decided upon in ministries, regulatory bodies, and energy plans, not with our reusable straws. Our childhood climate education did not prepare us for a world where the state normalizes air pollution levels that would be treated as a national emergency elsewhere.

3.2 Counter Arguments and Limitations

Recently, India has ranked within the first 100 countries worldwide in SDG ranking and this was mainly due to the efforts in poverty alleviation and provision of energy.⁷ SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), 13 (climate action), 14 (life below water), and 15 (life on land) remain the weakest points for India.⁸ Issues like air pollution, the loss of biodiversity, solid waste management, and climate mitigation are all far behind social sector progress. The 2030 Agenda commits India to a sustainable future, yet the air offers little evidence that we are on that path.

4. Implications

If India really wants to be an active player in climate justice, true justice that seeks to serve its citizens, then it has to surpass the stage of merely proclaiming the leadership role and indeed bring about fundamental change:

Declare a timetable for the phase-out of coal: a detailed schedule for the retirement of the current 210 GW coal capacity, and cancellation of the 92 GW pipeline.

Recognize clean air as a basic human right: Legally impose PM2.5 limits on cities with independent monitoring and actual penalties upon non compliance.⁹

⁷Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024. https://

⁸United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/

⁹World Health Organization. (2021). WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.

Support local adaptation: revive the National Adaptation Fund¹⁰ and other resilience programs to cover all the needy communities now, rather than in some distant climate finance future.

Such national planning must align with what the health evidence makes clear: air pollution is not a seasonal inconvenience but a public health emergency. My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

Key Takeaways

• India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 prioritised demanding finance from the Global North while failing to submit a strengthened NDC or commit to a coal phase-out timeline.
• Air pollution in India is a structural public health emergency, not an individual responsibility — the Air Quality Life Index shows PM2.5 levels reduce average lifespans by 3.5 years nationally and 8.3 years in the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
• True climate justice requires domestic action: a coal retirement schedule, legally enforceable clean air standards, and a revived National Adaptation Fund.

5. Conclusion

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility.

My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

References

• Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact
• Global Energy Monitor. (2024). Global Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/
• Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

¹⁰Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

• Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
• Greenstone, M., et al. (2024). Air Quality Life Index Annual Report 2024. Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago. https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/annual-report/
• United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/
• Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024.
• World Health Organization. (2021). WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.
• Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The post appeared first on 91̽��.

Source- Bizsolindia Pvt. Ltd.

India’s booming gig and platform economy continues to operate with restricted social and legal safeguards. This article aims to examine whether the Union Budget 2026-27 makes any meaningful advancement in areas of social security of gig workers, allocations to the Welfare Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020, welfare design and accessible protection mechanisms, while questioning the role of platform companies in ensuring accountability and the welfare of workers.

Introduction

The rapid expansion of food and grocery delivery platforms such as Zomato and Swiggy have reshaped urban labour markets in India. Despite the humorous Blinkit hoardings highlighting what the nation shopped the most in one year, or Zomato’s regular pop-up notifications attracting

the consumers to order more from the platform, there lies a deeply exploitative nature of employment that is meted out to the gig workers. In absence of any legislation on minimum wages, regulated hours of work, social security codes that are existent on papers and a rapidly growing economy that demands you to get along, the gig workers have no option but to succumb to their situations. While the world celebrated the coming of a new year, the gig workers protested for their rights, logging out of their respective platforms. The nationwide strike made its way to the Parliament when it caught the attention of Mr. Raghav Chaddha, a Member of Parliament, who from the floor of the Parliament called out the exploitative nature of work being performed by the gig and the platform workers today.¹

The silver lining lies in the fact that the State for the first time unequivocally called out the exploitative nature of the quick delivery models, putting a stop to them. The approach was lauded by labour unions, domain experts and the workers themselves, and further invoked enthusiasm and hope from the Union Budget for the Financial Year 2026-27. It is in this backdrop that the Budget was viewed with much hope and expectation for the gig and platform workers.²

Defining and Measuring the Gig Workforce

The gig workers were first defined by the Code on Social Security, 2020, which is a central law that aims to extend social security benefits to unorganized, gig, and platform workers across India. The legislation defines a gig worker as “a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside of a traditional employer-employee relationship”. A report by NITI Ayog titled, “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy”, has

¹ Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

² Ani. (2026, January 13). Ban on 10-minute delivery: CAIT welcomes move to protect gig workers – The Tribune. The Tribune.

projected it to reach 23.5 million by 2029-30, up from 7.7 million in 2020-21.³ However, the attempts at enumerating the gig workers through surveys remain inefficient. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions.⁴

The Gap between Policy and Protection

The Union Budget fell short of meeting the expectations of the workers involved in the gig economy. The current Union Budget draws our attention to the striking gap between the legal recognition and the actual fiscal assistance for the workers who sustain this sector. One of the major expectations from the budget was that it would effectuate the social security safeguards for the gig workers through appropriate funding. But in reality it just reinstated its earlier policies such as health coverage under Ayushman Bharat and registration through e-Shram portal, without allocating any new fiscal support for their welfare. Therefore, social security protection still remains a far-fetched ambition for the gig workers as it is a mere reality on paper without any legal enforcement⁵.

The budget also highlights the absence of addressing the concern related to income instability that workers in this sector face due to irregular demand cycles and delayed payments. It fails to incorporate a legal framework that could regulate or set the bar for minimum wages earned by an informal worker. This makes the labor force solely dependent upon the platform which can unilaterally alter their incentives, commission and daily targets. While the Economic Survey 2025-26 recognises the urgency of skill based programmes for gig workers, the budget formally fails to accommodate this urgency and only takes into account the youth skilling programmes

3 Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.

IMPRI INSIGHTS.

4 Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

5 Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).

concerning developing technologies and artificial intelligence. Hence, making the gig workers more prone to economic vulnerabilities.⁶

Other major concerns associated with the gig economy are the absence of meaningful heed to the working environment and the lack of effective regulatory framework governing platform labour. Delivery partners and riders engaged with various platforms have to spend longer hours outdoors and directly bear the brunt of adverse weather conditions along with occupational risks. In a report published by Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union (TGPWU), which surveyed a total of 166 workers, only eleven respondents confirmed the availability of heat-protective gear, while just 31% out of the total respondents verified having access to clean washrooms. Yet, the budget has failed to acknowledge any public investment in improving the working condition of the gig workers specifically.⁷ Moreover, it also failed to allocate funds for enhancing the enforcement mechanism for the labour codes which could help empower the gig workers by making aggregators liable for the fair labour practices. An Effective Enforcement mechanism encompasses enhancing grievances redressal system, inspection rules and monitoring mechanism within the labour department. In the absence of such a mechanism, the gig economy will be exposed to greater exploitation in the face of algorithmic control and arbitrary decision making by the aggregators.⁸

The Codes on Social Security of 2020 propose the formation of a National Social Security Board focused on formulating and monitoring welfare schemes for unorganized, gig, and platform workers. As per the Codes, the Board would recommend schemes for life/disability cover, health benefits, and old-age protection.The Board is mostly just a symbol because there is

6 Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

7 Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024, August 17).

8 Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.

no budget or plan for how to put it into action. This makes it less effective as a way to protect gig and platform workers. The composition of the Board is as depicted below in Table1:

Table 1: Composition of the National Social Security Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020 for gig and platform workers

The Path Forward

The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers, as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions. The first and foremost priority of any policy that aims to empower the gig workers should be to integrate the workers in the wider ambit of social security schemes, as promised under the new Labour Codes of 2020. Furthermore, several critical issues persist such as those related to

algorithmic controls, arbitrary account suspensions, opaque payment systems, exploitative and unsafe working conditions- topped with little to no accountability witnessed from the platforms’ end. Details on creating a dedicated fund as part of the law for gig and platform workers to cover life, disability, health and old-age benefits are still awaited, which is a key component in safeguarding the rights of the gig workers, while holding the platforms accountable for the same.

Therefore, rule-making must ensure independent worker representation, diversify and stabilize funding, require algorithmic audits and platform data-sharing, and implement robust monitoring in order for the policy to be effective. Absent these measures, the statute’s impact will remain limited; with them, it could become a scalable model for protecting gig workers.

Key takeaways:

• India’s gig and platform economy is undergoing rapid expansion, still workers lack basic social security provisions, fair wages and safe working conditions.
• The Budget of 2026-27 largely reiterates the existing provisions, while any funding to the Social Security Board was absent.
• The questions of income stability, platform accountability and grievance redressal mechanisms still loom large over the gig and platform workers of the nation.

Conclusion

The Union Budget, while recognizing the unorganised workers through schemes like e-Shram Portal, largely remains silent on providing tangible policy solutions such as social security benefits. In order to achieve a more dignified and secure workspace for the workers, the Government must move beyond empty promises and depict its commitment to equality and fairness through enforcing the provisions chalked out in the Social Security Codes, 2020⁹ for the gig and platform workers. Given the backdrop and the complexity of the issue, both the central and state governments need to reconsider whether the policies actually elevate the social standing of the gig workers or act as a mere band-aid?

9 Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

References

1. Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.
2. Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.                                                          IMPRI                                                                              INSIGHTS.

• Himanshu Nitnaware. (2026, January 29). Economic Survey 2026: India’s fast-growing gig economy needs       an                       overhaul.                       Down                       to                                Earth.
• Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024,                                                                     August                                                                17).
• Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).
• Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.
• Factsheet details: (n.d.).

• Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

• Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

The post Union Budget 2026-27: What it holds for Country’s Gig Economy? appeared first on 91̽��.

Amidst the AI fanfare, it becomes extremely important for budding policymakers, scholars and researchers to debunk the myths surrounding AI and to treat it as a technological tool capable of effectively performing some chores, while being equally likely in creating errors. The article examines the Union Budget to reflect on the status of AI’s progress in India, alongside the Impact AI Summit.

The Rise of AI and India’s Policy Agenda

Until now, 2026 has proved to be a pivotal year in India’s AI journey. The Budget Speech made by the Hon’ble FM in February invoked the use of the term “AI” eleven times, the highest till date, an indication of its growing importance. Later that month, India hosted the five-day Global AI Summit which brought forth serious discussions about AI, policy and society to the general public. Both developments indicate the country’s enthusiasm for the development and deployment of AI technologies across sectors. Artificial Intelligence technologies, however, are fraught with grave faultlines such as biases within the technology, hallucinations, environmental and safety concerns; governing the same, therefore, poses serious policy questions that governments across the globe are currently grappling with.¹

1 India Budget | Ministry of Finance | Government of India. (n.d.).

Union Budget vis-à-vis AI:

The Union Budget 2026-27 envisions the integration of AI across various domains, from agriculture and education, to the scaling up of production of assistive devices for persons with disabilities. The India AI Mission, as per the Budget Estimates for the year, is allocated Rs.1000 crores for the FY, which is a direct 50% cut in light of the Ministry’s limited absorption capacity and past trends. As per a response to a question on Lok Sabha in December 2024, over 85% of the ₹1,100 crores in subsidies disbursed under the compute pillar of the IndiaAI mission has been directed towards the development of indigenous generative AI models like Sarvam, BharatGen, Zenteq, SoketAI, Gnani.ai, and Avataar AI, which have been the recipients of these subsidies- all of which will result in increased demand for domestic data centres.²

When asked to generate the image of an Indian in May 2024, MetaAI displayed a peculiar predisposition to generating a ‘man with a turban’ – almost four out of five times.³ This depicts an inherent bias in the model, despite India’s rich cultural and demographic diversity, a fact ostensibly attributable to the biases present in the training dataset. Whether indigenous models could counter the bias that Western models display is yet to be determined. Pratyush Kumar, the co-founder of Sarvam, called for the development of such indigenous technologies to protect our citizens from data colonialism.

