Abstract

The 2024 Lok Sabha Elections held special significance for not just the ruling coalition NDA, but also for the opposition gathered under the INDIA alliance. BJP, unable to secure the bare minimum to form the government on its own was a shocker for everyone. Uttar Pradesh emerged as the primary reason for the downfall of BJP in the 2024 general elections. The stark decline in BJP’s seats in UP from 62 in 2019 to 33 in 2024 general elections can be attributed to Samajwadi Party’s role in the INDIA. This article takes a deep-dive into the political dynamics of UP that made a dent in the ruling coalition. We find that complacency and mismanagement at the ground level led to its failure in UP. Given BJP’s recent feats in various state elections post Lok Sabha debacle, the question is now that will BJP play the same game of welfare politics in UP in 2027 or will focus on disciplining their cadres and candidates.

Keywords: parliamentary elections 2024; Indian elections; UP debacle; INDIA; welfare politics; labharthi.

Introduction

The 2024 Lok Sabha Elections held special significance for not just the ruling coalition NDA, but also for the opposition gathered under the INDIA alliance. The election results would have made waves regardless of whether the NDA, with BJP as its flag bearer, achieving a third consecutive victory or if the INDIA alliance made a significant dent in the national political landscape, enough to form a new government.

The results came as a surprise for the INDIA alliance, which secured an impressive tally of 234 seats in the 2024 general elections. For the NDA, particularly the BJP, it was a shock as the alliance managed to win only 293 seats, with BJP’s tally being reduced from 303 seats in 2019 general elections to just 240 seats this time. These numbers fell far short of BJP’s election campaign slogan of ‘Abki baar 400 paar and also for achieving legislative majority to form the government. Consequently, BJP had to join hands with Telegu Desam of Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar’s JD (U) to form the government. After receiving a significant setback, the BJP, in close collaboration with RSS returned to its strategic drawing board room to make crucial adjustments.

These changes were planned not only to reinforce its Hindutva ideology but also to align with the idea of “Labharti Vikas” (development for the benefit of the people). In the backdrop of increasing pressure, the BJP implemented a series of rapid policy shifts and critical political measures, particularly in states where assembly elections were impending. The revamped political modifications paid off, leading to BJP securing resounding victories in the state assembly elections of Haryana, Chattissgarh, Maharashtra, and more recently, Delhi. These subsequent victories seemingly signal that the party seems to be gradually recovering from its 2024 Lok Sabha Polls setback. However, it is essential to take a step back and carefully analyse the outcome of the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, as it emerged as a pivotal moment in the shifting political dynamics of India.

Weakest Link – UP

Uttar Pradesh emerged as the primary reason for the downfall of BJP in the 2024 general elections, as Uttar Pradesh is the largest state having 80 Lok Sabha seats which is the highest in any state and sends the most number of MPs to Lok Sabha. Since after independence itself, Uttar Pradesh has long remained at the centre of political landscape of India, having playing a major role in the formation of central governments and with a historical record of having sent 9 out of 14 Prime Ministers in India so far, which signifies the importance which the state holds. UP shares borders with the neighbouring states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Haryana where BJP performed exceedingly well in the 2024 general elections, unlike in Uttar Pradesh.

The stark decline in BJP’s seats in UP from 62 in 2019 to just 33 in 2024 general elections can be attributed to several factors. Primary one being the strategic coalition of INDIA alliance under which Samajwadi Party and Congress were the major alliance partners in UP, contesting on 62 and 17 seats respectively, with Trinamool Congress contesting on one seat as well. In contrast to its 18.11% vote share in 2019’s Uttar Pradesh’s Lok Sabha Polls, Samajwadi Party increased its vote share to 33.59%, while Congress increased its vote share from 6.3% in 2019 to over 9% in 2024.

A key factor in Samajwadi Party’s success proved to be the ‘Pichda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak’ (PDA) strategy, under which SP chief Akhilesh Yadav distributed tickets to Yadav OBCs only on 5 seats, whereas distributed 27 tickets to candidates belonging to non yadav OBCs. SP also fielded 4 Muslim candidates, 11 general candidates, and 15 Dalit candidates. The PDA strategy helped SP gain 25 seats in reserved OBC constituencies and six seats in constituencies having large Muslim population. Samajwadi Party made significant inroads in eastern UP, gaining 18 seats in the region, which is represented by Prime Minister Modi (Varanasi) and and Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath (Gorakhpur).

The eastern region of UP boasts a large population of non-Yadav OBCs and Dalits. In addition to the PDA strategy, Rahul Gandhi’s promise of giving Rs 1 Lakh annually to poor women under the ‘Nari Nyay’ scheme appeared to resonate more with women voters on the ground and can be reflected from the figure where in 12 out of 17 seats in UP, where female voter turnout exceeded male voter turnout, INDIA Bloc secured a victory. Congress emerged victorious in Rae Barelily and Amethi, while SP triumphed in Ambedkarnagar, Pratapgarh, Sultanpur, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Salempur, Lalganj and Machhlishahr. The contrast in the BJP and INDIA Bloc’s campaigning style was very evident, where contrary to only holding grand rallies like BJP, SP and Congress laid more emphasis towards direct outreach to local communities and addressing their issues, which was also evident in Priyanka Gandhi’s campaigning in Amethi and Rae Bareli where instead of holding large rallies, she chose to conduct around 20 “nukkad sabhas” daily, which bolstered her connect with the regional issues of the people.

The deeper trends of 2024 Lok Sabha elections can be further understood by examining certain key constituencies in UP and laying emphasis on the heterogeneous factors behind their outcomes. 

Ayodhya

Ayodhya remained the biggest puzzle within the political playground for the people. While the outside narrative was charged up with the establishment of Ram Temple, an airport and the Ram Path, yet the then second time sitting BJP MP Lallu Singh from Faizabad lost to the 9 time MLA Awadhesh Prasad of SP from Milkipur constituency with a margin of 54,567 votes. The loss was majorly credited to the hardships the locals faced due to the reported shortcomings in governance such as the lack of proper compensation received by traders, with many traders claiming to have just received a small amount of ₹1-2 lakhs and despite their protests, their issues weren’t addressed effectively by their representative. Local contractors claim that several big contracts in Ayodhya are being monopolized by the Gujarati contractors which sidelines the indigenous population. Majority of the shops and houses in proximity to Ayodhya Dham are being operated by the renters under a system of feudal tenancy. As per a homestay owner, when the land rates were low, the local residents were prevented from buying the shops or houses, having being told they belonged to the God. 

Additionally, the development came at a cost to the regional inhabitants as many of them are still being displaced without being provided with the promised compensation. Ostensibly, there has been an increasing number of people who are shifting towards private firms to receive reasonable compensation but they comprise of firms like Times City , in which ruling party’s politicians’ stakes were allegedly involved. It is rumored amongst the regional people there that, the firm used to purchase lands at prices below the circuit level with the local leadership being aware about the same, which was then sold to the Adani Group. Students often have to take large detours in order to reach their colleges which was a matter of considerable discontentment amongst the youngsters.

Moreover, Awadesh Prasad was not a new face for the people, having a significant hold on the ground level amongst the people. Contrary to the rising incumbency and dissatisfaction against Lallu Singh, who was not the most desired amongst the people and was even loosing the grip amongst the ideological supporters of Ram Mandir. Mahant Raju Das of Hanumangarhi temple remarked that they didn’t have anything against the BJP government; however, they had issues with the candidate’s behaviour and his alienation from the ground realities. Such behaviour was reflected from his statements where he said that he will win even if business community didn’t voted for him. Moreover, his video went viral where he talks about amending the Constitution. This created a fear psychosis regarding reservation amongst the marginalized sections of the society who had reached to a saturation with the Hindutva Politics. Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)-Lokniti post-poll survey published in The Hindu also supported the same.

At the same time, the Pichda Dalit Alpsankhyak (PDA) campaign by the SP chief perfectly aligned within the broader context and found more resonance amongst all sections of society, primarily the marginalised sections. Subsequently, the local leadership of the BJP was aware of the undercurrents going on against Lallu Singh, yet was not alarmed. Even within the ideological fraction of BJP, there were some cracks on surface of rival fractions of Lallu Singh. Senior leaders like Vinay Katiyar, who also happened to be a pioneer of the Ram Mandir Andolan and had formed VHP youth wing and Bajrang Dal. Worldwide media coverage and developments within Ayodhya weren’t able to whitewash the discontentment against Lallu Singh, which was seen in the 2024 Lok Sabha results.

Varanasi

However, the 2024 Lok Sabha elections came as a huge shock for BJP and Modi, not only from the perspective of overall mandate of the general assembly elections, but rather also from the perspective of a significant drop in the votes casted to Modi versus the remarkable increase in the votes casted to the INDIA alliance candidate Ajay Rai. Modi secured 612,970 (54.24%) votes whereas Ajay Rai secured 460,457 (40.74%) votes. There is a notable dip of 9.4% in Modi’s 2024 vote share of 54.24% from the 2019 vote share of 63.6%. However, the real stark difference came in terms of the steep fall in victory margins, having fallen to just 13.5% in 2024, from the victory margin of 36.1% and 45.2% in 2014 and 2019. 

Apart from taking active participation in important events such as PM Modi’s roadshow or rally, the cadre of BJP’s allied organisations such as RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal was not very active on the ground and was largely absent from other important regional political campaigns including the key campaigns like door to door campaigning. Even the ‘Mool BJP Karyakarta’ in Varanasi was highly demoralised with the top leadership and was not in complete sync with the central campaign due to several key issues such as the work of grass-root BJP workers not being done by the Yogi administration, lateral entries into BJP taking important positions in organisation, growing interference of the Gujrat lobby of BJP in important decisions pertaining to campaigning and Karyakartas. Slogans such as ‘Ab ki baar 400 paar’ created a perception amongst many BJP voters in Varanasi that Modi will easily secure a landslide victory even this time and hence, didn’t turn up to vote for Modi like they did in the previous two elections. 

BJP failed to make an impressive stride in favour of PM Modi’s image in Varanasi, despite incurring almost twice on election campaign expenditure than Ajay Rai. The expenditure incurred in the 2019 elections by Narendra Modi was Rs 49,26,878 which was less than that of Ajay Rai who spent around 50,08,500 that came off on a losing cause. Although the money spent on 2024 elections by Ajay Rai was Rs 26,36,988 almost half this time, while Modi’s expenditure on 2024 elections was Rs 70,69,457. It showcases a significant decline in expenditure with a much narrow gap in election result than before. 

Ajay Rai and it’s INDIA alliance members from Samajwadi Party left no stone unturned to expose the Modi and Yogi government, when it came to criticising Modi for favouring his Gujrat lobby friends and the poor plight of Pushkar Pond in Varanasi. He alleged, ‘Modi ke Gujrati dost karodon rupya dakaar gaye Pushkar talab ki safai ke naam pe.” Ajay Rai and the INDIA alliance also played the battle on the grounds of identity where Modi was successfully projected as being an ‘Outsider’ to Kashi and Ajay Rai being an ‘Insider’ to Kashi. Congress further doubled down on this narrative by coming up with popular slogans like ‘Kashi ki Rai’ which was also aligning with the secularised concept idea of India which projected Hindutva propagated by Modi and BJP as problematic. There is a significant increase in the 2024 votes polled for Ajay Rai across all the 5 urban and rural sub constituencies of Varanasi. However, there is a remarkable rise in the 2024 votes polled for Ajay Rai in the rural constituencies of Varanasi namely Rohaniya and Sevapuri, which symbolises the smooth transfer of Yadav votes of Samajwadi Party to Congress, and new votes polled from other communities such as Muslims, Dalits, Bhumihars and Patels. the popular Congress campaign of ‘Haath badlega halaat’ was spread effectively on ground by the INDI alliance workers and the candidate Ajay Rai. Through the social media narratives, Congress was fairly successful in picking the shortcomings of Yogi and Modi government, and popularise the narrative of Modi as an ‘Outsider’ from Gujarat and disruptor of the ‘Pauranic Nagri’ due to his imposed development projects in the city which were disconnected with the essence and spirit of Varanasi. 