Incepted at Bletchley Park in the UK in 2023, the first Impact AI Summit began with a clear agenda of understanding the risks that frontier AI models pose, and designing strategies to counter them. With AI developing as quickly as the models themselves, the governance of AI becomes all the more vital. The Indian PM, alongside other world leaders, thus called for a more inclusive, trusted and collaborative AI, while positioning India as the tech leader of the Global South.⁴ The Summit poses larger questions about the deployment of AI revolving around safety regulations, the impact on marginalized communities, labour, and attempts to ‘govern’ it.⁵

2 Decoding the budget for India’s AI priorities – Takshashila Institution. (n.d.-b).

3 Mehta, I. (2024, May 8). Meta AI is obsessed with turbans when generating images of Indian men. TechCrunch.

4 India AI Impact Summit 2026. (n.d.). India AI Impact Summit 2026.

5 Kahekashan, & India, H. (2026, February 18). India pushes for sovereign AI at global AI summit. The Hans India.

The Limits of Technological Solutions

In the Budget presented by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, the government announced a High Powered Standing Committee meant to look at possible pathways from education to employment and entrepreneurship, which will identify services sub-sectors with growth potential, assess the impact of emerging technologies including AI on jobs and skills requirements, while proposing “specific measures” for including AI in the education curricula from school onwards and upgrading State Councils for Educational Research and Training Institutes for teacher training.⁶ While many AI-skilling programs are run by the government and private tech companies, their impact needs to be critically analysed keeping in mind the nature of the use to which AI will be deployed, or even whether AI as a technology is ready to be rolled out to young adolescents who might unintentionally inherit its biases, jeopardizing their safety as well. Further, in the Indian context, marginalized communities are often excluded from such programs due to inadequate infrastructure, accessibility and affordability constraints. Thus, will AI bridge the digital divide prevalent in India or widen the same remains to be seen.

The implicit concerns underlying these models can be understood through an example. Described as a multilingual AI tool that shall integrate the AgriStack portals and the ICAR package on agricultural practices with AI systems, the Bharat-VISTAAR model will enhance farm productivity, enable better decisions for farmers and reduce risk by providing customised advisory support.

While the initiative promises to empower farmers with real-time, multilingual information on insurance procedures, weather risks, and claim status, it ignores the array of concerns that shadow the Indian agricultural space today. From divided digital literacy among farmers to challenges such as fragmented landholdings, the exclusion of landless farmers from databases, inconsistent data sources, unclear land ownership and legal disputes, the initiative fails to recognize the grassroot reality of Indian farmers, who are a diverse community.⁷ The solution to the more pervasive concerns among farmers may not lie in technology-based solutions, but rather in questions of adequate minimum support prices and subsidies. Data heterogeneity, which is a defining feature of the diversity of Indian agriculture, does not speak in standard codes. Pearl millet is bajra in Hindi, bajri in Gujarati, kambu in Tamil, and sajje in Kannada.

6 Lakshman, A. (2026, February 1). Education and skilling get Budget push; high-power panel to look at education to employment pathways. The Hindu.

7 Garg, R. (2022, February 22). #StandWithFarmers: Joint Letter by 55 groups | Hold the Agriculture Ministry and Microsoft India accountable. Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF).

Such heterogeneity could be misinterpreted by AI models or they may even fail to generalise across regions if such linguistic and regional nuances are not considered.⁸

The Way Ahead:

India needs to develop technologies tailored to its own socio-economic needs which solve the problems of the nation, rather than deploying AI technology wherein deeper structural issues exist (such as agriculture).⁹ This creates a risk of misallocation of public resources. A better approach moving forward is to examine the actual need for the deployment of AI technologies, rather than taking a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.¹⁰ India, therefore needs a people-centred AI policy that exhibits the spirit of democratic and participatory governance. With more emphasis on locally-built AI models like Sarvam-AI, India can compete on the global stage while safeguarding its users’ data and interests. Models like Sarvam can be designed keeping in mind a techno-legal framework wherein legal frameworks and safeguards are embedded within the technology itself. India has the potential to lead global AI development by prioritizing purposeful AI, built around societal welfare, rather than competing for technological power. Existing initiatives such as E-Mitra chatbot for farmers or the eSanjeevani telemedicine platform are major breakthroughs in the agriculture and healthcare sectors respectively, and are useful guides for AI developed for aid in specific fields.¹¹ Deployment of Small Language Models (SLM) based for specific purposes can be cost effective, efficient and flexible as per that particular domain. While doing so, the country’s environmental and resource constraints should be constantly evaluated so as to not put the strain of technological advancement on the environment. In a resource-constrained and climatically vulnerable context as that of India, it is of crucial importance to regulate the expansion through adequate safeguards, efficiency standards, and sustainability assessments.¹²

8 Contributors, E. (2026, March 6). Artificial intelligence in Indian agriculture: The bus India cannot afford to miss.

The Economic Times.

9 Frontline News Desk. (2026, February 23). India AI Summit 2026: Who controls future tech order? Frontline.

10 Vipra, J. (2024, October 10). What would a people-centred AI policy for India look like? Economic and Political Weekly.

11 Contributors, E. (2026, March 6). Artificial intelligence in Indian agriculture: The bus India cannot afford to miss. The Economic Times.

12 Renu Khandelwal, “Small Language Model: LLM that Does More with Less,” Medium (12 August 2025), available at:

Key takeaways:

• India’s AI policy must prioritise people, keep in mind the unique context the country is placed in and develop technologies that align with local realities.
• Sustainable AI leadership for India would mean balancing between technological ambition and its socio-economic and ecological constraints.
• Therefore, a snake-oil approach towards AI may lead to misallocated resources and overlooking deeper socio-economic issues.

Conclusion:

AI technologies are dynamic and so are the challenges that come embroiled with it. Thus, as India posits itself as a leader of the Global South in AI technologies, it should do so keeping in mind that the technology facilitates in alleviating the problems of the people on ground. This would require a shift in the policy orientation- one from promoting AI as an end in itself to the one that helps in achieving the broader goal of public welfare, well-being of the citizenry and sustainable development.

Other references:

1. Das, K. (2026, February 1). Budget 2026: Big infra, AI data centres, defence push, cheaper cancer drugs.                                                                India                                                                          Today.

• AP, B. (2026, March 5). From data to Decisions: What Bharat-VISTAAR needs to transform Indian                           agriculture                 –                 The                 Wire.                 The                           Wire.
• Deep, A. (2026, February 23). What are the key takeaways from the AI summit? | Explained. The Hindu.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

The post Union Budget 2026-27: Making sense of India’s AI trajectory appeared first on 91̽��.

Source:

Deck

India’s push for Atmanirbharta in defence marks a strategic shift which aims at reducing long-standing dependence on foreign imports. While rising capital expenditure and indigenous programmes signal progress, continued reliance on external technology exposes critical gaps in self-reliance. This article examines how far India has come in achieving defence Atmanirbharta, and what challenges still stand in the way of true strategic autonomy.

Introduction

India’s defence policy has undergone a significant transformation in recent years. From steady increases in defence budgets and initiatives such as the Agnipath scheme to expand joint military exercises with partner countries and a more assertive response to terrorism, India’s security approach has evolved considerably. Yet one idea appears to connect many of these developments: the aspiration of Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) in defence.

In the last few years, this aspiration has increasingly found expression in the rising capital outlay for defence modernisation and investments in indigenous defence production. It is noteworthy that despite having one of the largest armies in the world, it has heavily relied on imports of defence equipment. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India accounted for 8.2% of global arms imports between 2021 and 2025, making it the second-largest arms importer in the world, just behind Ukraine¹.

1 Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI, March 9, 2026,

.

India’s continued position as the world’s second-largest arms importer highlights the gap between the policy objective of defence self-reliance and the current structure of its defence procurement.

Russia has traditionally been India’s largest supplier of defence equipment, accounting for around 40% of India’s arms imports in the same period^2[2], although this share has declined compared to previous years as India diversifies its suppliers towards countries such as France, Israel and the United States.

These imports helped maintain internal security and military capability. However, this dependence on external suppliers has also created vulnerabilities during times of geopolitical tension and a kind of reliance on foreign imports. For example, the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted Russian defence production and export commitments. India’s $5.5 billion S-400 deal signed in 2018 illustrates this vulnerability (Press Trust of India, 2025; United24 Media, 2026): only three of the five systems have been delivered so far, with the remaining two expected by 2026. This shows how geopolitical conflicts can directly affect defence procurement timelines. And this is where the idea of self-reliance came–to build a kind of system that focuses on boosting local manufacturing that would eventually reduce the over-reliance on imports. This is when the government launched the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative in 2020.

Evidence and Analysis

Capital outlay refers to expenditure on acquiring, upgrading, or maintaining defence assets such as aircraft, ships, and equipment. It does not include revenue expenditure, which covers day-to-day operational costs such as salaries, allowances, rations, and maintenance. Since 2020, the capital outlay of defence services has steadily increased.

2 Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI.

India’s Defence Capital Expenditure Trend (Data from )

This near doubling of the budget (from 2019 to 2026) shows that the country is focusing on modernising its military and is prioritising the integration of advanced systems. This rise in capital investment is evident through a number of major defence projects focused on enhancing the country’s indigenous military capabilities.

The aircraft and aero engines alone are receiving a budget allocation of ₹63,733.94 crore out of the total capital outlay of ₹219,306.47 crore. This accounts for nearly 29 percent of the total capital expenditure, making it quite visible that a significant portion of defence spending is being directed towards strengthening India’s aerospace capabilities and aircraft development.

One of the most prominent examples of this push towards aircraft development is HAL Tejas, a light combat aircraft often described as a 4.5 generation fighter and considered one of the lightest in the world, with growing export interest in global markets. This is followed by the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), a fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft currently under development. If developed successfully, it may also see demand in the global market, especially considering that at present only three countries possess operational fifth-generation fighter aircraft: the United States, Russia, and China.

Keeping indigenous projects in mind, self-reliance does not necessarily have to come only from isolated projects; it can also emerge from collaborative projects with other countries. For example, BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile which can travel at a speed of Mach 3, nearly three times the speed of sound, is a joint venture between India and Russia. In recent years, BrahMos has also begun to attract international buyers. After the Philippines, Indonesia has also shown interest in acquiring the missile system³, highlighting the growing export potential of jointly developed defence technologies.

Meanwhile, India’s defence industry is slowly opening up to not only foreign entities but also private enterprises. This is because the Indian government is gradually opening up its rules on direct foreign investments (FDIs) in defence manufacturing, especially to obtain high-end technology and finance through joint ventures with Indian companies. At the same time, private companies such as Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Adani Defence & Aerospace have entered defence manufacturing, especially in segments such as aircraft structures, missile parts, drones, small arms, and ammunition. This is a clear indication that India’s quest for self-reliance in defence manufacturing is likely to take a hybrid form.

3 Manoj Kumar, “IMF Raises India FY26 Growth Forecast to 7.3%, Sees Slower Pace in next Two Years,” India, Reuters, January 19, 2026,

Despite all the efforts towards self-reliance in defence production in India, significant challenges still remain. India is not only successful in exporting more arms compared to its past but is currently ranked among the top 30 arms exporters in the world. Also, a larger share of defence equipment is being inducted into the armed forces. Nevertheless, the country continues to depend on foreign imports.

Policy Recommendations

India has already been gradually stepping up its defence expenditure; nevertheless, the productivity of such expenditure is subject to the effectiveness with which these resources are utilized. Greater priority needs to be given to enhancing research and development (R&D) activities and expediting indigenous defence initiatives. Presently, India allocates ₹6,30,000 crore on R&D activities, which is substantially less compared to other prominent technological nations like the United States, which spends around ₹78,00,000 crore on R&D activities alone.

More investment in defence R&D activities will strengthen India’s technological capabilities in areas like jet engines, avionics, and aerospace, in which India is compelled to depend on foreign technology at present. Evidence of the benefits of such investment can already be seen in programmes like BrahMos, which have generated defence exports to the Philippines and strengthened India’s presence in global defence markets. A strong indigenous defence sector will not merely add to the strategic strength of the government and its defence forces but also generate employment and technological and economic growth for the nation at large.

Conclusion

Currently, India is facing challenges in its defence ecosystem, such as the indigenous programme’s delay in completing HAL’s Tejas and the dependence on imported technology such as jet engines and avionics. Despite the increase in capital spending and investments in indigenous programmes such as the Tejas, AMCA, and collaborative programmes such as BrahMos, the dependence on technology makes it clear that the process of achieving defence Atmanirbharta is still ongoing.

References

Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI. March 9, 2026.

“India Doubles Down on Russian S-400s Despite Years of Delivery Delays.” UNITED24 Media, March 3, 2026.

Kumar, Manoj. “IMF Raises India FY26 Growth Forecast to 7.3%, Sees Slower Pace in next Two Years.” India. Reuters, January 19, 2026.

Madhvendra. “India’s Defence Exports Hit Record High — 4 Companies Emerge as the Biggest Winners.” The Financial Express, October 7, 2025.

“Military Size by Country 2026.” April 17, 2026.

Moneycontrol. “Indonesia Inks BrahMos Deal with India amid Defence Export Push, Second Buyer after Philippines- Moneycontrol.Com.” March 9, 2026.

Shukla, Vinay. “Russia Will Complete Deliveries Of S-400 Missile Systems To India In 2026.”

Www.Ndtv.Com, September 22, 2025.

The Economic Times. “Indonesia Says It Has Entered Agreement with India to Procure BrahMos Missiles.” March 10, 2026.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

The post The Pursuit of Atmanirbharta in Indian Defence: Trends, Challenges, and Policy Recommendations appeared first on 91̽��.

Photo Credits:

India’s capex has surged from ₹4.39 lakh crore to ₹12.2 lakh crore in less than half a decade, with the government betting that building public infrastructure like roads, railways and highways will lead to job creation and draw in private investment. It hasn’t worked. The jobs that are being created by the Indian economy are, for the most part, informal and low-quality. Private firms are not investing more, and social programs like MGNREGA are being cut to fund it. The government needs to shift towards spending on housing, rural roads and local services, sectors where every rupee creates far more jobs, or India will end up infrastructure-rich and employment-poor.

Background

India is building itself faster than it is employing. Since FY2020-21, the centre has redirected union expenditure towards capital investment, from Rs. 4.39 lakh crore capital expenditure in RE 2020-211 to about Rs. 11 lakh crore capital expenditure in RE 2025-262, Budget 2026-27 further extends this to about Rs. 12.2 lakh crore3 which is an increase of 11.5% over the revised estimates of 2025-264. The stated strategy of the centre is the “crowding in” effect: public investment (through government capital expenditure) in infrastructure will catalyse capital from the private sector and generate employment while simultaneously sustaining GDP growth. This article interrogates this thesis by examining whether the strategy’s sectoral composition is aligned with its stated employment objectives and what fiscal tradeoffs it has created.

The scale of expansion of capital expenditure is unparalleled in recent Indian fiscal history. Capital expenditure as a share of GDP has roughly doubled in the last decade or so, driven mostly by allocations to roads and highways by way of allocations to the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), railway modernisation, and defence capital procurement. The centre has supplemented its own capex with ₹1.5 lakh crore in 50-year interest-free loans5 to state governments for infrastructure spending in FY2025–26 alone.

Capital Intensity and the Job Creation (Gap)

Yet these headline numbers obscure the capital intensity of the investments being made by the centre. Highways, railway corridor upgrades, and metro transit systems are increasingly built through large engineering contracts that rely on inexpensive, efficient heavy machinery rather than expensive, inefficient manual labour. This means that jobs created per rupee spent are fewer than they were in earlier generations of infrastructure building, which is a problem further compounded by weak linkages to small domestic businesses and suppliers. The government has assumed that building more infrastructure automatically means employing more people. The data suggests otherwise.
The most recently conducted national labour survey, the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2023–24, carried out by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), does capture some improvements: the share of people working or looking for work

1 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2021, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2020-21 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

2 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2026-27 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

3 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Union Budget FY 2026-27: Capital expenditure allocation [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

4 PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

5 Pti. (2025, February 1). Union Budget provides ₹1.5 lakh cr. outlay for interest-free loans to States for infrastructure development. The Hindu.

rose to 60.10%6 nationally, which is a real gain, but a closer look reveals a more problematic story. The unemployment rate remains stagnated at 3.20%7. Self-employment, much of it in the informal sector with no real job security or social protection, rose to a whopping 58.40% of all employment8, while only a mere 21.70% earned regular wages or salaries9. The construction sector, supposedly the main channel through which infrastructure spending creates jobs for our economy, is overwhelmingly informal10 and migrants11 dominated. More people may be counted as “employed”, but the quality of work available to most Indians has not improved in step with the scale of public spending on capital infrastructure, public spending that could have been put to use in improving, say, healthcare or education.

The Failure of Crowding-In Private Investment

The crowding-in strategy, the idea that government investment will draw in private investment from companies, has also largely failed to materialise. According to data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), new project announcements fell 22% year on year in the December 2024 quarter12. A Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP)

6 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

7 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

8 The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

9 The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

10 Wells, J. (2007). Informality in the construction sector in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 25(1), 87–93.

11 Srikanth, G., & Jabbar, M. (2025). Impact of migrant workers on construction projects, labor markets, and industry development [Research Article]. International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT), 13(7), c619–c620.

12 Bureau reporter. (2025, January 2). New projects unveiled down 22 per cent in Q3: CMIE. Financial Express.

analysis found that the investments that drive industrial growth by private nonfinancial corporations dropped sharply by 17% between 2011-12 and 2023-241314.

Additionally, the analysis found that investments are failing to translate into actual capital formation, roughly 40% of planned investments were translating into tangible assets over the four decades leading up to 201115. Since then, that conversion rate has fallen sharply to about 15%, and since 2016–17 it has stagnated at roughly 10%16. RBI data further shows that, despite an increase in total investment announcements, project completion rates have steadily declined to just 9% in 2022-2317.

Capex at the Cost of What?

Rather than investing in new factories or machinery, large firms have been buying back shares and paying higher dividends18, a sign of confidence in their own balance sheets, not in the broader investment climate of our country. This matters because fiscal space is always constrained, with Budget 2026-27 targeting a fiscal deficit of 4.3% of GDP19, meaning that every rupee spent on constructing a road is a rupee not spent elsewhere.
These trade offs are not far off and abstract, they are tangible. MGNREGA which is the rural job guarantee scheme that has for nearly two decades provided income security for India’s poorest households has had its central allocation cut from 86,000 crore to 30,000 crore20 in the current budget, even as its replacement scheme VB-G RAM G, whose central allocation

13 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

14 Disaggregated, year-wise data on private non-financial corporate investment is not consistently available in the public domain. The estimate cited here (17%) is drawn from a recent analysis by the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP, 2025), one of the few credible consolidated sources currently available.

15 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

16 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

17 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

18 Patil, A. K. P. (2022, March 28). India’s rising buyback tide doesn’t raise all boats equally. The Ken.

19 PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

20 Bureau reporter. (2026, February 1). VB-G RAM G gets Rs 95,000-plus crore allocation under Union Budget 2026-27, MGNREGA funds reduced. The Print.

according to experts falls far short21 of what’s needed to fulfil its promise of 125 days of guaranteed work per eligible household.

Rebalancing Capex

The deeper problem is one of composition and not merely scale, the government is spending on the right thing – infrastructure, but in the wrong mix. Highways and rail corridors produce economic gains in the long run but generate fewer jobs per rupee than affordable housing, rural roads or municipal urban services. If the government’s goal through capex remains increasing employment, it must rebalance the capex towards these labour-intensive sectors without necessarily having to spend more in total. The rebalancing has not happened with Budget 2026-27, and until it does, India risks possibly building itself a future which is infrastructure-rich and employment-poor.

References:

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2021, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2020-21 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2026-27 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Union Budget FY 2026-27: Capital expenditure allocation [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

Pti. (2025, February 1). Union Budget provides ₹1.5 lakh cr. outlay for interest-free loans to States for infrastructure development. The Hindu.

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

21 India Development Review. (2026, February). Budget 2026-27 fails to address the reality of employment insecurity. IDR Online.

The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

Bureau reporter. (2025, January 2). New projects unveiled down 22 per cent in Q3: CMIE. Financial Express.

Bureau reporter. (2026, February 1). VB-G RAM G gets Rs 95,000-plus crore allocation under Union Budget 2026-27, MGNREGA funds reduced. The Print.

India Development Review. (2026, February). Budget 2026-27 fails to address the reality of employment insecurity. IDR Online.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

The post Assessing India’s Capex-Led Growth Strategy appeared first on 91̽��.

Abstract

The 2024 Lok Sabha Elections held special significance for not just the ruling coalition NDA, but also for the opposition gathered under the INDIA alliance. BJP, unable to secure the bare minimum to form the government on its own was a shocker for everyone. Uttar Pradesh emerged as the primary reason for the downfall of BJP in the 2024 general elections. The stark decline in BJP’s seats in UP from 62 in 2019 to 33 in 2024 general elections can be attributed to Samajwadi Party’s role in the INDIA. This article takes a deep-dive into the political dynamics of UP that made a dent in the ruling coalition. We find that complacency and mismanagement at the ground level led to its failure in UP. Given BJP’s recent feats in various state elections post Lok Sabha debacle, the question is now that will BJP play the same game of welfare politics in UP in 2027 or will focus on disciplining their cadres and candidates.

Keywords: parliamentary elections 2024; Indian elections; UP debacle; INDIA; welfare politics; labharthi.

Introduction

The 2024 Lok Sabha Elections held special significance for not just the ruling coalition NDA, but also for the opposition gathered under the INDIA alliance. The election results would have made waves regardless of whether the NDA, with BJP as its flag bearer, achieving a third consecutive victory or if the INDIA alliance made a significant dent in the national political landscape, enough to form a new government.

The results came as a surprise for the INDIA alliance, which secured an impressive tally of 234 seats in the 2024 general elections. For the NDA, particularly the BJP, it was a shock as the alliance managed to win only 293 seats, with BJP’s tally being reduced from 303 seats in 2019 general elections to just 240 seats this time. These numbers fell far short of BJP’s election campaign slogan of ‘Abki baar 400 paar and also for achieving legislative majority to form the government. Consequently, BJP had to join hands with Telegu Desam of Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar’s JD (U) to form the government. After receiving a significant setback, the BJP, in close collaboration with RSS returned to its strategic drawing board room to make crucial adjustments.

These changes were planned not only to reinforce its Hindutva ideology but also to align with the idea of “Labharti Vikas” (development for the benefit of the people). In the backdrop of increasing pressure, the BJP implemented a series of rapid policy shifts and critical political measures, particularly in states where assembly elections were impending. The revamped political modifications paid off, leading to BJP securing resounding victories in the state assembly elections of Haryana, Chattissgarh, Maharashtra, and more recently, Delhi. These subsequent victories seemingly signal that the party seems to be gradually recovering from its 2024 Lok Sabha Polls setback. However, it is essential to take a step back and carefully analyse the outcome of the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, as it emerged as a pivotal moment in the shifting political dynamics of India.

Weakest Link – UP

Uttar Pradesh emerged as the primary reason for the downfall of BJP in the 2024 general elections, as Uttar Pradesh is the largest state having 80 Lok Sabha seats which is the highest in any state and sends the most number of MPs to Lok Sabha. Since after independence itself, Uttar Pradesh has long remained at the centre of political landscape of India, having playing a major role in the formation of central governments and with a historical record of having sent 9 out of 14 Prime Ministers in India so far, which signifies the importance which the state holds. UP shares borders with the neighbouring states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Haryana where BJP performed exceedingly well in the 2024 general elections, unlike in Uttar Pradesh.

The stark decline in BJP’s seats in UP from 62 in 2019 to just 33 in 2024 general elections can be attributed to several factors. Primary one being the strategic coalition of INDIA alliance under which Samajwadi Party and Congress were the major alliance partners in UP, contesting on 62 and 17 seats respectively, with Trinamool Congress contesting on one seat as well. In contrast to its 18.11% vote share in 2019’s Uttar Pradesh’s Lok Sabha Polls, Samajwadi Party increased its vote share to 33.59%, while Congress increased its vote share from 6.3% in 2019 to over 9% in 2024.

A key factor in Samajwadi Party’s success proved to be the ‘Pichda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak’ (PDA) strategy, under which SP chief Akhilesh Yadav distributed tickets to Yadav OBCs only on 5 seats, whereas distributed 27 tickets to candidates belonging to non yadav OBCs. SP also fielded 4 Muslim candidates, 11 general candidates, and 15 Dalit candidates. The PDA strategy helped SP gain 25 seats in reserved OBC constituencies and six seats in constituencies having large Muslim population. Samajwadi Party made significant inroads in eastern UP, gaining 18 seats in the region, which is represented by Prime Minister Modi (Varanasi) and and Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath (Gorakhpur).

The eastern region of UP boasts a large population of non-Yadav OBCs and Dalits. In addition to the PDA strategy, Rahul Gandhi’s promise of giving Rs 1 Lakh annually to poor women under the ‘Nari Nyay’ scheme appeared to resonate more with women voters on the ground and can be reflected from the figure where in 12 out of 17 seats in UP, where female voter turnout exceeded male voter turnout, INDIA Bloc secured a victory. Congress emerged victorious in Rae Barelily and Amethi, while SP triumphed in Ambedkarnagar, Pratapgarh, Sultanpur, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Salempur, Lalganj and Machhlishahr. The contrast in the BJP and INDIA Bloc’s campaigning style was very evident, where contrary to only holding grand rallies like BJP, SP and Congress laid more emphasis towards direct outreach to local communities and addressing their issues, which was also evident in Priyanka Gandhi’s campaigning in Amethi and Rae Bareli where instead of holding large rallies, she chose to conduct around 20 “nukkad sabhas” daily, which bolstered her connect with the regional issues of the people.