Amethi

The result of 2024 Amethi elections might’ve come across as a surprise for the national media; however, as per the residents of Amethi and the regional media coverage, Smriti Irani was relatively struggling during her campaigns, with her own regional BJP cadre not sharing the same fervour as her on the ground. Some issues such as the regional unit of the party not being in complete sync with the way of functioning of her created the rift.

In various interviews and surveys done there, upon being asked, the residents revealed many grievances including the failure of providing necessities such as sugar, gas cylinders, and ration at a regulated price, dealing with the rampant issue of the stray cattle, etc. Several farmers have reported to have stopped growing oilseeds and pulses altogether. However, one of the big setback which came before Smriti Irani was the order of the Allahabad High Court directing the state administration to reopen Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, which was closed on the grounds of medical negligence. The hospital had played a pivotal role in delivering medical services to the poor patients who couldn’t afford being transported to seek treatment in Lucknow or in nearby AIIMS in Rae Bareli. 

It was a wise tactic of Congress to replace Rahul Gandhi with Kishori Lal Sharma, a close aide and confidant of the Gandhi family who had worked with Rajiv Gandhi and had a firm understanding of the political landscape in Amethi. With Rahul Gandhi no longer being in the centre stage, Smriti Irani seemed to have lost the central narrative of launching aggressive attacks on Rahul Gandhi. Kishori Lal Sharma wasted no time in covering as much ground as he could have by kick starting his campaign way before than the Smriti Irani camp, which later on paid him a rich dividend in form of securing a significant victory with a difference of 1,67,196 votes over Smriti Irani.

Kishori Lal Sharma, with the help and support of Gandhi family, galvanised the local Congress cadre into swift action and active participation in the outreach and campaign for him. Priyanka Gandhi’s extended two week campaign in the circuit of Amethi and Rae Bareli really helped Kishori Lal Sharma to gain rigorous support of the party’s regional cadre, without any infighting in their own camp. Kishori Lal Sharma performed exceedingly well in the Vidhan Sabha constituencies such as Salon, Jagdishpur and Tiloi where Smriti Irani lost by over 52,318 votes, 18118 votes, and 15519 votes respectively. Apart from the Dalit and OBC voters, even the upper caste voters belonging from Kshatriya and Brahmin community didn’t turn up to vote in big numbers in the favour of Smriti Irani. Several Pradhans, speaking on the condition of anonymity, shared that due to fear of politically motivated actions against them by the administration, they are publicly lending support to Smriti Irani, but in reality, they are backing Kishori Lal Sharma. 

Furthermore, the lack of strong support from Sanjay Singh, who belongs to the royal family of Amethi resulted in further losses for Smriti Irani. As per a regional BJP executive, the cold ties between Sanjay SIngh and Smriti Irani is not something recent, but rather it dates back to the times of 2022 UP State Assembly elections. One of the reasons behind Sanjay Singh’s loss was also credited to the lack of coordination from the end of MP’s camp. From the outcome of the popular Lok Sabha contest in Amethi, the overarching sentiment of dissent amongst the voters of Amethi can be summed up in the words of a local kirana store owner, ‘Humne pichli baar Rahul Gandhi ko harane ke liye Smriti Madam ji ko vote kiya thaa par iss baar hum unhe harane ke liye Kishori Lal Ji ko vote denge’.

Allahabad

One of the key constituencies where Congress ended its 40 year long dry run is Allahabad.. Over the past two decades, the contest on this seat used to be really close with an average winning margin of 73,799 votes. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, under the INDIA Alliance seat sharing formula, Congress fielded former Allahabad MP Revati Raman Singh’s son, Ujjwal Raman Singh, who switched to Congress from SP before the elections. Ujjwal Raman Singh landed a defeat to BJP’s candidate Neeraj Tripathi by over 58,000 votes in a close face off. However, this feat wouldn’t have been truly achieved without a successful and planned coordination between Congress and Samajwadi Party where Congress largely benefited from the presence of an existing strong cadre of Samajwadi Party in Allahabad.

Many supporters of the 2019-2024 BJP MP Rita Bahuguna Joshi were not very keen to actively participate in the meetings and rallies held by Neeraj Tripathi. They also didn’t launch an open protest against the BJP top leadership’s choice of a new candidate but rather, they chose to remain in the backseat, deciding not to fully lend support to the new candidate choice. Ujjwal Raman Singh was also successful in striking a cord amongst the voters by bringing forth various pertinent issues such as the failure of the ruling government to revive the industrial area of Naini, absence of an AIIMS hospital in the city, despite having a large population of lower and middle class people living there.

Allahabad, since long has remained a coaching hub where students across different neighbouring cities come to prepare for distinct government exams, and Ujjwal Raman Singh was successful in utilising the voice of young voters against the state BJP government on the burning issues of the frequent government exam paper leaks in the state. 

Kannauj

Kannauj emerged as a battle of prestige for Akhilesh Yadav as the constituency has been a strong bastion of Samajwadi Party since 1998, barring the much talked about 2019 Lok Sabha election outcome where the SP chief Akhilesh Yadav’s wife Dimple Yadav was defeated by the BJP candidate Subrat Pathak in a very close fight by just 12,353 votes. 

Subrat Pathak has been active in the regional politics of Kannauj district since around two decades and gave a strong fight against Dimple Yadav in 2014 Kannauj Lok Sabha election too, gathering 4,69,257 votes as opposed to 4,89,164 votes received by Dimple Yadav, leading her to win by a narrow margin of 19,907 votes. However, for the 2024 Lok Sabha election, Akhilesh Yadav took charge in his own hands and was successful in defeating Subrat Pathak by a significant margin by 1,70,922 votes.

The victory of SP in Kannauj can be attributed to several reasons including the popularity and connect of Akhilesh Yadav with the demands of young voters, resentment against the central government amongst a large chunk of perfume traders due to the high GST tax imposed on ingredients of attar (perfume). This became a relevant issue in the circle of perfume traders who hold a decent grip on the political dynamics of Kannauj since the district is famously known for its Attar industry. Additionally, BJP candidate Subrat Pathak found himself embroiled in many controversies frequently, whether it be having a scuffle with the police administration or with his own regional party cadre.

Several fractions of local BJP workers were not very impressed with their MP’s temper and reportedly distanced themselves from Subrat Pathak’s campaign. In a subsequent turn of events, an infamous call recording between former UP government minister and current BJP politician from Kannauj, Sushil Pal and Subrat Pathak was leaked, where the latter was recorded to be indirectly issuing a warning to Sushil Pal against the consequences of fighting for the BJP ticket from Kannauj. Instances like the above revealed the discord within BJP’s own cadre in the region. 

With Akhilesh Yadav himself coming to contest from Kannauj, voters decided to pin their aspirations to a more influential candidate like him, which was echoed in the comment of a cable operator, ‘Akhilesh se umeed hai ki Kannauj me bhi Saifai jaisi vyavasthayein laa denge’. 

INDIA Alliance’s Gains in Uttar Pradesh: Capitalizing on Shifting Social Dynamics

INDIA Block Alliance emerged successful in winning many key constituencies with significant populations of Kurmi and Rajbhar communities, including Ghazipur, Chandauli, Ballia, Azamgarh, Salempur, Robertsganj and Lalganj. The alliance of BJP with Apna Dal (Soneylal) and Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party didn’t prove to be very fruitful for BJP as they lost in the above key mentioned constituencies too, where Rajbhar and Kurmi votes are dominant in number.

After the Lok Sabha Polls debacle in UP, UP Cabinet Minister and President of NDA alliance partner Suheldev Bhartiya Samaj Party, Om Prakash Rajbhar was quoted commenting on the shift in voting patterns. He said “Each caste group opted to vote for their own candidate, regardless of the alliance of party. The potential of many leaders of all parties in U.P. Including BJP, coming from a specific caste to transfer votes of their social group has dropped considerably as opposed to the 2014 or 2017 assembly polls. Since the Samajwadi Party (SP)-led INDIA alliance distributed several tickets to Kurmi, Maurya, Shakya, and Kushwaha, the votes of these social groups moved towards them in many key constituencies. The shift in voting was based more on caste alignment and was not towards the SP.” 

Apart from the above in depth examination of the 2024 Lok Sabha results in Uttar Pradesh, it’s also pertinent to look at the close contests where BJP faced a narrow face off against INDIA Bloc and was able to secure victory by a narrow gap of less than 50,000 votes. The table highlights the underlying anxieties of BJP, where,  had it lost in these constituencies, it would’ve been the biggest Lok Sabha Polls for the party in Uttar Pradesh. 

18 Constituencies where BJP won lower than the margin of 50,000 votes

Source: ECI

A large number of Union Ministers from UP in the Modi government 2.0 lost their respective constituencies in the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. The table underscores the disconnect between the public and their respective representatives. 

Source: ECI

Conclusion

The BJP’s political slogan of ‘Ab ki baar 400 paar’ was met with serious allegations from INDIA Bloc, accusing the BJP of trying to amend the Constitution and dismantle the reservations established by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. Much of these accusations stemmed from the careless statements of several BJP leaders regarding the desire to strike a majority of more than 400 seats to amend the constitution. The Samajwadi Party and Congress both benefited from their coalition under the INDIA Bloc banner, since many Dalit voters, who traditionally voted for Congress shifted in favour of Samajwadi Party. While Congress, despite having a weak grassroots presence, effectively leveraged the strong cadre of Samajwadi Party to mobilise votes for its own candidates.

The non-yadav OBC’s who had shifted away from SP to BJP over the past decade, made a comeback to the Samajwadi Party in the 2024 Lok Sabha Polls; however, it remains to be seen in the future polls whether their ideological allegiance remains with Samajwadi Party in future elections or not.

The declining performance of BSP in the recent Lok Sabha Polls benefited the Samajwadi Party upto a great deal as a large share of BSP’s non Jatavs core voters shifted to the INDIA Bloc, due to a lack of confidence in BSP’s ability to defend their constitutional rights against the ruling party. This diminishing trust in the BSP can be attributed to reasons such as Mayawati’s recent  political stances which were deemed as non aggressive towards BJP and also because of the majority of BSP MP’s drifting away to either BJP or Samajwadi Party.

The over reliance of BJP on the politically charged Ram Mandir narrative of Ram Mandir for both ideological and electoral gains eventually proved to be futile, since BJP failed to even secure victory in the Faizabad seat, let alone win all 79 seats as claimed by their leadership.

According to a detailed 15-page internal report, the primary reasons behind the 2024 Lok Sabha Polls debacle of BJP in Uttar Pradesh included remarks made by ruling party’s leaders about constitutional amendments, the pertinent issue of frequent paper leaks in competitive exams, discontentment among party workers against their state administration, and hasty ticket distribution. As per the regional BJP leadership, the alleged involvement of a senior journalist in the ticket distribution, without taking the state leadership into confidence was one of the major factors behind the poor ticket distribution. Ultimately, the results of the recent Lok Sabha Polls depict that issues related to youth and constitutional safeguards matter more to voters than the grand ideological narratives like Ram Mandir consecration. The political landscape of India is undergoing through a metamorphosis, with a once seemingly invincible ruling party now facing a formidable opposition well capable of challenging it electorally, even in its stronghold territory like Uttar Pradesh.

With the 2027 Uttar Pradesh State Assembly elections approaching, it will be an uphill fight for the BJP to hold its ground against the politically praised and successful Pichda, Dalit, Alpasankhyak and Adivasi (PDA) strategy of Samajwadi Party, as well as the potential continuation of the alliance of the Congress-Samajwadi Party alliance in the state. Another notable pattern is the announcement of a plethora of free welfare schemes by the BJP in all the recent state assembly elections, which might also make its way to the forthcoming state assembly polls in Uttar Pradesh. The BJP aims to address the challenging governance issues that have emerged during the second term of Yogi Adityanath’s leadership while also preparing a major overhaul of the state’s organisational structure which includes increased representation from the OBC and Dalit communities and possibly nominating a Dalit leader as State President in an attempt to reclaim the support of OBC and Dalit voters who made a shift to the INDIA alliance in the recent general elections.

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Shreyansh Singh and Animesh Choudhury Sanyal, post-graduate students of public policy, Jindal School of government and public policy, O.P. Jindal University

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Introduction

India’s democracy is vast, heterogeneous and largely shaped by regional differences such as language, political cultures and histories. Political participation, experience, trust levels and general perceptions vary largely across regions, shaped by caste, economic structures and other factors such as media and the general cultural structures. We understand India’s system to be an example of democratic backsliding (how contemporary democracies often erode gradually rather than collapse abruptly). Researchers such as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and Bermeo (2016) argue that modern democracies decline through subtle mechanisms such as weakening institutional autonomy, constraining media freedom, delegitimizing opposition, and normalizing dominance. An important outcome of this process is that democratic erosion reshapes citizen behavior and not just of the states. Citizens can continue voting while simultaneously losing trust, gaining fear or eventually withdrawing oneself from public expressions. Another major theme concerns the caste and social hierarchies. Marginalized groups are often the ones that experience biases and vulnerabilities when it comes to democracy and retaliation (Jodhka 2018; Still 2023). These inequalities/hierarchies influence not only participation but also willingness to be open about political preferences.

This report presents a three-way comparative analysis of political attitudes and experiences across Hindi-speaking regions, the Rest of India, and a third significant category of respondents who chose not to disclose their geographic location. We do this analysis using the frequency-percentage tables derived from the Questionnaire interviews carried out across India. Importantly, the latter group contributes the largest share of the sample, with 261 respondents, compared to 139 from the Hindi Heartland and 100 from the Rest of India. Hence, rather than treating this third group as a limitation, the report treats non-disclosure itself as an important analytical aspect.

Through the frequency tables, we examine how the respondents from two linguistic categories, along with the non-respondents, perceive/understand their political environment. We try to understand the percentages from different aspects such as political behavior and turnout, media presence, welfare, voter-government relationship and so on. This comparative analysis is structured around key themes of political experience:

• Political participation and Voting Behavior
• Motivations for voting
• Welfare Access and Governance
• Trust in Democratic Institutions
• Political outcomes and satisfaction
• Media exposure and Perceptions
• Civic Freedom and Safety

We start by understanding the differences in the socio-political context between the Hindi heartland and the rest of India. The Hindi belt comprises much of the North and Central India, which is mostly characterized by strong political mobilization, electoral participation, caste hierarchies and exposure to government welfare schemes. On the other hand, the rest of India is more linguistically and politically heterogeneous, characterized by region-specific parties, unique welfare schemes, diverse and varying media exposure.

An important theme we are trying to understand and address here is the significance and the implications of non-response in political surveys such as this. Non-response is often treated as some sort of nuisance that needs to be imputed/ignored in surveys. But in political surveys conducted on perceptions of democracy, political polarization, declining trust and such, non-response becomes a very important phenomenon, which reveals a lot about the existing systems. They reflect deeper issues such as fear, caution, disengagement or even strategic silence. As researchers of democratic erosion argue, declining democracy is often visible not only in institutions but also in how citizens choose to speak or remain silent (Kuran 1995; Bermeo 2016).

Data and Methodology

The analysis is done on post-poll survey data collected across India following the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Field investigators conducted structured questionnaire interviews covering a wide range of political attitudes and experiences. After data cleaning, the final sample consists of 500 respondents. The composition of the respondents were as follows:

• Hindi heartland: N= 139
• Rest of India: N= 100
• No-response on location: N= 261

We calculate the frequency of each answer for each question, convert it into percentage for normalization and analyse the trends. The analysis is descriptive in nature, not inferential. Importantly, responses such as “cannot say” and “no response” are retained and analyzed rather than being dropped. This allows us to examine not only what the respondents say, but also where they hesitate or remain silent.

Political participation and Voting Behavior (Q1-Q4)

Reported Voting (Q1)

We see clear regional differences in reported electoral participation:

• Hindi Heartland: Approximately 84.35% report having voted.
• Rest of India: Around 52.57% report voting.
• No-response group: Only 49.40% report voting, with a substantial share no/do not want to answer categories

The high participation/reporting in the Hindi heartland reflects the characteristics that we had discussed previously. However, it could also be possible that the numbers are inflated due to social desirability (Karp & Brockington, 2005). Participation is lower among respondents from the rest of India and lowest among those who did not disclose their location.

Party disclosure

We also see a significant variation in reluctance to disclose party preference:

• Hindi Heartland: 36.70% select non-disclosure categories
• Rest of India: Non-disclosure stands at 26.01%
• No-response group: Non-disclosure rises to 43.41%

The non-response group’s high reluctance reinforces their strong preference for anonymity, showing deep political insecurity or distrust.

Motivations for voting

The survey asked for reasons for voting and we see that there isn’t a significant variation between Hindi Heartland and the rest of India. But, among the non-respondents, the responses vary a lot.

• Hindi Heartland:
  • Development-related motivations account for 13.67%.
  • Leadership and welfare motivations together account for roughly 15–18%.
• Rest of India:
  • Development motivates 14.46%.
  • Responses are more evenly distributed across categories.
• No-response group:
  • A striking 33.39% fall into ambiguous or non-committal categories.

This shows that while the Hindi Heartland reflects a more nationalized narrative of development and leadership, the non-response group avoids conveying clear political motivations.

Welfare Access and Governance

We asked a series of questions regarding the awareness of different welfare programs by the central government. The responses were as follows:

• Hindi Heartland: Awareness of welfare schemes reaches as high as 70.50%.
• Rest of India: Awareness is more moderate and evenly spread, generally between 52–60%.
• No-response group: Awareness drops sharply, with some schemes below 30%.

These differences align with the literature arguing that central government welfare schemes have been particularly effective in the Hindi belt, while non-Hindi states often rely on strong state-level welfare identities. Lower awareness among non-respondents may reflect marginalization, limited state contact, or political disengagement.

Trust in Democratic Institutions

When asked about free and fair elections,

• Hindi Heartland: 38.12% express conditional trust, saying there were still some discrepancies. Approximately 44% were sure that the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner.
• Rest of India: 42.26% expressed that they believed it was fair. The other responses were evenly distributed across categories “Not at all” and “Somewhat, there were still some discrepancies” and ~6% of the sample chose “Cannot say” and “No response”.
• No-response group: Only 17.79% express trust, with the majority choosing neutral or ambiguous categories. A striking 39% chose “cannot say” and ~25% chose not to respond altogether.

When asked about trust in EVMs (Electronic Voting Machines),

• Hindi Heartland: >50% express trust
• Rest of India: Trust is higher at ~70%.
• No-response group: Trust falls to ~20%, with over half choosing neutral options or no response

The consistent pattern is that institutional trust is lowest among non-respondents, moderate in the Hindi Heartland, and highest in the Rest of India. A large share of non-respondents chooses neutral options, saying they cannot judge, or choosing not to answer altogether. This suggests that institutional distrust may coexist with uncertainty and fear of expressing criticism.

Political outcomes and satisfaction

When asked if the respondents were satisfied with the election outcomes:

• Hindi Heartland: 33.52% satisfied, but ~44% were only somewhat satisfied
• Rest of India: 34% satisfied and ~60% were not satisfied or partially satisfied
• No-response group: Only ~12% were satisfied and >50% chose not to respond

When asked if they were happy that there is a proper opposition in the parliament after a long while,

• Hindi Heartland: ~23% gave a positive response and over 50% chose not to respond.
• Rest of India: ~20% gave a positive response and again, over 50% chose not to respond.
• No-response group: ~4% gave a positive response, ~6% negative responses and >80% chose not to respond.

Once again, the non-response group avoids giving out strong opinions, reinforcing the pattern of political ambivalence.

Media exposure and Perceptions

When asked if political parties connecting over whatsapp or over call would make a difference in reaching out to the voter base,

• Hindi Heartland: ~52% report WhatsApp/calls as influential, ~30% said they were not and the remaining chose not to respond
• Rest of India: ~60% said yes and ~20% said no and ~20 didn’t have an idea
• No-response group: ~20% said yes, ~7% said not, ~12% did not have an idea and around 60% chose not to respond.

When asked whether media was free and fair in its reporting,

• Hindi Heartland: ~18% perceive the media as fair, ~36% don’t and the rest are either not sure or chose not to respond.
• Rest of India: 10% perceive the media as fair, 50% don’t and the rest are not sure chose not to respond.
• No-response group: Only 3% perceive media as fair, 9% don’t and the rest significantly large population chose not to respond.

Perceptions of media fairness are low across all groups, but non-response dominates among the No-response (location-wise) group. The non-response group is not only less exposed to campaign messaging but also significantly more distrustful of media.

Civic Freedom and Safety

When asked about whether they feel that their civil liberties and rights are safe and that whether they are able to voice their opinions without any fear,

• Hindi Heartland: ~70% feel fully or at least partially safe, while 20% don’t feel safe at all.
• Rest of India: 57-60% feel fully or partially safe, while 34-38% don’t feel safe at all.
• No-response group: Only 13-15% feel safe, ~15% don’t feel safe and ~70% chose not to respond.

A majority of respondents from the Hindi-speaking heartland and the rest of India report feeling fully or partially safe expressing political opinions. Among respondents who did not disclose their location, only a small minority reported feeling safe. Most either say they do not feel safe or decline to answer the question. This stark difference suggests that non-disclosure is closely linked to fear and perceived risk in political expression.

Overview of Non-Response Patterns in the data

Questions with High Non-Response (≥30–70%)

These questions correspond to sensitive political content such as judgments about the government, perceived fairness of elections, and self-assessments of political safety.

Questions with Low Non-Response (≤5–10%)

These include factual, descriptive, or low-risk questions:

• Q1: Did you vote?
• Q7 series: Awareness of schemes
• Q9: Whether the election was peaceful in the area
• Q12: Whether campaigning reached them

These are socially safe questions with lesser political risk.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis done in this report gives us a very important insight. It is that democratic backsliding in India must be understood not only through institutional changes but also through how citizens experience, negotiate, and respond to the political environment in their everyday lives. The consistently high levels of non-response on politically sensitive questions, particularly those relating to party preference, institutional trust, media fairness, and civic safety suggest that silence itself has become a meaningful political response. For a lot of respondents, especially those unwilling to disclose their location, non-response appears to be a strategy of self-protection in situations of political polarization, declining trust, and perceived risks associated with open expression. This finding reinforces the literature on democratic erosion, which emphasizes that fear, self-censorship, and withdrawal are some of the important outcomes of weakening democratic systems.

Moreover, the fact that the non-response group constitutes the largest segment of the sample becomes an important issue to be addressed. Rather than treating non-response as a methodological inconvenience, this study shows that it can give us valuable insights into the health of a democracy. Overall, the findings suggest that while electoral processes and political participation continue in India, the quality of engagement is very much uneven. Trust in institutions, confidence in media, and the freedom to express dissent are fragile, particularly among those who feel most vulnerable. Recognising these gaps and addressing them are crucial for the country to improve its political systems and thereby the welfare of its people.

References

Bermeo, N. (2016). On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19.

Caste in contemporary India. (n.d.). Routledge & CRC Press.

Karp, J. A., & Brockington, D. (2005). Social desirability and response validity: A comparative analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. The Journal of Politics, 67(3), 825–840.

Kuran, T. (1995). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification.   Harvard University Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2024). How democracies die. In Ideals and Ideologies (pp. 73-80). Routledge.

Still, C. (2023). Dalit Women: Honour and Patriarchy in South India. Routledge.

Anjana K. S. is a master’s student in Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore. Her research interests lie at the intersection of environmental and development economics and political economy, with a particular focus on low- and middle-income countries. 

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Abstract

Since his return to the White House in January 2025 to serve a second term as President, US President Donald Trump has announced and implemented a series of tariffs targeting the country’s top trade partners- China, Canada and Mexico, along with threats to impose reciprocal tariffs on every country that the US trades with. Arguing that the United States’ large bilateral trade deficits with its trade partners ‘unfair’ and insisting that they are ‘ripping off’ the US, Trump thus far has imposed a 25% tariff on all goods from Mexico and Canada (with a 10% tariff on Canadian oil and energy products), a 20% tariff on goods from China and a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminium imports. This article attempts to provide the context behind these decisions along with their implication for global trade.