The deeper trends of 2024 Lok Sabha elections can be further understood by examining certain key constituencies in UP and laying emphasis on the heterogeneous factors behind their outcomes. 

Ayodhya

Ayodhya remained the biggest puzzle within the political playground for the people. While the outside narrative was charged up with the establishment of Ram Temple, an airport and the Ram Path, yet the then second time sitting BJP MP Lallu Singh from Faizabad lost to the 9 time MLA Awadhesh Prasad of SP from Milkipur constituency with a margin of 54,567 votes. The loss was majorly credited to the hardships the locals faced due to the reported shortcomings in governance such as the lack of proper compensation received by traders, with many traders claiming to have just received a small amount of ₹1-2 lakhs and despite their protests, their issues weren’t addressed effectively by their representative. Local contractors claim that several big contracts in Ayodhya are being monopolized by the Gujarati contractors which sidelines the indigenous population. Majority of the shops and houses in proximity to Ayodhya Dham are being operated by the renters under a system of feudal tenancy. As per a homestay owner, when the land rates were low, the local residents were prevented from buying the shops or houses, having being told they belonged to the God. 

Additionally, the development came at a cost to the regional inhabitants as many of them are still being displaced without being provided with the promised compensation. Ostensibly, there has been an increasing number of people who are shifting towards private firms to receive reasonable compensation but they comprise of firms like Times City , in which ruling party’s politicians’ stakes were allegedly involved. It is rumored amongst the regional people there that, the firm used to purchase lands at prices below the circuit level with the local leadership being aware about the same, which was then sold to the Adani Group. Students often have to take large detours in order to reach their colleges which was a matter of considerable discontentment amongst the youngsters.

Moreover, Awadesh Prasad was not a new face for the people, having a significant hold on the ground level amongst the people. Contrary to the rising incumbency and dissatisfaction against Lallu Singh, who was not the most desired amongst the people and was even loosing the grip amongst the ideological supporters of Ram Mandir. Mahant Raju Das of Hanumangarhi temple remarked that they didn’t have anything against the BJP government; however, they had issues with the candidate’s behaviour and his alienation from the ground realities. Such behaviour was reflected from his statements where he said that he will win even if business community didn’t voted for him. Moreover, his video went viral where he talks about amending the Constitution. This created a fear psychosis regarding reservation amongst the marginalized sections of the society who had reached to a saturation with the Hindutva Politics. Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)-Lokniti post-poll survey published in The Hindu also supported the same.

At the same time, the Pichda Dalit Alpsankhyak (PDA) campaign by the SP chief perfectly aligned within the broader context and found more resonance amongst all sections of society, primarily the marginalised sections. Subsequently, the local leadership of the BJP was aware of the undercurrents going on against Lallu Singh, yet was not alarmed. Even within the ideological fraction of BJP, there were some cracks on surface of rival fractions of Lallu Singh. Senior leaders like Vinay Katiyar, who also happened to be a pioneer of the Ram Mandir Andolan and had formed VHP youth wing and Bajrang Dal. Worldwide media coverage and developments within Ayodhya weren’t able to whitewash the discontentment against Lallu Singh, which was seen in the 2024 Lok Sabha results.

Varanasi

However, the 2024 Lok Sabha elections came as a huge shock for BJP and Modi, not only from the perspective of overall mandate of the general assembly elections, but rather also from the perspective of a significant drop in the votes casted to Modi versus the remarkable increase in the votes casted to the INDIA alliance candidate Ajay Rai. Modi secured 612,970 (54.24%) votes whereas Ajay Rai secured 460,457 (40.74%) votes. There is a notable dip of 9.4% in Modi’s 2024 vote share of 54.24% from the 2019 vote share of 63.6%. However, the real stark difference came in terms of the steep fall in victory margins, having fallen to just 13.5% in 2024, from the victory margin of 36.1% and 45.2% in 2014 and 2019. 

Apart from taking active participation in important events such as PM Modi’s roadshow or rally, the cadre of BJP’s allied organisations such as RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal was not very active on the ground and was largely absent from other important regional political campaigns including the key campaigns like door to door campaigning. Even the ‘Mool BJP Karyakarta’ in Varanasi was highly demoralised with the top leadership and was not in complete sync with the central campaign due to several key issues such as the work of grass-root BJP workers not being done by the Yogi administration, lateral entries into BJP taking important positions in organisation, growing interference of the Gujrat lobby of BJP in important decisions pertaining to campaigning and Karyakartas. Slogans such as ‘Ab ki baar 400 paar’ created a perception amongst many BJP voters in Varanasi that Modi will easily secure a landslide victory even this time and hence, didn’t turn up to vote for Modi like they did in the previous two elections. 

BJP failed to make an impressive stride in favour of PM Modi’s image in Varanasi, despite incurring almost twice on election campaign expenditure than Ajay Rai. The expenditure incurred in the 2019 elections by Narendra Modi was Rs 49,26,878 which was less than that of Ajay Rai who spent around 50,08,500 that came off on a losing cause. Although the money spent on 2024 elections by Ajay Rai was Rs 26,36,988 almost half this time, while Modi’s expenditure on 2024 elections was Rs 70,69,457. It showcases a significant decline in expenditure with a much narrow gap in election result than before. 

Ajay Rai and it’s INDIA alliance members from Samajwadi Party left no stone unturned to expose the Modi and Yogi government, when it came to criticising Modi for favouring his Gujrat lobby friends and the poor plight of Pushkar Pond in Varanasi. He alleged, ‘Modi ke Gujrati dost karodon rupya dakaar gaye Pushkar talab ki safai ke naam pe.” Ajay Rai and the INDIA alliance also played the battle on the grounds of identity where Modi was successfully projected as being an ‘Outsider’ to Kashi and Ajay Rai being an ‘Insider’ to Kashi. Congress further doubled down on this narrative by coming up with popular slogans like ‘Kashi ki Rai’ which was also aligning with the secularised concept idea of India which projected Hindutva propagated by Modi and BJP as problematic. There is a significant increase in the 2024 votes polled for Ajay Rai across all the 5 urban and rural sub constituencies of Varanasi. However, there is a remarkable rise in the 2024 votes polled for Ajay Rai in the rural constituencies of Varanasi namely Rohaniya and Sevapuri, which symbolises the smooth transfer of Yadav votes of Samajwadi Party to Congress, and new votes polled from other communities such as Muslims, Dalits, Bhumihars and Patels. the popular Congress campaign of ‘Haath badlega halaat’ was spread effectively on ground by the INDI alliance workers and the candidate Ajay Rai. Through the social media narratives, Congress was fairly successful in picking the shortcomings of Yogi and Modi government, and popularise the narrative of Modi as an ‘Outsider’ from Gujarat and disruptor of the ‘Pauranic Nagri’ due to his imposed development projects in the city which were disconnected with the essence and spirit of Varanasi. 

Amethi

The result of 2024 Amethi elections might’ve come across as a surprise for the national media; however, as per the residents of Amethi and the regional media coverage, Smriti Irani was relatively struggling during her campaigns, with her own regional BJP cadre not sharing the same fervour as her on the ground. Some issues such as the regional unit of the party not being in complete sync with the way of functioning of her created the rift.

In various interviews and surveys done there, upon being asked, the residents revealed many grievances including the failure of providing necessities such as sugar, gas cylinders, and ration at a regulated price, dealing with the rampant issue of the stray cattle, etc. Several farmers have reported to have stopped growing oilseeds and pulses altogether. However, one of the big setback which came before Smriti Irani was the order of the Allahabad High Court directing the state administration to reopen Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, which was closed on the grounds of medical negligence. The hospital had played a pivotal role in delivering medical services to the poor patients who couldn’t afford being transported to seek treatment in Lucknow or in nearby AIIMS in Rae Bareli. 

It was a wise tactic of Congress to replace Rahul Gandhi with Kishori Lal Sharma, a close aide and confidant of the Gandhi family who had worked with Rajiv Gandhi and had a firm understanding of the political landscape in Amethi. With Rahul Gandhi no longer being in the centre stage, Smriti Irani seemed to have lost the central narrative of launching aggressive attacks on Rahul Gandhi. Kishori Lal Sharma wasted no time in covering as much ground as he could have by kick starting his campaign way before than the Smriti Irani camp, which later on paid him a rich dividend in form of securing a significant victory with a difference of 1,67,196 votes over Smriti Irani.

Kishori Lal Sharma, with the help and support of Gandhi family, galvanised the local Congress cadre into swift action and active participation in the outreach and campaign for him. Priyanka Gandhi’s extended two week campaign in the circuit of Amethi and Rae Bareli really helped Kishori Lal Sharma to gain rigorous support of the party’s regional cadre, without any infighting in their own camp. Kishori Lal Sharma performed exceedingly well in the Vidhan Sabha constituencies such as Salon, Jagdishpur and Tiloi where Smriti Irani lost by over 52,318 votes, 18118 votes, and 15519 votes respectively. Apart from the Dalit and OBC voters, even the upper caste voters belonging from Kshatriya and Brahmin community didn’t turn up to vote in big numbers in the favour of Smriti Irani. Several Pradhans, speaking on the condition of anonymity, shared that due to fear of politically motivated actions against them by the administration, they are publicly lending support to Smriti Irani, but in reality, they are backing Kishori Lal Sharma. 

Furthermore, the lack of strong support from Sanjay Singh, who belongs to the royal family of Amethi resulted in further losses for Smriti Irani. As per a regional BJP executive, the cold ties between Sanjay SIngh and Smriti Irani is not something recent, but rather it dates back to the times of 2022 UP State Assembly elections. One of the reasons behind Sanjay Singh’s loss was also credited to the lack of coordination from the end of MP’s camp. From the outcome of the popular Lok Sabha contest in Amethi, the overarching sentiment of dissent amongst the voters of Amethi can be summed up in the words of a local kirana store owner, ‘Humne pichli baar Rahul Gandhi ko harane ke liye Smriti Madam ji ko vote kiya thaa par iss baar hum unhe harane ke liye Kishori Lal Ji ko vote denge’.

Allahabad

One of the key constituencies where Congress ended its 40 year long dry run is Allahabad.. Over the past two decades, the contest on this seat used to be really close with an average winning margin of 73,799 votes. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, under the INDIA Alliance seat sharing formula, Congress fielded former Allahabad MP Revati Raman Singh’s son, Ujjwal Raman Singh, who switched to Congress from SP before the elections. Ujjwal Raman Singh landed a defeat to BJP’s candidate Neeraj Tripathi by over 58,000 votes in a close face off. However, this feat wouldn’t have been truly achieved without a successful and planned coordination between Congress and Samajwadi Party where Congress largely benefited from the presence of an existing strong cadre of Samajwadi Party in Allahabad.

Many supporters of the 2019-2024 BJP MP Rita Bahuguna Joshi were not very keen to actively participate in the meetings and rallies held by Neeraj Tripathi. They also didn’t launch an open protest against the BJP top leadership’s choice of a new candidate but rather, they chose to remain in the backseat, deciding not to fully lend support to the new candidate choice. Ujjwal Raman Singh was also successful in striking a cord amongst the voters by bringing forth various pertinent issues such as the failure of the ruling government to revive the industrial area of Naini, absence of an AIIMS hospital in the city, despite having a large population of lower and middle class people living there.

Allahabad, since long has remained a coaching hub where students across different neighbouring cities come to prepare for distinct government exams, and Ujjwal Raman Singh was successful in utilising the voice of young voters against the state BJP government on the burning issues of the frequent government exam paper leaks in the state. 

Kannauj

Kannauj emerged as a battle of prestige for Akhilesh Yadav as the constituency has been a strong bastion of Samajwadi Party since 1998, barring the much talked about 2019 Lok Sabha election outcome where the SP chief Akhilesh Yadav’s wife Dimple Yadav was defeated by the BJP candidate Subrat Pathak in a very close fight by just 12,353 votes. 

Subrat Pathak has been active in the regional politics of Kannauj district since around two decades and gave a strong fight against Dimple Yadav in 2014 Kannauj Lok Sabha election too, gathering 4,69,257 votes as opposed to 4,89,164 votes received by Dimple Yadav, leading her to win by a narrow margin of 19,907 votes. However, for the 2024 Lok Sabha election, Akhilesh Yadav took charge in his own hands and was successful in defeating Subrat Pathak by a significant margin by 1,70,922 votes.