Trade, Tariffs and Comparative Advantage

Ideas and practices concerning trade of goods and services has changed through the centuries. Tariffs, or taxes on imports of foreign goods, have been used since ancient times as measures

of boosting state revenue and controlling patterns of trade flows. Today, the most influential theory concerning international trade is the theory of comparative advantage. First introduced by David Ricardo in 1817, comparative advantage in its most basic form says that when two countries trade with each other, both countries can be made better off in terms of total goods available by choosing to specialize in the production of the commodities they are relatively better at making while trading to obtain what they are relatively worse at making. To illustrate, suppose there are two countries- A and B. A produces 120 units of bread and 100 units of butter in 12 hours , while B produces 90 units of butter and 80 units of bread in 12 hours . Clearly, A is better than B at producing both bread and butter. Despite this, both countries could benefit from trade by specializing in what they are relatively better at producing (bread for A and butter for B) and trading to get the other good. This is because for A the opportunity cost of producing butter (1.2 bread) is higher than B’s (0.88 bread) and the reverse of this is true for both of their opportunity costs of producing bread. This insight played a crucial role in dismantling a previously held mercantilist belief – the idea that trade is a zero-sum game, ie someone’s gain implies someone else’s loss. It is still viewed as one of the strongest arguments in favour of free trade and low tariffs. With that said, it should be noted that the theory doesn’t claim that free trade would be beneficial for everyone. People within nations whose livelihoods depend on producing goods that may be more efficiently produced elsewhere would be adversely affected by freer trade. This would have important distributional consequences that may not be seen as desirable on the whole.

Trade Post-World War 2

Following the damage inflicted on countries around the world as a result of WW2, 44 nations agreed to participate in the formation of a new global economic order that would aim to design institutions and mechanisms to assist post-war recovery and strengthen economic ties between nations. The system, in reference to Bretton Woods, New Hampshire where the meetings

between the nations were held, came to be known as Bretton Woods. While Bretton Woods itself was mostly concerned with financial and monetary matters, it was accompanied and supported by a broader emphasis on the role of multilateral institutions for maintaining world peace. For international trade, the most significant of these institutions was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The several trade agreements that would be passed in the years to come under this framework, in line with Ricardo’s idea of comparative advantage, aimed to liberalize trade flows between nations by reducing tariffs and restricting quotas. Global trade did in in fact increase significantly post World War 2. Real exports in 1997 were roughly14 times what they were in 1950. The World Trade Organization (WTO) formed in 1995 during a time of market optimism among Western countries – neoliberalism or the Washington consensus as its sometimes called – introduced a harsher enforcement mechanism for free trade principles. By this time, China was starting to emerge as a dominant trade power through its careful combination of state interventions through currency devaluation, heavy subsidies and capital controls with market-oriented incentives and openness to foreign investment. China’s transformation to a manufacturing powerhouse was thus aided by the liberal global trade order which promoted the free flow of goods, services and capital across borders. In the process, it became a major exporter of goods to the United States and the preferred location for many American companies’ manufacturing centres due to lower labour and compliance costs. This practice of offshoring production to foreign countries and importing their cheaper products undermined domestic industries in the US and set the stage for the election of Trump in 2016.

Trump’s First Term, Trade War with China

Donald Trump’s ascent to power in 2016 as a result of the US elections marked a shift in the direction of US trade policy – from an optimistic view of the ability of free trade to benefit all parties involved, to a view that promoted the use of tariffs as tools of negotiation to further

unilateral interests. His election may be interpreted as a manifestation of a broader display of scepticism shown by Western countries regarding the extent of globalization that had taken place in the preceding decades. In the United States’ case, issues such as stagnation of wages, offshoring of manufacturing jobs and income inequality came to be perceived as resulting from the high level of US imports from its trade partners, strengthening the appeal of Trump’s pitch to renegotiate trade agreements and put American interests first. Accordingly, he imposed a 30- 50% tariff on washing machines and solar panels and set off a trade war with China by targeting roughly $350 billion worth of imports, claiming they were guilty of unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. China responded with tariffs of their own, targeting $100 billion worth of goods from the US. The chart below shows how trade relationships for both countries have changed since the trade war.

Source: Bloomberg (Bloomberg Economics, .)

Both countries have reduced their dependence on each other with China’s share of total US trade (measured as the sum of goods exports and imports) from 2018 to 2024 dropping from

15.7% to 10.9%, and the US’s share in China’s trade falling from 13.7% to 11.2%¹. China is now the source of only 18% of US imports as opposed to its previous 22% before the trade war². China’s trade surplus with the US remains the world’s largest but has been declining. The Biden administration-maintained Trump’s tariffs and layered on various export controls designed to curb Beijing’s access to key technologies.

Trump 2.0 and Present Scenario

The context on global trade established thus far allows President Trump’s current actions on trade to be interpreted as further steps that aim to restructure the global post ww2 trade order, from a multilateral rules based order guided by principles of free trade and comparative advantage, to a more fragmented order that places transactional interests at the forefront, guided by protectionist views to support domestic industries and jobs. Given the United States’ role as the largest source of global demand for goods and services (as indicated by chart below) and the highly interconnected nature of global trade, this shift is bound to produce significant consequences affecting every country.

¹ How Trump’s First Trade War with China Gave Rise to New Targets: Bloomberg (2025).

² Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling? Peterson Institute for International Economics (2022).

US has the highest current account deficit in the world, implying its role as an important source of global demand.

The global trade order is a complex system with several interlinkages that evolve and adapt to change in unpredictable ways. This makes the task of trying to estimate the precise effects of tariff increases on inflation, economic growth, jobs and other economic variables for different countries arduous and unreliable. With that said, given the structure of global trade as it exists today, some general implications may be drawn out.

Global Value Chains

A global value chain (GVC) refers to the network of inter-country trade linkages involved in the development, marketing, production and distribution of a product. It involves the movement of intermediate goods across several borders for the creation of a single product.   According   to

OECD, approximately 70% of international trade takes place through GVCs³. Given their importance, the effect of tariffs from the US may be discussed keeping in mind their effect on GVCs.

³ Global value and supply chains: OECD.

Effect of US tariffs on Mexico from a GVC perspective

The illustration above shows how the costs of a tariff imposed by the US on Mexican goods passesthrough the cross-border supply chain, affecting different parties differently depending on the extent to which they absorb the final burden. For example, the costs incurred by American importers from a higher tariff on Mexican intermediate goods may be passed on to American consumers, through sale of final goods and/or to other countries through exports. Higher prices on US exports would in turn affect Mexico which gets 44% of their backward linkages from the US⁴ . At the same time, higher costs would also affect demand for those goods and thus could impact the margins of the parties passing on the costs (Mexican exporters and American importers in this case), if they choose to do so rather than bear the loss themselves. Lower demand for these intermediate exports from Mexico would also affect

⁴ The Integration of Mexico in Global Value Chains: Opportunities and Challenges (2022).

Mexican domestic industries and the backward linkages that supply these inputs, affecting the countries from which they get them and so on. The diagram also shows that the higher costs of US intermediate exports to Mexico (or other countries) can loop back to the US itself due to the interconnected nature of global value chains (intermediate exports from US may be used by Mexico for making other intermediate goods or final goods that are again imported by the US). Indeed, a study by rabobank.com shows that global value chain integration of US firms is most prominent in three Mexican industries: motor vehicles (18.1%), electronic equipment (17.2%) and electrical machinery (16.7%). For example, for the Mexican motor vehicles industry, this means that 18.1% of final exports from Mexico to the US consists of American value added⁵. Extending this way of looking at trade linkages to other major trade partners on which the US has imposed tariffs, Canada and China for example and on which the US plans to impose retaliatory tariffs, like India and the EU, we can see how tariff changes can cascade along global value chains with implications for countries involved directly and indirectly.

The goal of such a policy, from the US’s perspective, would be to encourage purchases of goods from domestic industries. Given that intermediate exports, final exports and domestic final goods made using inputs from Mexico now cost more due to the tariffs, it would incentivize consumption of inputs and final goods coming from American firms as they can supply these goods without having to pass on costs or bear losses due to tariffs. Demand for more American made goods, particularly in the manufacturing sector, could mean more jobs and/or higher incomes for working class Americans. The difficulties with this however, apart the transition costs and linkage issues discussed above, arise from the output and efficiency losses that would ensue for the US as a result of having to forgo the gains from comparative advantage. Different countries having different distributions of labour, capital and resources can increase total output of goods and services for one another by specializing in what they are good at and trading what

⁵ US global value chain integration: a major impediment for Trump’s protectionist trade agenda (2017).

they are relatively worse at. In the US’s case, this has meant focusing on high-value, capital- intensive activities while offshoring labour-intensive manufacturing jobs to other countries. Trying to reverse this would have effects on output and distribution of income. What the net effect of these changes would be for the US or the world as a whole is uncertain and remains to be seen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the new round of tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump aims to reshape global trade by altering what the US perceives to be decades of unfair treatment at the hands foreign nations’ trade policies that he believes have exacerbated US trade deficits and rendered their manufacturing sector and the jobs associated with it stagnant. The move rejects the economic logic of comparative advantage, placing distributional and unilateral concerns at the forefront. The stress this will place on global value chains is likely to be significant, implying a disruptive and uncertain readjustment process for countries around the world. These events also make clear the inherently political nature of economic decisions. Whatever outcome a theory may suggest when viewed as an abstract model, when the time comes to make a decision, theory alone cannot provide definite answers of what the best decision is. Theory may be used to inform decision-making, but the choice itself comes down to the convictions of the decision-maker and the values he chooses to embody.

Bibliography

Bown, Chad P. “Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?” PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS,

https:/ and-china-decoupling.

Erken, Hugo. “US global value chain integration: a major impediment for Trump’s protectionist trade agenda.” Rabobank, https:/ integration-a-major-impediment-for-trumps-protectionist-trade-agenda.

Flach, Prof. Dr. Lisandra, and Dr. Feodora Teti. “The Integration of Mexico in Global Value Chains: Opportunities and Challenges.” ifo Center for International Economics. https:/ obal+Value+Chains+Opportunities+and+Challenges_KAS_M%C3%A9xico_ifo_com pressed.pdf/18c5a99f-afda-aaa9-ddf1-afd10b14380e?version=1.0&t=1678385287714. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Global value and supply chains.” OECD,     https:/chains.html.

Saito, Yasufumi, and Malcolm Scott. “How Trump’s First Trade War with China Gave Rise to New Targets.” Bloomberg Economics, https:/ trump-china-new-trade-war/.

About the author

Dhruvah is a first-year undergraduate student studying B.A Economics (Hons.) at Jindal School of Government and Public Policy. His research interests include macroeconomics, economic schools of thought and complexity theory.

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Road accident fatalities in India are an ever-growing concern. This opinion piece analyses the factors driving this issue and critically assesses the role of broader systems in addressing them. It challenges the narrow framing of accidents as mere driver error and calls for a more holistic approach to road safety that includes thoughtful infrastructure design, accountable vehicle manufacturing standards, and equitable access to emergency care. Drawing from global and domestic best practices, the piece advocates for people-focused policies that offer a clearer, more inclusive path to safe mobility.

Introduction

When we think about Indian roads, what do we see? Congested roads, speeding vehicles, the incessant cacophony of cars and people. Our roads enrage us. But who are we angry at? Overcrowded buses, pedestrians darting across roads, or bikers cutting through traffic. It is ironic how roads, designed to ease movement, have hampered our right to safe mobility. We have become

so desensitized to everyday dangers that even our children routinely jaywalk on their way home from school, unaware of the risks. Too many names have become numbers buried in reports we don’t care to read. How long until it is one of us? Road accidents seem to have become an inescapable reality of daily life. Somewhere along the way, we have grown numb to our responsibilities. In 2022, the country recorded 4,61,312 road accidents, resulting in 1,68,491 fatalities. This is a 9.4% increase in accident-related deaths compared to 2021, a sudden hike from the decadal decline of 0.3% in 2020 (MORTH 2022). The major cause of the rising fatality rate is overspeeding, accounting for 71.2% of deaths. Other dangerous behaviors, such as drunken driving, driving on the wrong side, jumping red lights, and using mobile phones, collectively led to a 28.3% increase in deaths in 2022 (MORTH 2022). The numbers clearly suggest that Overspeeding behaviour must be assessed because there are multiple parameters to be considered. It is influenced by heterogeneous traffic conditions, spatial and temporal factors, even social dynamics.

The Cost of Speed-

These behaviours are aggravated by the vehicles we drive. On Indian roads, speed costs lives. The way we engineer our vehicles must be matched by how thoughtfully we design our roads. Speed is not a measure of progress, inclusivity and safety for all is. In 53 major cities across India, over- speeding was responsible for 51.5% of all road accident deaths in 2022 (MORTH 2022). A Study carried out in Mumbai showed that road design can play a significant role in curbing overspeeding. For instance, increasing the number of lanes reduces overspeeding by 3.26%, while improving road connectivity decreases it by 1.12% (CSE 2023). Conversely, arterial roads see more overspeeding, emphasizing the need for speed-calming measures like humps, rumble strips, and

stricter enforcement through speed cameras and penalties. It is also suggested for future policies to ensure infrastructure of fully controlled pedestrian access for drivers to become more vigilant of their overspeeding behaviours in such spaces.

Source: 

The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 enacted by the Parliament aims to tackle such a crisis by enforcing stricter penalties and leveraging compliance of traffic rules through technology

(Government of India 2019). A total of 23.92 crore e-challans amounting to Rs.36703.96 crore have been issued in the country for violation of traffic rules during the period from 25 September, 2020 to 7th December, 2024 (MORTH 2024 But can the fear of fines and penalties alone truly ensure compliance with traffic regulations? There is a need to address deeper systemic flaws that may be encouraging such behavior. There is a lack of transparency as to how the road safety funds are being utilized. Manufacturers often prioritize profits over safety, resulting in vehicles that undermine the vision of sustainable and secure mobility. In India, express highways are designed for maximum speeds of 120-150 km/hr for cars but automobile makers are allowed to produce vehicles capable of speeds of 200-250 km/hr (Global NCAP 2023). This crisis is not specific to India. Nearly 80 countries lack any laws regulating vehicle safety standards, leaving millions vulnerable to preventable accidents. However, vehicle safety standards must also consider the effects vehicles have on each other during collisions while performing vehicle crash tests. While SUV occupants are protected by the size and mass of their vehicles, this often comes at the cost of increased danger for those in smaller cars during collisions. Studies show that smaller cars bear the brunt of collisions, with fatality risks increasing up to eightfold when compared to larger vehicles (IIHS 2020). Therefore, manufacturers must cater to strict accident compatibility norms in order to mitigate risks faced by all road users in case of an accident. What matters is not just the occupant’s safety, but whether a vehicle is safe for all road users. It inadvertently inhibits a culture of  exclusion  where  safety  is  warranted  to  only  those  who  can  afford  it. This challenge is further amplified by increased motorisation with newly registered vehicles amounting to a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 9.83 percent between 2010 and 2020 (MoSPI 2021). With these developments, it may also be more pragmatic to invest in public

transport infrastructure and Emergency medical assistance to reduce the likely future increase in road incidents and fatalities, than attempting to achieve reductions in accident numbers.

Is it the driver’s fault?-

The enforcement of road safety norms is more complex than it appears. Who is truly to blame- the citizen, the institution or the manufacturer? Although 78% of road accidents are officially blamed on driver error, one must ask—what about the systemic failures, like ambulances arriving too late? Rural India suffered a staggering share of 68% of the road accident deaths (1,14,261 deaths) in 2022. The disproportionate number of deaths, in comparison to urban areas, emphasises on the critical need for adequate trauma care facilities along with other enforcement practices and awareness programs (MORTH 2022).

Global best practices-

Brunei, for instance, is one of the ten countries that have reduced their road accident numbers by 50% in the past decade. As part of their road safety strategies, the number of ambulances was increased annually to improve response times to road crashes and post-crash care (WHO 2023). The ‘Vision Zero’ policy in Sweden has successfully halved the number of road fatalities since the turn of the millennium. The policy prioritizes minimizing the fatal consequences of human error, aiming to protect both motorists and vulnerable road users. With only a 10% survival rate for pedestrians at 40mph, Sweden introduced an 18.6mph limit in built-up areas under Vision Zero. By 2020, 2,200 speed cameras ensured compliance after a comprehensive speed review (OECD/ITF 2021).

Kerala, paving its path toward safer roads, has made notable strides in road safety, achieving a 13.31% reduction in accidents and a 0.84% drop in fatalities. It has taken a decentralised approach to tackling its short term and long term road safety goals. It pioneered the Safe Corridor Demonstration Project, investing ₹146.6 crores on implementing best practices such as improving 33 junctions, gateway treatment in 36 school zones, solar lighting, road markings, sign boards and crash barriers in an 80 km stretch of one of the state’s most accident prone areas. Moreover, the World Bank has assisted the phase II of this program by allocating 4.0 million US dollars to the challenge fund which aims to implement best practices from the SCDP on road safety solutions at the district level (World Bank 2023).

Representational image of an under-construction road | Photo: Suraj Singh Bisht | ThePrint

Conclusion

To address the road safety crisis, we must first absorb the urgency of the problem. While it is not something that can be tackled without institutional engagement, individual awareness and empathy

paves way for change in stringent environments. he foundation of effective road safety lies in the ‘four E’s’: education, enforcement, engineering, and emergency care. Strengthening road safety management through coordinated efforts at local, state, and national levels can help streamline policies and enforcement. Vehicles must be equipped with the latest safety features and should adhere to vehicle safety standards. Educating all road users and fostering responsible behavior is key to minimizing human error, while a robust post-crash response system can save lives through timely medical interventions. Finally, creating safer driving environments by redesigning roads to accommodate pedestrians, cyclists, and motor vehicles alike will promote inclusivity and reduce risks for all road users.

Safer roads require collective responsibility among all stakeholders involved. It is crucial to focus on evidence based solutions, and stick to the basics- Education, Engineering, Enforcement and Emergency medical care. No one should have to risk their life simply to travel for work, education, or leisure.

Biblography

Centre for Science and Environment. (2023). CSE analysis of road design and speed patterns in Mumbai.                    

Global NCAP. (2023). India vehicle safety assessment report.

Government of India. (2019). The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019. Ministry of Law and Justice.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. (2020). Crash compatibility and vehicle size.

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. (2022). Road accidents in India – 2022. Government of India.

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. (2024). E-challan and penalty collection report (2020– 2024). Government of India.

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. (2021). Transport statistics of India 2021.

Government of India.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Transport Forum. (2021). Sweden: Road safety annual report.

World       Bank.       (2023). Safe      Corridor       Demonstration       Project:       Kerala,       India.

World     Health     Organization.     (2023). Global     status     report     on     road    safety     2023.

About the author

Raarya Priyadarsini Kuanr is a second-year Masters student in Public Policy at OP Jindal Global University. Her policy interests span urban governance, public transportation, critical perspectives on science and technology, smart cities, Informal economies and displacement of marginalized people Outside academia, she is passionate about sports particularly basketball and boxing and is currently relearning the joy of reading and writing in an age of constant digital acceleration.

The post Mobility Or Mortality: Rethinking Safety on Indian Roads appeared first on 91̽��.

Abstract

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 aims to modernize India’s immigration framework by centralizing processes, enhancing security, and enforcing compliance. While many argue that it streamlines outdated laws and strengthens national security, critics highlight the risk of excessive centralization, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and economic drawbacks. Drawing from global case studies, including post-Brexit UK and Germany’s federal approach, this article underscores the bill’s potential impact on foreign investment, skilled migration, and regional autonomy. It also explores why India must balance security with economic competitiveness by ensuring that immigration policies remain flexible and attractive for global talent while addressing local needs and avoiding excessive bureaucratic hurdles.

Modernizing India’s Immigration Laws: Addressing Security and Policy Gaps

Given the rising global migration crisis, border security concerns, and the increasing complexities of illegal immigration, the bill is seen as a crucial step towards a more structured immigration framework. Recent developments, including the India-Canada diplomatic tensions over visa suspensions and India’s growing role as a global economic hub, also make this bill particularly relevant. Moreover, India has faced challenges in dealing with undocumented immigrants, particularly in border states like Assam and West Bengal. As highlighted in past debates over the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), India needs a clear and updated immigration policy to distinguish between legitimate migrants, asylum seekers, and illegal forces.

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “bill”) seeks to streamline various services related to immigration and foreigners, including their entry, exit and stay in the country. This bill repeals four existing laws, namely: Foreigners Act, 1946, Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act, 2000 which govern the services related to immigration and foreigners.

A New Era of Immigration Laws: Key Objectives of the Bill

The bill is designed around three primary objectives:

1. Modernization of Immigration Laws: The bill replaces four colonial-era acts, introduces digital tracking and biometric verification. Additionally, by establishing a centralized Bureau of Immigration, it aims to bring India’s immigration policies in line with international standards, thereby attempting to shift to a more centralized, structured and transparent system. On the flip side, a centralized Bureau of Immigration may lead to delays, red tape, and administrative backlogs, similar to issues seen in India’s Aadhaar system and centralized visa processing delays in the US. It is also crucial to note that immigration issues also vary across

states, particularly in border regions like Assam and West Bengal where immigration concerns are highly multi-faceted and localized. A one-size-fits-all policies risks overlooking these historical and demographic differences, thereby limiting state governments’ ability to adapt immigration policies to regional needs.

• Strengthening National Security: The bill implements strict visa screening procedures to prevent illegal immigration, human trafficking, and terrorist infiltration. It also enforces stronger penalties for visa overstays, fake documentation, and unauthorized entry. Furthermore, it aims to improve border control mechanisms with better cooperation between immigration officers and security forces, thereby strengthening national security.
• Enhancing Compliance and Accountability: The bill mandates foreign nationals to register upon arrival, with institutions (hotels, universities, hospitals) required to report foreign residents. The bill enforces harsher fines and deportation policies for those violating visa conditions. Furthermore, individuals overstaying their visas can face fines up to ₹10 lakh ($12,000) and imprisonment up to 7 years. It implements mandatory compliance from airlines and carriers, which must submit detailed passenger records to immigration authorities before arrival, similar to the U.S. Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). However, the implementation of digital tracking and biometric verification raises concerns about data privacy and potential misuse of personal information, especially in the absence of a robust data protection law in India.

Case Study: European Union and Germany

Drawing parallels and lessons from global experiences, the European countries have struggled with immigration policies, particularly due to the 2015 migrant crisis and subsequent asylum restrictions. Countries like France have managed to balance security with economic interests by offering fast-track residency for high-skilled migrants. Therefore, India’s bill, while emphasizing security, must also ensure it does not create unnecessary hurdles for students, skilled professionals, and investors.

Another interesting example is that of Germany’s federal structure. It allows its individual states (Länder) to tailor integration policies to their specific regional needs. This decentralized approach enables regions experiencing labor shortages to implement measures that expedite the recruitment and integration of skilled workers. Such flexibility ensures that local economic demands are met while maintaining national security standards.

From the Economic Lens

It is crucial to examine immigration not only from a social perspective but also through an economic lens to fully understand its multifaceted impact on a nation’s labor market and fiscal health. Immigration policies directly influence start-ups and key industries, as immigrant entrepreneurs play a vital role in driving innovation and job creation. Additionally, the economic consequences of talent migration, particularly a country’s ability to attract global talent and the challenges of “brain drain” due to emigration, significantly affect long-term economic growth and competitiveness.

Restrictive immigration policies may push skilled professionals toward more developed countries (e.g., Canada and Australia) for better prospects in high-income nations. According to a written response by the Ministry of External Affairs in the Rajya Sabha, 216,219 Indians renounced their citizenship in 2023. This figure represents a significant increase compared to earlier years. For instance, in 2011, the number stood at 122,819, indicating a substantial rise over the past decade. The data highlights the need for policies aimed at retaining skilled professionals and making India an attractive destination for global talent.

It has long been the global norm for individuals to migrate from lower HDI countries to higher HDI nations in pursuit of better opportunities hence immigration policies in developed nations can significantly impact labor markets globally. Countries with high HDI benefit from skilled immigrants, whereas low HDI countries suffer from a loss of workforce therefore, India must ensure its policies do not deter skilled migrants and foreign investment. If India is serious about achieving developed nation status, it must shift to an active architect of talent retention and attraction. The consistent outflow of skilled professionals to countries reflects not just global aspirations but domestic shortcomings. To position itself as a hub for innovation, entrepreneurship and global talent, India must focus not only on attracting professionals from abroad but also on creating conditions that make talented individuals want to stay within India. This means streamlining business and work visas, fostering diaspora engagement, and crafting an environment where skilled professionals find career satisfaction, opportunities for growth, and a high quality of life. It’s time to pull our socks up, ensuring India becomes a destination not just for migrants but for its own talent to flourish.