The victory of SP in Kannauj can be attributed to several reasons including the popularity and connect of Akhilesh Yadav with the demands of young voters, resentment against the central government amongst a large chunk of perfume traders due to the high GST tax imposed on ingredients of attar (perfume). This became a relevant issue in the circle of perfume traders who hold a decent grip on the political dynamics of Kannauj since the district is famously known for its Attar industry. Additionally, BJP candidate Subrat Pathak found himself embroiled in many controversies frequently, whether it be having a scuffle with the police administration or with his own regional party cadre.

Several fractions of local BJP workers were not very impressed with their MP’s temper and reportedly distanced themselves from Subrat Pathak’s campaign. In a subsequent turn of events, an infamous call recording between former UP government minister and current BJP politician from Kannauj, Sushil Pal and Subrat Pathak was leaked, where the latter was recorded to be indirectly issuing a warning to Sushil Pal against the consequences of fighting for the BJP ticket from Kannauj. Instances like the above revealed the discord within BJP’s own cadre in the region. 

With Akhilesh Yadav himself coming to contest from Kannauj, voters decided to pin their aspirations to a more influential candidate like him, which was echoed in the comment of a cable operator, ‘Akhilesh se umeed hai ki Kannauj me bhi Saifai jaisi vyavasthayein laa denge’. 

INDIA Alliance’s Gains in Uttar Pradesh: Capitalizing on Shifting Social Dynamics

INDIA Block Alliance emerged successful in winning many key constituencies with significant populations of Kurmi and Rajbhar communities, including Ghazipur, Chandauli, Ballia, Azamgarh, Salempur, Robertsganj and Lalganj. The alliance of BJP with Apna Dal (Soneylal) and Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party didn’t prove to be very fruitful for BJP as they lost in the above key mentioned constituencies too, where Rajbhar and Kurmi votes are dominant in number.

After the Lok Sabha Polls debacle in UP, UP Cabinet Minister and President of NDA alliance partner Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party, Om Prakash Rajbhar was quoted commenting on the shift in voting patterns. He said “Each caste group opted to vote for their own candidate, regardless of the alliance of party. The potential of many leaders of all parties in U.P. Including BJP, coming from a specific caste to transfer votes of their social group has dropped considerably as opposed to the 2014 or 2017 assembly polls. Since the Samajwadi Party (SP)-led INDIA alliance distributed several tickets to Kurmi, Maurya, Shakya, and Kushwaha, the votes of these social groups moved towards them in many key constituencies. The shift in voting was based more on caste alignment and was not towards the SP.” 

Apart from the above in depth examination of the 2024 Lok Sabha results in Uttar Pradesh, it’s also pertinent to look at the close contests where BJP faced a narrow face off against INDIA Bloc and was able to secure victory by a narrow gap of less than 50,000 votes. The table highlights the underlying anxieties of BJP, where,  had it lost in these constituencies, it would’ve been the biggest Lok Sabha Polls for the party in Uttar Pradesh. 

18 Constituencies where BJP won lower than the margin of 50,000 votes

Source: ECI

A large number of Union Ministers from UP in the Modi government 2.0 lost their respective constituencies in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. The table underscores the disconnect between the public and their respective representatives. 

Source: ECI

Conclusion

The BJP’s political slogan of ‘Ab ki baar 400 paar’ was met with serious allegations from INDIA Bloc, accusing the BJP of trying to amend the Constitution and dismantle the reservations established by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Much of these accusations stemmed from the careless statements of several BJP leaders regarding the desire to strike a majority of more than 400 seats to amend the constitution. The Samajwadi Party and Congress both benefited from their coalition under the INDIA Bloc banner, since many Dalit voters, who traditionally voted for Congress shifted in favour of Samajwadi Party. While Congress, despite having a weak grassroots presence, effectively leveraged the strong cadre of Samajwadi Party to mobilise votes for its own candidates.

The non-yadav OBC’s who had shifted away from SP to BJP over the past decade, made a comeback to the Samajwadi Party in the 2024 Lok Sabha Polls; however, it remains to be seen in the future polls whether their ideological allegiance remains with Samajwadi Party in future elections or not.

The declining performance of BSP in the recent Lok Sabha Polls benefited the Samajwadi Party upto a great deal as a large share of BSP’s non Jatavs core voters shifted to the INDIA Bloc, due to a lack of confidence in BSP’s ability to defend their constitutional rights against the ruling party. This diminishing trust in the BSP can be attributed to reasons such as Mayawati’s recent  political stances which were deemed as non aggressive towards BJP and also because of the majority of BSP MP’s drifting away to either BJP or Samajwadi Party.

The over reliance of BJP on the politically charged Ram Mandir narrative of Ram Mandir for both ideological and electoral gains eventually proved to be futile, since BJP failed to even secure victory in the Faizabad seat, let alone win all 79 seats as claimed by their leadership.

According to a detailed 15-page internal report, the primary reasons behind the 2024 Lok Sabha Polls debacle of BJP in Uttar Pradesh included remarks made by ruling party’s leaders about constitutional amendments, the pertinent issue of frequent paper leaks in competitive exams, discontentment among party workers against their state administration, and hasty ticket distribution. As per the regional BJP leadership, the alleged involvement of a senior journalist in the ticket distribution, without taking the state leadership into confidence was one of the major factors behind the poor ticket distribution. Ultimately, the results of the recent Lok Sabha Polls depict that issues related to youth and constitutional safeguards matter more to voters than the grand ideological narratives like Ram Mandir consecration. The political landscape of India is undergoing through a metamorphosis, with a once seemingly invincible ruling party now facing a formidable opposition well capable of challenging it electorally, even in its stronghold territory like Uttar Pradesh.

With the 2027 Uttar Pradesh State Assembly elections approaching, it will be an uphill fight for the BJP to hold its ground against the politically praised and successful Pichda, Dalit, Alpasankhyak and Adivasi (PDA) strategy of Samajwadi Party, as well as the potential continuation of the alliance of the Congress-Samajwadi Party alliance in the state. Another notable pattern is the announcement of a plethora of free welfare schemes by the BJP in all the recent state assembly elections, which might also make its way to the forthcoming state assembly polls in Uttar Pradesh. The BJP aims to address the challenging governance issues that have emerged during the second term of Yogi Adityanath’s leadership while also preparing a major overhaul of the state’s organisational structure which includes increased representation from the OBC and Dalit communities and possibly nominating a Dalit leader as State President in an attempt to reclaim the support of OBC and Dalit voters who made a shift to the INDIA alliance in the recent general elections.

References

1. Dhingra, S. (2024, June 9). “Threat” to Constitution, Dalit-Muslim-OBC alliance — how SP won over Dalits in UP & challenges ahead. ThePrint; theprint. https://theprint.in/politics/threat-to-constitution-dalit-muslim-obc-alliance-how-sp-won-over-dalits-in-up-challenges-ahead/2122837/
2. ‌ Singh, N. (2024, June 4). Uttar Pradesh Lok Sabha election results: What worked in favour of INDIA? @Bsindia; Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/uttar-pradesh-lok-sabha-election-results-what-worked-in-favour-of-india-124060401242_1.html
3. ‌ UP Election Results Lok Sabha 2024 Highlights: Ujjwal Raman Singh ends Congress’ 40-year dry spell, wins … (2024, June 4). The Economic Times; Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/newsblogs/up-election-results-2024-live-updates-uttar-pradesh-lok-sabha-election-vote-counting-bjp-modi-sp-dimple-akhilesh-yadav-congress-rahul-gandhi-bsp-rld-chunav-latest-news-4th-june/liveblog/110683690.cms?from=mdr
4. ‌ Yamini Aiyarthe. (2024, June 8). Lok Sabha Elections 2024 | How the BJP lost UP. Deccan Herald. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/how-the-bjp-lost-up-3057842
5. ‌ Chingakham, D. (2024, June 5). Modi ministers in UP: A tale of hard losses and weakening victory margins. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha/story/uttar-pradesh-bjp-performance-modi-ministers-lost-samajwadi-party-up-election-result-2549396-2024-06-05
6. ‌ The UP Index. (2024, June 19). Understanding The “SOCIAL” Factors Behind BJP’s Performance In UP. Swarajya by Kovai Media Private Limited. https://swarajyamag.com/politics/understanding-the-social-factors-behind-bjps-performance-in-up
7. ‌ Sharda, S. (2024, June 4). Resurgent Congress scripts comeback tale in Uttar Pradesh; vote share too goes up. The Times of India; Times Of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/resurgent-congress-makes-a-strong-comeback-in-uttar-pradesh-with-significant-increase-in-vote-share/articleshow/110716588.cms
8. ‌ 2024 UP turnaround explained in India Today’s Election Intelligence graphics. (2024, June 5). India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha/story/samajwadi-party-congress-uttar-pradesh-lok-sabha-election-results-pda-ticket-distribution-rajput-anger-2549210-2024-06-05
9. ‌ Mutiny in Awadh: The Story of Uttar Pradesh and the 2024 Lok Sabha Elections. (2024). The Wire. https://thewire.in/politics/mutiny-in-awadh-the-story-of-uttar-pradesh-and-the-2024-lok-sabha-elections
10. ‌ Kumar, A. (2024, June 4). Uttar Pradesh Election Results 2024: U.P.’s western region proved to be the wind vane of the State. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha/ups-western-region-proved-to-be-the-wind-vane-of-the-state/article68252487.ece
11. ‌ Sen, R., & Khattri, R. (2019). The BJP Debacle in Uttar Pradesh – NUS Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS). Nus.edu.sg. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-bjp-debacle-in-uttar-pradesh/
12. ‌ Yadav, S., & Pandey, B. (2024, June 5). Disconnect on ground, ticket distribution, caste, jobs: How BJP lost the plot in UP. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-politics/local-disconnect-agniveer-ticket-choice-caste-equations-how-bjp-lost-the-up-plot-uttar-pradesh-9372166/
13. ‌ Yamini. (2024, May 28). The Constitution, a surprise entrant in poll battlefield. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-constitution-a-surprise-entrant-in-poll-battlefield/article68225687.ece

Shreyansh Singh and Animesh Choudhury Sanyal, post-graduate students of public policy, Jindal School of government and public policy, O.P. Jindal University

The post The 2024 Lok Sabha Elections: Unfolding Uttar Pradesh’s Role in Shifting Political Dynamics appeared first on 91̽��.

Introduction

India’s democracy is vast, heterogeneous and largely shaped by regional differences such as language, political cultures and histories. Political participation, experience, trust levels and general perceptions vary largely across regions, shaped by caste, economic structures and other factors such as media and the general cultural structures. We understand India’s system to be an example of democratic backsliding (how contemporary democracies often erode gradually rather than collapse abruptly). Researchers such as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and Bermeo (2016) argue that modern democracies decline through subtle mechanisms such as weakening institutional autonomy, constraining media freedom, delegitimizing opposition, and normalizing dominance. An important outcome of this process is that democratic erosion reshapes citizen behavior and not just of the states. Citizens can continue voting while simultaneously losing trust, gaining fear or eventually withdrawing oneself from public expressions. Another major theme concerns the caste and social hierarchies. Marginalized groups are often the ones that experience biases and vulnerabilities when it comes to democracy and retaliation (Jodhka 2018; Still 2023). These inequalities/hierarchies influence not only participation but also willingness to be open about political preferences.

This report presents a three-way comparative analysis of political attitudes and experiences across Hindi-speaking regions, the Rest of India, and a third significant category of respondents who chose not to disclose their geographic location. We do this analysis using the frequency-percentage tables derived from the Questionnaire interviews carried out across India. Importantly, the latter group contributes the largest share of the sample, with 261 respondents, compared to 139 from the Hindi Heartland and 100 from the Rest of India. Hence, rather than treating this third group as a limitation, the report treats non-disclosure itself as an important analytical aspect.

Through the frequency tables, we examine how the respondents from two linguistic categories, along with the non-respondents, perceive/understand their political environment. We try to understand the percentages from different aspects such as political behavior and turnout, media presence, welfare, voter-government relationship and so on. This comparative analysis is structured around key themes of political experience:

• Political participation and Voting Behavior
• Motivations for voting
• Welfare Access and Governance
• Trust in Democratic Institutions
• Political outcomes and satisfaction
• Media exposure and Perceptions
• Civic Freedom and Safety

We start by understanding the differences in the socio-political context between the Hindi heartland and the rest of India. The Hindi belt comprises much of the North and Central India, which is mostly characterized by strong political mobilization, electoral participation, caste hierarchies and exposure to government welfare schemes. On the other hand, the rest of India is more linguistically and politically heterogeneous, characterized by region-specific parties, unique welfare schemes, diverse and varying media exposure.