The Deccan Herald article titled “Not the End of Immigration Challenges for India” highlights that India’s immigration discourse remains largely centered on national security and demographic concerns, often sidelining the significant economic opportunities associated with migration. This narrow framing has economic consequences. Unlike countries such as Canada, Australia, or the UAE, which actively promote skilled migration as a tool for innovation and growth, India has hesitated to position itself as an attractive destination for global talent. Furthermore, its limited engagement in international migration dialogues and the absence of robust bilateral frameworks mean that India risks losing strategic influence in shaping global talent flows. This is particularly concerning for key labor-exporting sectors like healthcare and technology, where international mobility is closely tied to economic competitiveness.

Thereby, considering all arguments, it is safe to conclude that:

1. Increased bureaucratic hurdles may discourage foreign investors who need seamless business immigration processes.
2. Stricter visa policies and complex regulations could push international students and skilled workers toward countries with simpler immigration frameworks. Strict foreigner registration rules could hinder tourism and hospitality businesses, leading to losses in a major revenue sector.

Countries that implement excessively strict immigration laws often see skilled labor migrating elsewhere. For example, post-Brexit UK saw a decline in EU workers, impacting industries like healthcare and IT. India must ensure it remains an attractive destination for global talent.

Immigration Reform in India: Striking the Right Balance

The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025, represents a much-needed reform in India’s immigration system by replacing outdated laws and addressing security concerns. However, India must ensure that these regulations do not create unnecessary barriers for skilled workers, international students, and foreign investors. The experiences of Europe serve as a valuable lesson; a balanced approach is needed which protects national security while fostering economic growth and international collaboration. The success of this bill will depend on how effectively it is implemented and whether it adapts to India’s evolving socio-economic needs

Bibliography

Bendel, Petra, Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels, Brussels: Migration Institute Europe, 2014.

Explained: How India’s New Immigration Bill Overhauls Foreign Entry, Visa Rules.” The New Indian Express, 16 Mar. 2025,

Accessed 26 March

2025.

Immigrants and emigrants by Human Development Index country category, World Migration Report 2024, Module 4: Where do people migrate? International Organization for Migration, 2024,

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Migrants To, Within, and From Asia (1990-2020). World Migration Report 2024, Module 4: Where do people migrate? International Organization for Migration, 2024,

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Financial Times, 20 Mar. 2025,

Accessed 26 March 2025.

Economic Travesty: Congress on Over 2.1 lakh Indians Giving Up Citizenship in 2023, National Herald, 3 August 2024, .

Accessed 18 March 2025.

About the Author

Anubhi Srivastava is a member of the research cluster at Jindal Policy Research Lab, where she focuses to critically analyze power structures and their influence on social mobility while exploring the broader connections between law, policy, and society.

The post The Two Faces Of The Immigration Coin: A Critique On The Immigration And Foreigners Bill appeared first on 91̽��.

By Mahi Dahibaokar

“To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt, and the surest way to undermine it is laughter.” – Hannah Arendt, On Violence (1970).

First introduced by Richard Dawkins in his book ‘the Selfish Gene’ a meme refers to a concept, behaviour, or piece of information that spreads from person to person, analogizing them to genes in how they replicate, mutate, and evolve. He derived “meme” from the Greek word “mimema”, meaning “that which is imitated,” blending it with the English word “gene” to create a term that emphasizes the spread and mutation of ideas. (Dawkins, 2006). Internet memes are visual and emotive forms of online communication employing popular cultural images with succinct messages to communicate. Memes are considered ideas presented as a written text that moves from one medium to another as cultural units (Shifman).

Memes have ability to simplify complex political issues and distil them into easily digestible and shareable content. Memes often employ humour, satire, and irony to convey messages, making them not only accessible but also engaging to a wide range of audiences. This accessibility has democratized political discourse, allowing individuals from diverse backgrounds to participate in discussions that might have seemed intimidating in traditional formats. Memes, therefore, serve as a bridge between political elites and the public, fostering a more inclusive and participatory political culture. (Misra 2022)

The 2023 G20 Summit saw a viral meme featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, humorously capturing their interaction. The meme gained widespread attention, even prompting Meloni to share the photo with #melodi,

highlighting how a light–hearted meme can engage global leaders. This incident not only amused scholars but also demonstrated how memes can powerfully reflect and amplify political moments, resonating across audiences.

We have also seen meme battles being contested on the social media handles of national parties. They are used either to defame the opponent or to push the popularity of the political leader. But the flow and distribution of memes have become almost instantaneous with real-life events to an extent that sometimes it becomes difficult to decipher whether memes originate in response to political events or vice versa (Gupta, 2023). This creates doubts on whether social media conversation is politically driven actors     or organically result from citizens politicized and reacting to politics and sharing their opinions through shareable content. In either case, memes have undoubtedly become an integral means of political communication, encompassing political actors, parties, civil societies, and most of all, netizens. Using humour and satire, they foster communities of like-minded individuals and spark debates on social media platforms. Satire is a crucial narrative and communicative form for thinking and caring about politics in contemporary India. (Punathambekar, 2015)

Let’s take a look at the ‘humour’ critically. For Bakhtin, laughter is a socially acceptable way for the less powerful to challenge or subvert authority. A way to take down something that is above you, presented more superior, than satirize it, take away its power and debase it. The internet is known for turning everything into a joke, and humour takes the severity and gravity away from authority, one meme at a time. It is a tool in the hands of the masses to be critical of political leaders without inviting the wrath of those in power (Chatterjee, 2020). Memes play the performative task of stimulating public discourse. As seen most recently post

Trump’s inauguration a deepfake image of President of USA kissing feet of tech giant and capitalist Elon Musk. This is a sharp intelligent political commentary where AI tools are revolutionizing the landscape of memes with its absurdity. Popularity of AI memes may be due to technological neophilia, the obsession with innovation, new technologies, and continuous hype cycles. The current- day interest in AI-generated memes stems in large part from their novelty.

Screenshot from a Deepfake AI generated video

Through viral circulation, memes foster a kind of political community centred on shared codes of viewing/reading practices. (Baishya, 2021). Thus, memes are not just frivolous internet content but rather deeply embedded in the fabric of digital culture, serving as performative acts that evolve with each iteration and carry significant ideological weight. They are cultural moments in time that reflect and create the way we conceptualize the world. They can challenge authority,  amplify oppressed voices,  or  even solidify stereotypes, and all while forming shared inside jokes that unite us. In their simplicity, memes carry the weight of our beliefs, biases, and communal struggles behind them, making them a strong influence upon the contemporary ideology.

Baishya uses the term “light critique” to differentiate the work of the meme from work of a political pamphlet or public speech. The meme is “light” critique in two senses—first, it is

concise and literally lightweight in its rapid dissemination and consumption. Second, it is light- hearted critique, which does not necessarily mean inconsequential critique. (Baishya, 2021). But even as a light-hearted critique, memes can engage with audience, stimulate discussion among netizens or elicit reactions. It is not merely laughing then; it is a form of laughing with community of ideological peers.

Bibliography

Ankita Chatterjee (2020) Humour in Narendra Modi memes on new media.

Baishya, A. K. (2021). The conquest of the world as meme: memetic visuality and political humour in critiques of the Hindu right wing in India. Media Culture & Society, 43(6), 1113– 1135. .

Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press.

Gupta, N. K., PhD. (2023). Politics on memes and memes on politics. Economic & Political Weekly, lViii(30), 17–18.

Misra, Pritha. “The Role of Memes in Political Discourse and Public Opinion Formation: A Study”. International Journal of Cultural Studies and Social Sciences, vol. 15, no. 18, 2022,

pp. 101-108. ISSN: 2347-4777

Punathambekar, A. (2015). Satire, elections, and democratic politics in digital India. Television & New Media, 16(4), 394–400.

ŠKORO, I. E., BRIL, M., & Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. (n.d.). AI CAN’T MEME?!HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE AI MEMES. CRITICAL MEME READER III, 265–268.

South Asian Popular Culture, 18:3, 227-245, DOI: 10.1080/14746689.2020.1815450.

About the author

Mahi Dahibaokar is a public policy graduate student at 91̽��. She has worked with the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy and the Observer Research Foundation on issues ranging from urban governance to media-driven misinformation. Based in Mumbai, her interests include internet governance, algorithmic bias, and critical approaches to emerging AI technologies.

The post Laughing At Authority: Memes As A Tool For Political Subversion appeared first on 91̽��.

Abstract

This article examines India’s strategic challenges in narcotics regulation, analysing its geographical vulnerability between major drug-producing regions and the escalating production in Myanmar following political instability. It critiques the limitations of India’s legislative framework, particularly the NDPS Act’s failure to distinguish between different types of offenders and address sophisticated trafficking networks. The article also highlights emerging digital drug markets and emphasises the importance of enhanced enforcement capabilities to meet India’s sustainable development goals.

Historical and Geographical Relevance

The etymology of narcotics can be traced back to the ancient Greek medicant Hippocrates, who used the word narcosis to describe a state of benumbing or deadening. He is purportedly said to have used opium as an anaesthetic in his primordial medical procedures. Kautilya’s Arthashastra elaborates on the different effects of herbs and poisons that the king should be aware of. The use of intoxicating and addictive substances predates scriptural history and has remained embedded in our cultural sphere for millennia. 

Considering its known dual use throughout the centuries, societies have also grappled with the medical application of narcotics on one hand and abuse on the other. The supply and cultivation of drugs meant for medicinal or ritual use, such as opium or cannabis, have evolved into complex trafficking systems that are entrenched in traditional and contemporary networks that span across the length of the subcontinent. India’s strategic location at the crossroads of the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle places it in a precarious position. Overlapping supply routes expose Indian law enforcement to a deadly combination of the two drug dens, each vying for dominance in the region. While not legally binding, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target 3.5 that seeks to strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol, obligates India to pursue effective enforcement within its territories.

Regional Realities

As of 2024, the Taliban regime has reportedly cracked down on opium cultivation, likely driving an increase in opioid supply from Myanmar. Along with this, Myanmar is also finding a foothold in synthetic drug production, with a surge in Amphetamine Type Stimulant (ATS) drugs such as amphetamine, methamphetamine and ephedrine. While it is a myth that natural drugs are much safer, some synthetics can be potent and have unpredictable effects and an expanding inventory of addictive substances inherently makes regulation and enforcement much more tougher.
The competition for control over drug trafficking routes is deeply entangled with the conflict in Manipur, as most armed groups rely on revenue through drug trades, supplementing extortion with direct collaboration and facilitation of Myanmar-based drug cartels. Myanmar’s ongoing state of lawlessness, ever since the Military Junta took control in 2021, has only exacerbated the crisis, as rising costs have forced farmers in the Shan and Kachin states to cultivate poppy to survive. 

According to the Opium Survey conducted by the UNODC and the Myanmar Government 2022, Myanmar has seen an increase of 33% in opium cultivation area to 40,100 hectares, and an 88% increase in potential yield to 790 metric tonnes. Added to that, the increasing production of ATS as a viable alternative.

As shown in Fig (1), there is a significant spike in the seizure of opium from late 2021, likely attributing to the increase in production catalysed by the instability in Myanmar. The Indian state has been actively monitoring this issue and its links to the ongoing conflict in Manipur. The recent declaration of President’s Rule over the state is being speculated to be a strategic move in the right direction. 

Limitations of the NDPS Act and Enforcement Agencies

It is in this context that India should seek to optimise its teetering yet draconian piece of legislation that is the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act of 1985. The NDPS Act is the primary jurisprudential document that prohibits, except for medical or scientific purposes, the manufacture, production, trade, use, etc., of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It, however, misses a major piece of enforcement with its focus on small-time traffickers but does not outline prosecution and law enforcement on extensive drug cartels, which are the new reality of narcotics proliferation in the region. The Act, and by extension, statutory agencies such as the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the lesser-known Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), while acknowledging the amount/quantity of contraband peddled and classifying them, do not categorically draw any distinction between everyday addicts, small-time peddlers and large traffickers.

This law does not equip or lay down any procedure for the Indian law and order establishment to work closely with the armed forces to tackle imminent threats that are linked with drug financing and trafficking. The NCB, like most other Indian agencies, used to work in relative isolation and therefore seldom worked in coordination with the state police and the customs department, thereby establishing a weak link that is ripe to be exploited. This was, however, largely rectified by the NCORD (National Narcotics Coordination Portal) with its 4 tier mechanism of real time coordination. 

Digital Drug Markets

There also exists the domain of digital drug markets, which are increasingly difficult to track and identify. The online drug market, despite being a volatile one, provides surprising quality of service, and consistently weeds out underperformers. Dark web anonymous drug platforms, such as the infamous Silk Road, provide detailed time series data on products along with prices and rated transactions by scraping their websites. Ross Ulbricht, creator of Silk Road, was recently pardoned by the Trump Administration citing the case as an instance of government overreach despite prosecutors stating that the website sold $200 million worth of drugs anonymously.

Fig. (2): Visualisation of the chronological substance distribution on the Dark Web.

Indian agencies struggle with expertise to conduct cyber investigations that cover the scope of the dark web where transactions are made through cryptocurrency. As late as December 2024, the Delhi Crime Branch managed to bust a cartel operating through the dark web by seizing a cache of cannabis worth Rs 2 crore ahead of the Delhi Assembly Elections. With an expanding base of internet users, digital drug enforcement remains an imperative that the Indian state must direct its energies towards.

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In a world that is increasingly gaining access to drugs, prescription or otherwise, regulating its production and use is critical to achieving sustainable development as outlined through SDG target 3.5. As India moves up the income ladder, it is critical for it to lead the charge against substance abuse and addictions in the developing world.

Bibliography

Anstie, F. E. (1865). The definition of narcosis. In F. E. Anstie, Stimulants and narcotics: Their mutual relations; with special researches on the action of alcohol, aether, and chloroform on the vital organism (pp. 152–169). Lindsay and Blakiston. https://doi.org/10.1037/12215-004. Accessed 17 Mar 2025.

Bhaskar, et al. “The Economic Functioning of Online Drugs Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 159, July 2019. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268117302007 Accessed 17 Mar 2025

Central Government. “THE NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, ACT, 1985.” CHAPTER I, 1985, www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/18974/1/narcotic-drugs-and-psychotropic-substances-act-1985.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2025

“Challenges to India’s National Security: The Illicit Flow of Drugs From Myanmar to India-Pre and Post Myanmar Coup of 2021 – CENJOWS,” June 8, 2023. https://cenjows.in/challenges-to-indias-national-security-the-illicit-flow-of-drugs-from-myanmar-to-india-pre-and-post-myanmar-coup-of-2021/. Accessed 11 Mar 2025.

Hayes, Christal. Trump Pardons Silk Road Creator Ross Ulbricht. 22 Jan. 2025, www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7e0jve875o. Accessed 17 Mar 2025.

“Myanmar Opium Survey 2022: Cultivation, Production, and Implications.” UNODOC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and Pacific, UNODOC, 2022, www.unodc.org/roseap/myanmar/2023/01/myanmar-opium-survey-report/story.html. Accessed 23 Mar. 2025.

“Indicator Group Details,” n.d. https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/indicator-groups/indicator-group-details/GHO/sdg-target-3.5-substance-abuse. Accessed 12 Mar 2025.

Jain, Bharti. “Days After Biren’s Resignation, President’s Rule Imposed in Manipur.” The Times of India, February 14, 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/days-after-birens-resignation-prez-rule-imposed-in-manipur/articleshow/118230157.cms. Accessed 14 Mar 2025.

McCann, Conor. “Myanmar Supplies Most of Australia’s Drugs, but Can a New Coffee Culture Help Kick the Habit?” ABC News, February 12, 2024. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-11/myanmar-opium-production-and-coffee/103365256 Accessed 12 Mar 2025.

“National_Policy_on_NDPS_published.Pdf,” https://narcoticsindia.nic.in/Notifications/National_Policy_on_NDPS_published.pdf. Accessed 13 Mar 2025.

“NCB Annual Report 2023,” National Narcotics Coordination Portal (NCORD) (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2001), https://narcoordindia.gov.in/narcoordindia/periodicals.php. Accessed 10 Mar 2025.

Trevino, Steve. “Natural Vs. Synthetic Drugs: The Myth and Reality.” More Than Rehab, 24 Oct. 2024, morethanrehab.com/2023/12/21/natural-vs-synthetic-drugs-the-myth-and-reality/#:~:text=Natural%20Drugs%20are%20Always%20Safer,reactions%2C%20toxicity%2C%20and%20dependency Accessed 12 Mar 2025.

Parth Kumar Chaudhary, Vasudev A Chate, and Shreevathsa, “Insight Into Kautilya Arthashastra With Perspective of Ayurveda”, RGUHS Journal of Ayush Sciences 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2022), https://doi.org/10.26463/rjas.9_1_5. Accessed 17 Mar 2025.

Pti. “Delhi: Dark Web Drug Cartel Busted, Hydroponic Weed Worth ₹2.1 Crore Seized.” The Hindu, January 19, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/delhi-dark-web-drug-cartel-busted-hydroponic-weed-worth-21-crore-seized/article69115934.ece. Accessed 15 Mar 2025.

Sudan, Harjeev Kour, Andy Man Yeung Tai, Jane Kim, and Reinhard Michael Krausz. “Decrypting the Cryptomarkets: Trends Over a Decade of the Dark Web Drug Trade.” Drug Science Policy and Law 9 (January 1, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1177/20503245231215668. Accessed 14 Mar 2025. 

Transnational Institute, “Poppy Farmers Under Pressure,” report, Transnational Institute, December 2021, https://www.tni.org/en/myanmar-in-focus. Transnational Institute, “Poppy Farmers Under Pressure,” report, Transnational Institute, December 2021, https://www.tni.org/en/myanmar-in-focus. Accessed 10 Mar 2025.

United Nations: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “UNODC Report: Record Amount of Methamphetamine Seized in East and Southeast Asia as Synthetic Drug Market Expands and Evolves,” n.d. https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/2024/05/regional-synthetic-drugs-report-launch/story.html. Accessed 12 Mar 2025.

About the Author

Akash Namboodiripad is a first-year Master’s in Public Policy student. His current interests revolve around History, National Security, Foreign and Tech Policy and its intersections with Political Philosophy and Epistemology. He is an avid reader and enjoys writing on varied topics. 

The post Gaps In the System: Addressing the Challenges of Drug Enforcement in India appeared first on 91̽��.

Abstract

By 2050, 68% of the world’s population is projected to live in urban areas, consuming nearly 75% of global energy (Urban Energy | UN-Habitat, n.d.) and generating over 70% of carbon emissions (Executive Summary – Empowering Urban Energy Transitions, n.d.). With no clear decline in sight, the future of humanity will hang in the delicate balance of our urban design and urban planning choices. The mass urban agglomeration highlights the need for innovative and sustainable approaches in both urban design and urban planning as cities become the lifelines of mankind (Cities Have a Key Role to Play in Tackling Climate Change, 2023).

This article will introduce the idea of sustainable cities, cities that are considered the “gold standard”, what their key strategies are, and how rapidly developing cities around the world can implement similar (or identical) measures to decrease further emissions in the future; and develop sustainably.

What does it mean to be a “sustainable city”?

The importance of making cities sustainable is so great that the United Nations (UN) set it as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); goal number eleven: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (Cities – United Nations Sustainable Development Action 2015, n.d.).

Because the UN does not strictly specify what it means for a city to be considered “sustainable,” we will employ a broader definition. A sustainable city is a city that integrates eco-friendly practices, green spaces and advanced technologies to minimise environmental impact, reduce pollution and preserve natural resources (6 Traits of a Sustainable City (With Examples), n.d.). Using this definition, two cities stand out as the gold standard for what it means to be a sustainable city: Copenhagen (Sustainable Cities, 2019) and Singapore (Singapore as a Sustainable City | 6 | Past, Present, And the Future, n.d.).

The Buzzing Capital of Denmark: Copenhagen

With hundreds of kilometres of bike paths, electric ferries and a bold plan to become the world’s first carbon-neutral capital by this year (Calisto Friant et al., 2023), Copenhagen is a great example of building a sustainable city.

To be more specific, Copenhagen is focused on becoming a circular economy, which, by definition, is a model of production and consumption, which involves sharing, leasing, reusing, repairing, refurbishing and recycling existing materials and products as long as possible. In this way, the life cycle of products is extended. This approach contradicts the more linear economic models which are constructed on a take-make-consume-throw pattern.

This is because Copenhagen has a resource consumption per capita that is twice the EU average (Calisto Friant et al., 2023), which leads to excessive raw material and energy usage, and faster waste generation. Copenhagen’s municipal corporation introduced a slew of policies that are supposed to achieve the following:

Control Excessive Energy Consumption, particularly by buildings

Curb emissions produced from Energy Production

Reduce the emissions from the transport sector

The ultimate goal of moving towards carbon neutrality.

Copenhagen employed various methods to achieve its sustainability goals: To address excessive energy consumption in buildings, the city transformed urban energy use through strategic improvements. It enhanced district heating, saved electricity, and collaborated with building owners to retrofit properties. By implementing energy-efficient building standards and supporting the transition from oil heating to cleaner alternatives, Copenhagen effectively reduced carbon emissions and modernised its infrastructure.

To minimise emissions from energy production, the city utilized sustainable biomass and developed advanced district heating and cooling systems (Winter, 2019). It aimed to lower peak load production needs by converting peak and reserve capacity, establishing green town gas, and working on carbon-neutral water supplies and wastewater processing. Additionally, Copenhagen boosted renewable energy by installing onshore and offshore wind turbines and large-scale solar photovoltaic systems. The city also set up materials recovery facilities for waste and implemented biogas solutions for organic household waste while improving sorting rates for household and business waste.

In the transport sector, Copenhagen committed to a fully zero-emission public transport system, including all buses and harbour buses, by 2025. The city also aimed to reduce maritime pollution by providing shore power for cruise ships and creating an environmental zone in its inner basin. Furthermore, it converted non-road construction machinery to lower emissions, enhancing the overall sustainability of urban transport and maritime activities.

Singapore, the city-state at the forefront of the world

One of the most impressive economic growth stories of the last fifty years (Fujii & Ray, 2021) — its rapid development and population boom led to it facing various challenges surrounding its sustainability and liveabilit

Singapore has implemented a wide range of policies and initiatives to combat concerns about its sustainability and liveability across various sectors. These efforts are underpinned by sound long- term vision and planning as well as flexibility in policy implementation.

Being such a small country, the city-state immediately felt the effects of land scarcity. In order to approach this fast-approaching problem, the government employed many tactics revolving around efficient land use and land reclamation. Through horizontal expansion via land reclamation, the city-state has increased its land area from 580 square kilometres in 1965 to 721 square kilometres with plans to reach 780 square kilometres by 2030, despite facing environmental and cost challenges. The government has also explored alternative reclamation methods, such as impoldering.

To address land scarcity, Singapore has promoted vertical urbanism by relaxing storey height limits and facilitating collective sales. The Housing Development Board (HDB) has been instrumental in providing high-rise, high-density public housing with essential amenities nearby.

Additionally, Singapore has focused on improving land use for sustainability and liveability. This includes constructing eco-friendly buildings, such as those featuring Elevator Energy Regeneration Systems and LED lighting in common areas. Incentives like the Landscaping for Urban Space and High-Rises (LUSH) scheme encourage developers to include greenery like sky terraces and roof gardens. The city actively pursues its “garden city” vision, mandating greenery in developments and integrating it into residential and commercial spaces. Community interaction is fostered through better use of public spaces, such as playgrounds and parks. Furthermore, research initiatives like the Land and Liveability National Innovation Challenge aim to find innovative solutions to enhance land capacity and improve living conditions.