An important theme we are trying to understand and address here is the significance and the implications of non-response in political surveys such as this. Non-response is often treated as some sort of nuisance that needs to be imputed/ignored in surveys. But in political surveys conducted on perceptions of democracy, political polarization, declining trust and such, non-response becomes a very important phenomenon, which reveals a lot about the existing systems. They reflect deeper issues such as fear, caution, disengagement or even strategic silence. As researchers of democratic erosion argue, declining democracy is often visible not only in institutions but also in how citizens choose to speak or remain silent (Kuran 1995; Bermeo 2016).

Data and Methodology

The analysis is done on post-poll survey data collected across India following the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Field investigators conducted structured questionnaire interviews covering a wide range of political attitudes and experiences. After data cleaning, the final sample consists of 500 respondents. The composition of the respondents were as follows:

• Hindi heartland: N= 139
• Rest of India: N= 100
• No-response on location: N= 261

We calculate the frequency of each answer for each question, convert it into percentage for normalization and analyse the trends. The analysis is descriptive in nature, not inferential. Importantly, responses such as “cannot say” and “no response” are retained and analyzed rather than being dropped. This allows us to examine not only what the respondents say, but also where they hesitate or remain silent.

Political participation and Voting Behavior (Q1-Q4)

Reported Voting (Q1)

We see clear regional differences in reported electoral participation:

• Hindi Heartland: Approximately 84.35% report having voted.
• Rest of India: Around 52.57% report voting.
• No-response group: Only 49.40% report voting, with a substantial share no/do not want to answer categories

The high participation/reporting in the Hindi heartland reflects the characteristics that we had discussed previously. However, it could also be possible that the numbers are inflated due to social desirability (Karp & Brockington, 2005). Participation is lower among respondents from the rest of India and lowest among those who did not disclose their location.

Party disclosure

We also see a significant variation in reluctance to disclose party preference:

• Hindi Heartland: 36.70% select non-disclosure categories
• Rest of India: Non-disclosure stands at 26.01%
• No-response group: Non-disclosure rises to 43.41%

The non-response group’s high reluctance reinforces their strong preference for anonymity, showing deep political insecurity or distrust.

Motivations for voting

The survey asked for reasons for voting and we see that there isn’t a significant variation between Hindi Heartland and the rest of India. But, among the non-respondents, the responses vary a lot.

• Hindi Heartland:
  • Development-related motivations account for 13.67%.
  • Leadership and welfare motivations together account for roughly 15–18%.
• Rest of India:
  • Development motivates 14.46%.
  • Responses are more evenly distributed across categories.
• No-response group:
  • A striking 33.39% fall into ambiguous or non-committal categories.

This shows that while the Hindi Heartland reflects a more nationalized narrative of development and leadership, the non-response group avoids conveying clear political motivations.

Welfare Access and Governance

We asked a series of questions regarding the awareness of different welfare programs by the central government. The responses were as follows:

• Hindi Heartland: Awareness of welfare schemes reaches as high as 70.50%.
• Rest of India: Awareness is more moderate and evenly spread, generally between 52–60%.
• No-response group: Awareness drops sharply, with some schemes below 30%.

These differences align with the literature arguing that central government welfare schemes have been particularly effective in the Hindi belt, while non-Hindi states often rely on strong state-level welfare identities. Lower awareness among non-respondents may reflect marginalization, limited state contact, or political disengagement.

Trust in Democratic Institutions

When asked about free and fair elections,

• Hindi Heartland: 38.12% express conditional trust, saying there were still some discrepancies. Approximately 44% were sure that the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner.
• Rest of India: 42.26% expressed that they believed it was fair. The other responses were evenly distributed across categories “Not at all” and “Somewhat, there were still some discrepancies” and ~6% of the sample chose “Cannot say” and “No response”.
• No-response group: Only 17.79% express trust, with the majority choosing neutral or ambiguous categories. A striking 39% chose “cannot say” and ~25% chose not to respond altogether.

When asked about trust in EVMs (Electronic Voting Machines),

• Hindi Heartland: >50% express trust
• Rest of India: Trust is higher at ~70%.
• No-response group: Trust falls to ~20%, with over half choosing neutral options or no response

The consistent pattern is that institutional trust is lowest among non-respondents, moderate in the Hindi Heartland, and highest in the Rest of India. A large share of non-respondents chooses neutral options, saying they cannot judge, or choosing not to answer altogether. This suggests that institutional distrust may coexist with uncertainty and fear of expressing criticism.

Political outcomes and satisfaction

When asked if the respondents were satisfied with the election outcomes:

• Hindi Heartland: 33.52% satisfied, but ~44% were only somewhat satisfied
• Rest of India: 34% satisfied and ~60% were not satisfied or partially satisfied
• No-response group: Only ~12% were satisfied and >50% chose not to respond

When asked if they were happy that there is a proper opposition in the parliament after a long while,

• Hindi Heartland: ~23% gave a positive response and over 50% chose not to respond.
• Rest of India: ~20% gave a positive response and again, over 50% chose not to respond.
• No-response group: ~4% gave a positive response, ~6% negative responses and >80% chose not to respond.

Once again, the non-response group avoids giving out strong opinions, reinforcing the pattern of political ambivalence.

Media exposure and Perceptions

When asked if political parties connecting over whatsapp or over call would make a difference in reaching out to the voter base,

• Hindi Heartland: ~52% report WhatsApp/calls as influential, ~30% said they were not and the remaining chose not to respond
• Rest of India: ~60% said yes and ~20% said no and ~20 didn’t have an idea
• No-response group: ~20% said yes, ~7% said not, ~12% did not have an idea and around 60% chose not to respond.

When asked whether media was free and fair in its reporting,

• Hindi Heartland: ~18% perceive the media as fair, ~36% don’t and the rest are either not sure or chose not to respond.
• Rest of India: 10% perceive the media as fair, 50% don’t and the rest are not sure chose not to respond.
• No-response group: Only 3% perceive media as fair, 9% don’t and the rest significantly large population chose not to respond.

Perceptions of media fairness are low across all groups, but non-response dominates among the No-response (location-wise) group. The non-response group is not only less exposed to campaign messaging but also significantly more distrustful of media.

Civic Freedom and Safety

When asked about whether they feel that their civil liberties and rights are safe and that whether they are able to voice their opinions without any fear,

• Hindi Heartland: ~70% feel fully or at least partially safe, while 20% don’t feel safe at all.
• Rest of India: 57-60% feel fully or partially safe, while 34-38% don’t feel safe at all.
• No-response group: Only 13-15% feel safe, ~15% don’t feel safe and ~70% chose not to respond.

A majority of respondents from the Hindi-speaking heartland and the rest of India report feeling fully or partially safe expressing political opinions. Among respondents who did not disclose their location, only a small minority reported feeling safe. Most either say they do not feel safe or decline to answer the question. This stark difference suggests that non-disclosure is closely linked to fear and perceived risk in political expression.

Overview of Non-Response Patterns in the data

Questions with High Non-Response (≥30–70%)

These questions correspond to sensitive political content such as judgments about the government, perceived fairness of elections, and self-assessments of political safety.

Questions with Low Non-Response (≤5–10%)

These include factual, descriptive, or low-risk questions:

• Q1: Did you vote?
• Q7 series: Awareness of schemes
• Q9: Whether the election was peaceful in the area
• Q12: Whether campaigning reached them

These are socially safe questions with lesser political risk.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis done in this report gives us a very important insight. It is that democratic backsliding in India must be understood not only through institutional changes but also through how citizens experience, negotiate, and respond to the political environment in their everyday lives. The consistently high levels of non-response on politically sensitive questions, particularly those relating to party preference, institutional trust, media fairness, and civic safety suggest that silence itself has become a meaningful political response. For a lot of respondents, especially those unwilling to disclose their location, non-response appears to be a strategy of self-protection in situations of political polarization, declining trust, and perceived risks associated with open expression. This finding reinforces the literature on democratic erosion, which emphasizes that fear, self-censorship, and withdrawal are some of the important outcomes of weakening democratic systems.

Moreover, the fact that the non-response group constitutes the largest segment of the sample becomes an important issue to be addressed. Rather than treating non-response as a methodological inconvenience, this study shows that it can give us valuable insights into the health of a democracy. Overall, the findings suggest that while electoral processes and political participation continue in India, the quality of engagement is very much uneven. Trust in institutions, confidence in media, and the freedom to express dissent are fragile, particularly among those who feel most vulnerable. Recognising these gaps and addressing them are crucial for the country to improve its political systems and thereby the welfare of its people.

References

Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19.

Caste in contemporary India. (n.d.). Routledge & CRC Press.

Karp, J. A., & Brockington, D. (2005). Social desirability and response validity: A comparative analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. The Journal of Politics, 67(3), 825–840.

Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification.   Harvard University Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2024). How democracies die. In Ideals and Ideologies (pp. 73-80). Routledge.

Still, C. (2023). Dalit Women: Honour and Patriarchy in South India. Routledge.

Anjana K. S. is a master’s student in Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore. Her research interests lie at the intersection of environmental and development economics and political economy, with a particular focus on low- and middle-income countries. 

The post A comparative analysis of political attitudes, beliefs and experiences between Hindi-speaking regions, rest of India and location non-respondents appeared first on 91̽��.

Source: Da-kuk on Getty Images

Abstract

Since his return to the White House in January 2025 to serve a second term as President, US President Donald Trump has announced and implemented a series of tariffs targeting the country’s top trade partners- China, Canada and Mexico, along with threats to impose reciprocal tariffs on every country that the US trades with. Arguing that the United States’ large bilateral trade deficits with its trade partners ‘unfair’ and insisting that they are ‘ripping off’ the US, Trump thus far has imposed a 25% tariff on all goods from Mexico and Canada (with a 10% tariff on Canadian oil and energy products), a 20% tariff on goods from China and a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminium imports. This article attempts to provide the context behind these decisions along with their implication for global trade.

Trade, Tariffs and Comparative Advantage

Ideas and practices concerning trade of goods and services has changed through the centuries. Tariffs, or taxes on imports of foreign goods, have been used since ancient times as measures

of boosting state revenue and controlling patterns of trade flows. Today, the most influential theory concerning international trade is the theory of comparative advantage. First introduced by David Ricardo in 1817, comparative advantage in its most basic form says that when two countries trade with each other, both countries can be made better off in terms of total goods available by choosing to specialize in the production of the commodities they are relatively better at making while trading to obtain what they are relatively worse at making. To illustrate, suppose there are two countries- A and B. A produces 120 units of bread and 100 units of butter in 12 hours , while B produces 90 units of butter and 80 units of bread in 12 hours . Clearly, A is better than B at producing both bread and butter. Despite this, both countries could benefit from trade by specializing in what they are relatively better at producing (bread for A and butter for B) and trading to get the other good. This is because for A the opportunity cost of producing butter (1.2 bread) is higher than B’s (0.88 bread) and the reverse of this is true for both of their opportunity costs of producing bread. This insight played a crucial role in dismantling a previously held mercantilist belief – the idea that trade is a zero-sum game, ie someone’s gain implies someone else’s loss. It is still viewed as one of the strongest arguments in favour of free trade and low tariffs. With that said, it should be noted that the theory doesn’t claim that free trade would be beneficial for everyone. People within nations whose livelihoods depend on producing goods that may be more efficiently produced elsewhere would be adversely affected by freer trade. This would have important distributional consequences that may not be seen as desirable on the whole.

Trade Post-World War 2

Following the damage inflicted on countries around the world as a result of WW2, 44 nations agreed to participate in the formation of a new global economic order that would aim to design institutions and mechanisms to assist post-war recovery and strengthen economic ties between nations. The system, in reference to Bretton Woods, New Hampshire where the meetings

between the nations were held, came to be known as Bretton Woods. While Bretton Woods itself was mostly concerned with financial and monetary matters, it was accompanied and supported by a broader emphasis on the role of multilateral institutions for maintaining world peace. For international trade, the most significant of these institutions was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The several trade agreements that would be passed in the years to come under this framework, in line with Ricardo’s idea of comparative advantage, aimed to liberalize trade flows between nations by reducing tariffs and restricting quotas. Global trade did in in fact increase significantly post World War 2. Real exports in 1997 were roughly14 times what they were in 1950. The World Trade Organization (WTO) formed in 1995 during a time of market optimism among Western countries – neoliberalism or the Washington consensus as its sometimes called – introduced a harsher enforcement mechanism for free trade principles. By this time, China was starting to emerge as a dominant trade power through its careful combination of state interventions through currency devaluation, heavy subsidies and capital controls with market-oriented incentives and openness to foreign investment. China’s transformation to a manufacturing powerhouse was thus aided by the liberal global trade order which promoted the free flow of goods, services and capital across borders. In the process, it became a major exporter of goods to the United States and the preferred location for many American companies’ manufacturing centres due to lower labour and compliance costs. This practice of offshoring production to foreign countries and importing their cheaper products undermined domestic industries in the US and set the stage for the election of Trump in 2016.

Trump’s First Term, Trade War with China

Donald Trump’s ascent to power in 2016 as a result of the US elections marked a shift in the direction of US trade policy – from an optimistic view of the ability of free trade to benefit all parties involved, to a view that promoted the use of tariffs as tools of negotiation to further

unilateral interests. His election may be interpreted as a manifestation of a broader display of scepticism shown by Western countries regarding the extent of globalization that had taken place in the preceding decades. In the United States’ case, issues such as stagnation of wages, offshoring of manufacturing jobs and income inequality came to be perceived as resulting from the high level of US imports from its trade partners, strengthening the appeal of Trump’s pitch to renegotiate trade agreements and put American interests first. Accordingly, he imposed a 30- 50% tariff on washing machines and solar panels and set off a trade war with China by targeting roughly $350 billion worth of imports, claiming they were guilty of unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. China responded with tariffs of their own, targeting $100 billion worth of goods from the US. The chart below shows how trade relationships for both countries have changed since the trade war.

Source: Bloomberg (Bloomberg Economics, .)

Both countries have reduced their dependence on each other with China’s share of total US trade (measured as the sum of goods exports and imports) from 2018 to 2024 dropping from

15.7% to 10.9%, and the US’s share in China’s trade falling from 13.7% to 11.2%¹. China is now the source of only 18% of US imports as opposed to its previous 22% before the trade war². China’s trade surplus with the US remains the world’s largest but has been declining. The Biden administration-maintained Trump’s tariffs and layered on various export controls designed to curb Beijing’s access to key technologies.

Trump 2.0 and Present Scenario

The context on global trade established thus far allows President Trump’s current actions on trade to be interpreted as further steps that aim to restructure the global post ww2 trade order, from a multilateral rules based order guided by principles of free trade and comparative advantage, to a more fragmented order that places transactional interests at the forefront, guided by protectionist views to support domestic industries and jobs. Given the United States’ role as the largest source of global demand for goods and services (as indicated by chart below) and the highly interconnected nature of global trade, this shift is bound to produce significant consequences affecting every country.

¹ How Trump’s First Trade War with China Gave Rise to New Targets: Bloomberg (2025).

² Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling? Peterson Institute for International Economics (2022).

US has the highest current account deficit in the world, implying its role as an important source of global demand.

The global trade order is a complex system with several interlinkages that evolve and adapt to change in unpredictable ways. This makes the task of trying to estimate the precise effects of tariff increases on inflation, economic growth, jobs and other economic variables for different countries arduous and unreliable. With that said, given the structure of global trade as it exists today, some general implications may be drawn out.

Global Value Chains

A global value chain (GVC) refers to the network of inter-country trade linkages involved in the development, marketing, production and distribution of a product. It involves the movement of intermediate goods across several borders for the creation of a single product.   According   to

OECD, approximately 70% of international trade takes place through GVCs³. Given their importance, the effect of tariffs from the US may be discussed keeping in mind their effect on GVCs.

³ Global value and supply chains: OECD.

Effect of US tariffs on Mexico from a GVC perspective

The illustration above shows how the costs of a tariff imposed by the US on Mexican goods passesthrough the cross-border supply chain, affecting different parties differently depending on the extent to which they absorb the final burden. For example, the costs incurred by American importers from a higher tariff on Mexican intermediate goods may be passed on to American consumers, through sale of final goods and/or to other countries through exports. Higher prices on US exports would in turn affect Mexico which gets 44% of their backward linkages from the US⁴ . At the same time, higher costs would also affect demand for those goods and thus could impact the margins of the parties passing on the costs (Mexican exporters and American importers in this case), if they choose to do so rather than bear the loss themselves. Lower demand for these intermediate exports from Mexico would also affect

⁴ The Integration of Mexico in Global Value Chains: Opportunities and Challenges (2022).

Mexican domestic industries and the backward linkages that supply these inputs, affecting the countries from which they get them and so on. The diagram also shows that the higher costs of US intermediate exports to Mexico (or other countries) can loop back to the US itself due to the interconnected nature of global value chains (intermediate exports from US may be used by Mexico for making other intermediate goods or final goods that are again imported by the US). Indeed, a study by rabobank.com shows that global value chain integration of US firms is most prominent in three Mexican industries: motor vehicles (18.1%), electronic equipment (17.2%) and electrical machinery (16.7%). For example, for the Mexican motor vehicles industry, this means that 18.1% of final exports from Mexico to the US consists of American value added⁵. Extending this way of looking at trade linkages to other major trade partners on which the US has imposed tariffs, Canada and China for example and on which the US plans to impose retaliatory tariffs, like India and the EU, we can see how tariff changes can cascade along global value chains with implications for countries involved directly and indirectly.

The goal of such a policy, from the US’s perspective, would be to encourage purchases of goods from domestic industries. Given that intermediate exports, final exports and domestic final goods made using inputs from Mexico now cost more due to the tariffs, it would incentivize consumption of inputs and final goods coming from American firms as they can supply these goods without having to pass on costs or bear losses due to tariffs. Demand for more American made goods, particularly in the manufacturing sector, could mean more jobs and/or higher incomes for working class Americans. The difficulties with this however, apart the transition costs and linkage issues discussed above, arise from the output and efficiency losses that would ensue for the US as a result of having to forgo the gains from comparative advantage. Different countries having different distributions of labour, capital and resources can increase total output of goods and services for one another by specializing in what they are good at and trading what

⁵ US global value chain integration: a major impediment for Trump’s protectionist trade agenda (2017).

they are relatively worse at. In the US’s case, this has meant focusing on high-value, capital- intensive activities while offshoring labour-intensive manufacturing jobs to other countries. Trying to reverse this would have effects on output and distribution of income. What the net effect of these changes would be for the US or the world as a whole is uncertain and remains to be seen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the new round of tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump aims to reshape global trade by altering what the US perceives to be decades of unfair treatment at the hands foreign nations’ trade policies that he believes have exacerbated US trade deficits and rendered their manufacturing sector and the jobs associated with it stagnant. The move rejects the economic logic of comparative advantage, placing distributional and unilateral concerns at the forefront. The stress this will place on global value chains is likely to be significant, implying a disruptive and uncertain readjustment process for countries around the world. These events also make clear the inherently political nature of economic decisions. Whatever outcome a theory may suggest when viewed as an abstract model, when the time comes to make a decision, theory alone cannot provide definite answers of what the best decision is. Theory may be used to inform decision-making, but the choice itself comes down to the convictions of the decision-maker and the values he chooses to embody.

Bibliography

Bown, Chad P. “Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?” PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS,

https:/ and-china-decoupling.

Erken, Hugo. “US global value chain integration: a major impediment for Trump’s protectionist trade agenda.” Rabobank, https:/ integration-a-major-impediment-for-trumps-protectionist-trade-agenda.

Flach, Prof. Dr. Lisandra, and Dr. Feodora Teti. “The Integration of Mexico in Global Value Chains: Opportunities and Challenges.” ifo Center for International Economics. https:/ obal+Value+Chains+Opportunities+and+Challenges_KAS_M%C3%A9xico_ifo_com pressed.pdf/18c5a99f-afda-aaa9-ddf1-afd10b14380e?version=1.0&t=1678385287714. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Global value and supply chains.” OECD,     https:/chains.html.

Saito, Yasufumi, and Malcolm Scott. “How Trump’s First Trade War with China Gave Rise to New Targets.” Bloomberg Economics, https:/ trump-china-new-trade-war/.

About the author

Dhruvah is a first-year undergraduate student studying B.A Economics (Hons.) at Jindal School of Government and Public Policy. His research interests include macroeconomics, economic schools of thought and complexity theory.

The post Trump And Tariffs: How Us Trade Policy Affects The World appeared first on 91̽��.

Road accident fatalities in India are an ever-growing concern. This opinion piece analyses the factors driving this issue and critically assesses the role of broader systems in addressing them. It challenges the narrow framing of accidents as mere driver error and calls for a more holistic approach to road safety that includes thoughtful infrastructure design, accountable vehicle manufacturing standards, and equitable access to emergency care. Drawing from global and domestic best practices, the piece advocates for people-focused policies that offer a clearer, more inclusive path to safe mobility.

Introduction

When we think about Indian roads, what do we see? Congested roads, speeding vehicles, the incessant cacophony of cars and people. Our roads enrage us. But who are we angry at? Overcrowded buses, pedestrians darting across roads, or bikers cutting through traffic. It is ironic how roads, designed to ease movement, have hampered our right to safe mobility. We have become

so desensitized to everyday dangers that even our children routinely jaywalk on their way home from school, unaware of the risks. Too many names have become numbers buried in reports we don’t care to read. How long until it is one of us? Road accidents seem to have become an inescapable reality of daily life. Somewhere along the way, we have grown numb to our responsibilities. In 2022, the country recorded 4,61,312 road accidents, resulting in 1,68,491 fatalities. This is a 9.4% increase in accident-related deaths compared to 2021, a sudden hike from the decadal decline of 0.3% in 2020 (MORTH 2022). The major cause of the rising fatality rate is overspeeding, accounting for 71.2% of deaths. Other dangerous behaviors, such as drunken driving, driving on the wrong side, jumping red lights, and using mobile phones, collectively led to a 28.3% increase in deaths in 2022 (MORTH 2022). The numbers clearly suggest that Overspeeding behaviour must be assessed because there are multiple parameters to be considered. It is influenced by heterogeneous traffic conditions, spatial and temporal factors, even social dynamics.

The Cost of Speed-

These behaviours are aggravated by the vehicles we drive. On Indian roads, speed costs lives. The way we engineer our vehicles must be matched by how thoughtfully we design our roads. Speed is not a measure of progress, inclusivity and safety for all is. In 53 major cities across India, over- speeding was responsible for 51.5% of all road accident deaths in 2022 (MORTH 2022). A Study carried out in Mumbai showed that road design can play a significant role in curbing overspeeding. For instance, increasing the number of lanes reduces overspeeding by 3.26%, while improving road connectivity decreases it by 1.12% (CSE 2023). Conversely, arterial roads see more overspeeding, emphasizing the need for speed-calming measures like humps, rumble strips, and

stricter enforcement through speed cameras and penalties. It is also suggested for future policies to ensure infrastructure of fully controlled pedestrian access for drivers to become more vigilant of their overspeeding behaviours in such spaces.

Source: 

The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 enacted by the Parliament aims to tackle such a crisis by enforcing stricter penalties and leveraging compliance of traffic rules through technology

(Government of India 2019). A total of 23.92 crore e-challans amounting to Rs.36703.96 crore have been issued in the country for violation of traffic rules during the period from 25 September, 2020 to 7th December, 2024 (MORTH 2024 But can the fear of fines and penalties alone truly ensure compliance with traffic regulations? There is a need to address deeper systemic flaws that may be encouraging such behavior. There is a lack of transparency as to how the road safety funds are being utilized. Manufacturers often prioritize profits over safety, resulting in vehicles that undermine the vision of sustainable and secure mobility. In India, express highways are designed for maximum speeds of 120-150 km/hr for cars but automobile makers are allowed to produce vehicles capable of speeds of 200-250 km/hr (Global NCAP 2023). This crisis is not specific to India. Nearly 80 countries lack any laws regulating vehicle safety standards, leaving millions vulnerable to preventable accidents. However, vehicle safety standards must also consider the effects vehicles have on each other during collisions while performing vehicle crash tests. While SUV occupants are protected by the size and mass of their vehicles, this often comes at the cost of increased danger for those in smaller cars during collisions. Studies show that smaller cars bear the brunt of collisions, with fatality risks increasing up to eightfold when compared to larger vehicles (IIHS 2020). Therefore, manufacturers must cater to strict accident compatibility norms in order to mitigate risks faced by all road users in case of an accident. What matters is not just the occupant’s safety, but whether a vehicle is safe for all road users. It inadvertently inhibits a culture of  exclusion  where  safety  is  warranted  to  only  those  who  can  afford  it. This challenge is further amplified by increased motorisation with newly registered vehicles amounting to a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 9.83 percent between 2010 and 2020 (MoSPI 2021). With these developments, it may also be more pragmatic to invest in public

transport infrastructure and Emergency medical assistance to reduce the likely future increase in road incidents and fatalities, than attempting to achieve reductions in accident numbers.

Is it the driver’s fault?-

The enforcement of road safety norms is more complex than it appears. Who is truly to blame- the citizen, the institution or the manufacturer? Although 78% of road accidents are officially blamed on driver error, one must ask—what about the systemic failures, like ambulances arriving too late? Rural India suffered a staggering share of 68% of the road accident deaths (1,14,261 deaths) in 2022. The disproportionate number of deaths, in comparison to urban areas, emphasises on the critical need for adequate trauma care facilities along with other enforcement practices and awareness programs (MORTH 2022).

Global best practices-

Brunei, for instance, is one of the ten countries that have reduced their road accident numbers by 50% in the past decade. As part of their road safety strategies, the number of ambulances was increased annually to improve response times to road crashes and post-crash care (WHO 2023). The ‘Vision Zero’ policy in Sweden has successfully halved the number of road fatalities since the turn of the millennium. The policy prioritizes minimizing the fatal consequences of human error, aiming to protect both motorists and vulnerable road users. With only a 10% survival rate for pedestrians at 40mph, Sweden introduced an 18.6mph limit in built-up areas under Vision Zero. By 2020, 2,200 speed cameras ensured compliance after a comprehensive speed review (OECD/ITF 2021).

Kerala, paving its path toward safer roads, has made notable strides in road safety, achieving a 13.31% reduction in accidents and a 0.84% drop in fatalities. It has taken a decentralised approach to tackling its short term and long term road safety goals. It pioneered the Safe Corridor Demonstration Project, investing ₹146.6 crores on implementing best practices such as improving 33 junctions, gateway treatment in 36 school zones, solar lighting, road markings, sign boards and crash barriers in an 80 km stretch of one of the state’s most accident prone areas. Moreover, the World Bank has assisted the phase II of this program by allocating 4.0 million US dollars to the challenge fund which aims to implement best practices from the SCDP on road safety solutions at the district level (World Bank 2023).

Representational image of an under-construction road | Photo: Suraj Singh Bisht | ThePrint

Conclusion

To address the road safety crisis, we must first absorb the urgency of the problem. While it is not something that can be tackled without institutional engagement, individual awareness and empathy

paves way for change in stringent environments. he foundation of effective road safety lies in the ‘four E’s’: education, enforcement, engineering, and emergency care. Strengthening road safety management through coordinated efforts at local, state, and national levels can help streamline policies and enforcement. Vehicles must be equipped with the latest safety features and should adhere to vehicle safety standards. Educating all road users and fostering responsible behavior is key to minimizing human error, while a robust post-crash response system can save lives through timely medical interventions. Finally, creating safer driving environments by redesigning roads to accommodate pedestrians, cyclists, and motor vehicles alike will promote inclusivity and reduce risks for all road users.

Safer roads require collective responsibility among all stakeholders involved. It is crucial to focus on evidence based solutions, and stick to the basics- Education, Engineering, Enforcement and Emergency medical care. No one should have to risk their life simply to travel for work, education, or leisure.

Biblography

Centre for Science and Environment. (2023). CSE analysis of road design and speed patterns in Mumbai.                    

Global NCAP. (2023). India vehicle safety assessment report.

Government of India. (2019). The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019. Ministry of Law and Justice.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. (2020). Crash compatibility and vehicle size.

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. (2022). Road accidents in India – 2022. Government of India.

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. (2024). E-challan and penalty collection report (2020– 2024). Government of India.

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. (2021). Transport statistics of India 2021.

Government of India.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Transport Forum. (2021). Sweden: Road safety annual report.

World       Bank.       (2023). Safe      Corridor       Demonstration       Project:       Kerala,       India.

World     Health     Organization.     (2023). Global     status     report     on     road    safety     2023.

About the author

Raarya Priyadarsini Kuanr is a second-year Masters student in Public Policy at OP Jindal Global University. Her policy interests span urban governance, public transportation, critical perspectives on science and technology, smart cities, Informal economies and displacement of marginalized people Outside academia, she is passionate about sports particularly basketball and boxing and is currently relearning the joy of reading and writing in an age of constant digital acceleration.

The post Mobility Or Mortality: Rethinking Safety on Indian Roads appeared first on 91̽��.

Abstract

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 aims to modernize India’s immigration framework by centralizing processes, enhancing security, and enforcing compliance. While many argue that it streamlines outdated laws and strengthens national security, critics highlight the risk of excessive centralization, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and economic drawbacks. Drawing from global case studies, including post-Brexit UK and Germany’s federal approach, this article underscores the bill’s potential impact on foreign investment, skilled migration, and regional autonomy. It also explores why India must balance security with economic competitiveness by ensuring that immigration policies remain flexible and attractive for global talent while addressing local needs and avoiding excessive bureaucratic hurdles.

Modernizing India’s Immigration Laws: Addressing Security and Policy Gaps

Given the rising global migration crisis, border security concerns, and the increasing complexities of illegal immigration, the bill is seen as a crucial step towards a more structured immigration framework. Recent developments, including the India-Canada diplomatic tensions over visa suspensions and India’s growing role as a global economic hub, also make this bill particularly relevant. Moreover, India has faced challenges in dealing with undocumented immigrants, particularly in border states like Assam and West Bengal. As highlighted in past debates over the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), India needs a clear and updated immigration policy to distinguish between legitimate migrants, asylum seekers, and illegal forces.

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “bill”) seeks to streamline various services related to immigration and foreigners, including their entry, exit and stay in the country. This bill repeals four existing laws, namely: Foreigners Act, 1946, Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act, 2000 which govern the services related to immigration and foreigners.

A New Era of Immigration Laws: Key Objectives of the Bill

The bill is designed around three primary objectives:

1. Modernization of Immigration Laws: The bill replaces four colonial-era acts, introduces digital tracking and biometric verification. Additionally, by establishing a centralized Bureau of Immigration, it aims to bring India’s immigration policies in line with international standards, thereby attempting to shift to a more centralized, structured and transparent system. On the flip side, a centralized Bureau of Immigration may lead to delays, red tape, and administrative backlogs, similar to issues seen in India’s Aadhaar system and centralized visa processing delays in the US. It is also crucial to note that immigration issues also vary across

states, particularly in border regions like Assam and West Bengal where immigration concerns are highly multi-faceted and localized. A one-size-fits-all policies risks overlooking these historical and demographic differences, thereby limiting state governments’ ability to adapt immigration policies to regional needs.

• Strengthening National Security: The bill implements strict visa screening procedures to prevent illegal immigration, human trafficking, and terrorist infiltration. It also enforces stronger penalties for visa overstays, fake documentation, and unauthorized entry. Furthermore, it aims to improve border control mechanisms with better cooperation between immigration officers and security forces, thereby strengthening national security.
• Enhancing Compliance and Accountability: The bill mandates foreign nationals to register upon arrival, with institutions (hotels, universities, hospitals) required to report foreign residents. The bill enforces harsher fines and deportation policies for those violating visa conditions. Furthermore, individuals overstaying their visas can face fines up to ₹10 lakh ($12,000) and imprisonment up to 7 years. It implements mandatory compliance from airlines and carriers, which must submit detailed passenger records to immigration authorities before arrival, similar to the U.S. Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). However, the implementation of digital tracking and biometric verification raises concerns about data privacy and potential misuse of personal information, especially in the absence of a robust data protection law in India.

Case Study: European Union and Germany

Drawing parallels and lessons from global experiences, the European countries have struggled with immigration policies, particularly due to the 2015 migrant crisis and subsequent asylum restrictions. Countries like France have managed to balance security with economic interests by offering fast-track residency for high-skilled migrants. Therefore, India’s bill, while emphasizing security, must also ensure it does not create unnecessary hurdles for students, skilled professionals, and investors.

Another interesting example is that of Germany’s federal structure. It allows its individual states (Länder) to tailor integration policies to their specific regional needs. This decentralized approach enables regions experiencing labor shortages to implement measures that expedite the recruitment and integration of skilled workers. Such flexibility ensures that local economic demands are met while maintaining national security standards.

From the Economic Lens

It is crucial to examine immigration not only from a social perspective but also through an economic lens to fully understand its multifaceted impact on a nation’s labor market and fiscal health. Immigration policies directly influence start-ups and key industries, as immigrant entrepreneurs play a vital role in driving innovation and job creation. Additionally, the economic consequences of talent migration, particularly a country’s ability to attract global talent and the challenges of “brain drain” due to emigration, significantly affect long-term economic growth and competitiveness.

Restrictive immigration policies may push skilled professionals toward more developed countries (e.g., Canada and Australia) for better prospects in high-income nations. According to a written response by the Ministry of External Affairs in the Rajya Sabha, 216,219 Indians renounced their citizenship in 2023. This figure represents a significant increase compared to earlier years. For instance, in 2011, the number stood at 122,819, indicating a substantial rise over the past decade. The data highlights the need for policies aimed at retaining skilled professionals and making India an attractive destination for global talent.

It has long been the global norm for individuals to migrate from lower HDI countries to higher HDI nations in pursuit of better opportunities hence immigration policies in developed nations can significantly impact labor markets globally. Countries with high HDI benefit from skilled immigrants, whereas low HDI countries suffer from a loss of workforce therefore, India must ensure its policies do not deter skilled migrants and foreign investment. If India is serious about achieving developed nation status, it must shift to an active architect of talent retention and attraction. The consistent outflow of skilled professionals to countries reflects not just global aspirations but domestic shortcomings. To position itself as a hub for innovation, entrepreneurship and global talent, India must focus not only on attracting professionals from abroad but also on creating conditions that make talented individuals want to stay within India. This means streamlining business and work visas, fostering diaspora engagement, and crafting an environment where skilled professionals find career satisfaction, opportunities for growth, and a high quality of life. It’s time to pull our socks up, ensuring India becomes a destination not just for migrants but for its own talent to flourish.

The Deccan Herald article titled “Not the End of Immigration Challenges for India” highlights that India’s immigration discourse remains largely centered on national security and demographic concerns, often sidelining the significant economic opportunities associated with migration. This narrow framing has economic consequences. Unlike countries such as Canada, Australia, or the UAE, which actively promote skilled migration as a tool for innovation and growth, India has hesitated to position itself as an attractive destination for global talent. Furthermore, its limited engagement in international migration dialogues and the absence of robust bilateral frameworks mean that India risks losing strategic influence in shaping global talent flows. This is particularly concerning for key labor-exporting sectors like healthcare and technology, where international mobility is closely tied to economic competitiveness.

Thereby, considering all arguments, it is safe to conclude that:

1. Increased bureaucratic hurdles may discourage foreign investors who need seamless business immigration processes.
2. Stricter visa policies and complex regulations could push international students and skilled workers toward countries with simpler immigration frameworks. Strict foreigner registration rules could hinder tourism and hospitality businesses, leading to losses in a major revenue sector.

Countries that implement excessively strict immigration laws often see skilled labor migrating elsewhere. For example, post-Brexit UK saw a decline in EU workers, impacting industries like healthcare and IT. India must ensure it remains an attractive destination for global talent.

Immigration Reform in India: Striking the Right Balance

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025, represents a much-needed reform in India’s immigration system by replacing outdated laws and addressing security concerns. However, India must ensure that these regulations do not create unnecessary barriers for skilled workers, international students, and foreign investors. The experiences of Europe serve as a valuable lesson; a balanced approach is needed which protects national security while fostering economic growth and international collaboration. The success of this bill will depend on how effectively it is implemented and whether it adapts to India’s evolving socio-economic needs

Bibliography

Bendel, Petra, Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels, Brussels: Migration Institute Europe, 2014.

Explained: How India’s New Immigration Bill Overhauls Foreign Entry, Visa Rules.” The New Indian Express, 16 Mar. 2025,

Accessed 26 March

2025.

Immigrants and emigrants by Human Development Index country category, World Migration Report 2024, Module 4: Where do people migrate? International Organization for Migration, 2024,

.

Accessed 26 March 2025.

Migrants To, Within, and From Asia (1990-2020). World Migration Report 2024, Module 4: Where do people migrate? International Organization for Migration, 2024,

.

Officials Do Not Fully Understand UK Skilled Worker Visa, Watchdog Says.

Financial Times, 20 Mar. 2025,

Accessed 26 March 2025.

Economic Travesty: Congress on Over 2.1 lakh Indians Giving Up Citizenship in 2023, National Herald, 3 August 2024, .

Accessed 18 March 2025.

About the Author

Anubhi Srivastava is a member of the research cluster at Jindal Policy Research Lab, where she focuses to critically analyze power structures and their influence on social mobility while exploring the broader connections between law, policy, and society.

The post The Two Faces Of The Immigration Coin: A Critique On The Immigration And Foreigners Bill appeared first on 91̽��.