Figure 2: Singapore’s LRT

Another challenge faced by the country is the emission by transportation; often when countries rapidly urbanise, cars become the default transport option, like the effects seen in India, among many countries. Singapore adopts a comprehensive approach to managing traffic congestion through push and pull factors. On the push side, the government makes private vehicle ownership and usage more expensive with import taxes, registration fees, road taxes, and the Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system. The Vehicle Quota System (VQS) also restricts the growth of the car population. On the pull side, significant investments have been made to enhance the public transportation system, particularly the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) and Light Rapid Transit (LRT) networks, to make it more attractive and reliable for users.

Figure 3 : Bike Lanes in Singapore

To promote active mobility, Singapore improves conditions for pedestrians and cyclists by constructing sheltered walkways, pedestrian overhead bridges, and dedicated bike paths, along with introducing regulations for bicycles and personal mobility devices to ensure safety.

In terms of sustainable transport technologies and policies, Singapore has implemented progressively stricter emission and noise standards for vehicles and fuel quality. Financial incentives encourage the purchase of cleaner vehicles, and the government is actively developing and testing Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technology. The Land Transport Master Plan 2040 aims to create a well-connected, inclusive, and healthier transport network for all users.

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Abstract

This essay critically examines the ongoing discussion regarding India’s proposed Uniform Civil Code (UCC) to assess whether it promotes equality or poses a risk to majoritarian values. It emphasizes issues related to cultural diversity, minority rights, and gender justice, drawing on the example of Goa and current state efforts. It argues that eliminating discriminatory practices in personal laws is the best way to achieve true equality rather than enforcing uniformity. It also cautions that a UCC could jeopardize India’s pluralism and constitutional liberties in the absence of broad consensus.

Introduction: The UCC and India’s Diversity

The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has been a cause for various debates all over the country, and I find myself wondering if this extensive reform is indeed about equality or just a mere means of enforcing societal norms. From cultural norms to religious traditions, India’s diversity is what makes it different and beautiful. The foundations of the country are threatened by the prospect of imposing universally applicable rules. A standard set of laws may appear to be a logical starting point for achieving justice. However, the more I think about it, the more I see that equality isn’t automatically achieved by standardizing everything. The major issue lies in the biased practices embedded within different personal laws, not in their existence per se. Instead of disposing of entire traditions in lieu of uniformity, wouldn’t it make more sense to amend such inequalities present within them?

The case of Goa: A mixed example

Goa is frequently used as an example for the UCC. Although Goa does adhere to the Portuguese Civil Code 1867, many are unaware that there are still certain deviations. This raises the question: why are we not seeking methods to change unjust behaviour without demolishing communal identities if the goal is equality? Moreover, even after the enforcement of the code, gender discrimination persists in Goa. For example, as per the Portuguese civil code that is still prevalent in Goa, a married woman cannot make use of shared property without her husband’s permission- showing that uniformity does not always correlate to justice. (Law Commission of India, 2018).

Freedom, Control, and the Constitution

The most concerning point of all is the possibility that the UCC can be used as a way of control rather than a way of advancement. It feels like personal freedom is being violated when the state determines which traditions are acceptable and which are not. Article 25 of the Constitution, which protects one’s freedom to practice any religious beliefs, could be easily violated by this. Personal laws reflect how societies have lived and changed over the years; they are more than just legal codes. People may feel helpless and estranged if that is taken away for the sake of development.

Emotional and Cultural Attachments

Furthermore, it appears that the UCC’s constraints ignore the emotional attachment that people have to their traditions. The majority of the population sees personal laws as a crucial part of who they are, rather than just being legal frameworks. Consider a woman from Northeastern tribal community whose inheritance rights are protected by conventional norms. She might be refused those safeguards by a generally accepted code, which would force her to follow a framework that isn’t suited to her own situation. Quantifying the emotional and psychological effects of losing that connection merely in terms of the law is completely impossible.

Minority Rights and the Risk of Majoritarianism

Additionally, I cannot overlook the possible unequal impact this policy might have on minority groups. Given India’s vast history of inter-communal conflict, there is reason to be concerned that a universal rule could largely favour the majority. Minority voices are at risk of being further excluded and violated when the state begins to dictate which customs are acceptable. Concerns have already been raised by the current UCC proposal in Madhya Pradesh, which raises questions about whose traditions will be kept and whose will be lost (Hindustan Times). I find this power imbalance highly concerning, particularly given how UCC debate often labels some traditions as modern while others as outdated. For example, Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, promotes monogamy and views it as modern, whereas polygamy in Islamic law is considered outdated. This difference brings up questions as to how UCC discriminates against cultural traditions. (Law Commission of India,2018)

Gender Equality: Reform or Uniformity?

If gender equality is the main goal of the UCC, then particular changes are the answer. Inclusive changes could be made gradually by engaging minority groups, women’s organizations, and community leaders. For instance, Women’s Reservation Bill (2023) was passed mandating a third of seats in the Lok Sabha, Delhi Legislative Assembly and the State Legislative assemblies be rightfully set aside for women after decades of campaigning by women’s rights organisations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023). The 2005 modifications to the Hindu Succession Act, that gave daughters equal rights to inherit family property, is one example of a successful legal reform in India. Why aren’t various personal laws subjected to the same logic?

Philosophical Perspectives and Political Timing

To me, equality stands for a society in which every person has the freedom to make their own decisions, whether those decisions involve complying with or departing from religious traditions. Implementing a uniform rule without taking into consideration the underlying reason of inequality seems like a shortcut that prioritising legal uniformity over true equality. This viewpoint aligns with the ethos of philosophers like John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859) who highlighted that individual freedom is the sole basis of an ideal society and not state imposed monotony. In a similar manner, Amartya Sen (Development as Freedom, 1999) claims that strengthening the meaningful decision making of people is the path to true growth instead of enforcing strict legal conducts. Moreover, I believe the UCC debate’s timing is more political than being focused on social justice. India is at a crucial moment where women’s safety and economic injustice require immediate actions. Shouldn’t these urgent matters hold priority over a project that could cause community division?

Conclusion: Respecting Diversity for True Equality

At the present moment, it seems that the UCC is more concerned with maintaining legal uniformity than bringing about true inclusivity. The path to true growth is respecting differences while making sure nobody is left behind. We should be creating a system that ensures everyone has choice, respect, and dignity rather than imposing conformity. India’s variety has always been its greatest asset. Why should our individuality be sacrificed in the name of equality?

References:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. India’s Women’s Reservation Bill: A Step Towards Political Inclusion. 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/21/india-s-women-s-reservation-bill-step-towards-political-inclusion-pub-90567.

Government of India. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2005-39.pdf.

Hindustan Times. “Madhya Pradesh’s UCC Draft: Key Proposals and Debates.” 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/madhya-pradesh-ucc-draft-key-proposals-and-debates-2025-101679002345678.html.

Law Commission of India. Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law. 2018. https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/CPonReformFamilyLaw.pdf.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. 1859. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/34901.

Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 1999. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/development-as-freedom-9780192893307.

About the author

Anaaya Wahi is a second year Economics student with a passion for finance, policy, and research. An avid reader and writer, she has extensive experience in content writing, social media management, and graphic design. She enjoys exploring the intersection of economics, finance, policy, and storytelling.

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Abstract

In the twenty-first century, social media has emerged as a powerful tool for revolutionising the way people connect, communicate, influence, mobilize and consume information. From breaking news updates to viral trends, it influences everything, from personal relationships to global movements. Political parties around the world have increasingly turned to platforms like Facebook, Twitter (now X), and Instagram (even TikTok in some other countries) to shape their narratives, engage with voters, and influence public opinion. While it provides opportunities for greater political participation and transparency, the use of social media in politics raises worries about misinformation, manipulation, and hate speech. Furthermore, we will look at the role of social media in moulding political discourse and propaganda, as well as the risks and advantages of using it in politics.

Introduction

Political parties leverage social media to communicate their policies, mobilise supporters, and counter opposition narratives. Unlike traditional media, i.e., new reporters, papers, and channels, social media enables parties to bypass intermediaries and speak directly to their audience. This direct engagement fosters a sense of connection between politicians and voters, allowing for immediate feedback and interaction. Parties use targeted advertising, viral campaigns, and influencer endorsements to sway public sentiment. Data analytics, on the other hand, help them craft messages tailored to specific demographics, enhancing their outreach and effectiveness.

Donald Trump’s 2016 and 2024 U.S. presidential campaigns exude exemplary conduct for the same. Instead of relying on traditional media, Trump leveraged Twitter to communicate directly with his voters, bypassing journalists and news channels. His frequent and unfiltered tweets shaped public discourse, set media agendas, and kept supporters (as well as critiques) engaged. Additionally, his campaign used Facebook’s data analytics to micro-target voters with personalised ads, influencing key swing states. This strategy not only strengthened his base but also played a crucial role in his electoral success. Nowadays, almost every political party has an extremely prominent social media presence with teams dedicated for the same, under the ambit of Public Relations (PR), upholding their reputation and social media posts/engagement, keeping up with trends and news that might help them connect with their audiences better.

Brief Overview

Before social media, political campaigns solely relied on traditional forms of communication, such as television ads, newspaper coverage, rallies, and scheduled debates, to connect with voters. Politicians had to rely on journalists and media outlets to broadcast their messages, often shaping their narratives to fit the preferences and biases of news networks. This created a barrier between candidates and the public, as media organisations acted as gatekeepers, controlling what information reached the masses.

A classic example of traditional media’s influence on political campaigns is the 1960 U.S. presidential debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. This was the first-ever televised presidential debate, and it demonstrated the power of visual media in shaping public political perception. Kennedy, young and charismatic, appeared confident, well-prepared, and composed on screen, whereas Nixon, on the contrary, still recuperating from an illness, looked pale, sweaty, and visibly uncomfortable. While radio listeners thought Nixon had performed better based on his arguments, television viewers overwhelmingly perceived Kennedy as the winner. This debate highlighted how a candidate’s media presence and visual appeal could significantly impact voter sentiment, something that became even more critical and prominent in the digital age with the rise of social media.

In India, Narendra Modi’s 2014 Lok Sabha election campaign marked a shift from traditional media reliance to a social media-driven strategy. His team used targeted digital advertising, interactive hashtags like “#AbKiBaarModiSarkar”, and WhatsApp groups to reach millions, including young and even first-time voters, to gain leverage. Additionally, 3D hologram rallies allowed him to address multiple locations simultaneously, further expanding his reach. This direct engagement helped shape his image as a tech-savvy, quite updated and capable leader and played a crucial role in the Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP) victory. The success of this strategy set a precedent for future Indian elections, where social media continues to be a dominant force in political campaigning.

An image of BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi during a live “3D hologram” telecast where he addressed audiences in 100 locations in 15 states. Photo by Shailesh Raval.

The Rise of Political Propaganda

Political propaganda refers to a convincing effort supported by political parties, political groups, and politicians. In recent decades, political propaganda has been demonstrated in the form of captivating factional slogans. In recent scenarios, political propaganda can be seen in other forms, from rewriting the history of nations which is taught in schools, to preventing the mass media (Aro, 2016).

Before social media, propaganda existed to support wars, promote certain ideologies and even legitimise authoritarian ways. However, the advent of the internet and social media has revolutionised the way propaganda is created. Unlike traditional forms of propaganda, which were often controlled by governments or elites, modern propaganda is decentralised and accessible to a wide range of actors. This democratisation of propaganda has made it more dynamic and adaptable but also more challenging to regulate and counter its present possibilities as well as obstacles. The spread of misinformation and disinformation, which may distort public opinion and erode faith in democratic institutions, is a major source of worry.

Furthermore, social media platforms can reinforce existing prejudices and create “filter bubbles” that entrench party differences and obstruct efforts to establish common ground. Political players’ usage of social media might result in privacy breaches and cyberattacks, jeopardising critical information and jeopardising the integrity of democratic processes. To counteract manipulation through disinformation, it is critical to develop media literacy and fact-checking activities. Also, enhancing data protection rules and regulations can aid in the prevention of privacy violations and cyberattacks. To eliminate dangerous or improper information, social media platforms must also take responsibility for monitoring their platforms and enforcing community norms. Even cross-party cooperation and conversation can also aid in reducing polarisation. Strong cyber security measures can eventually shield political players from cyber dangers while also ensuring the integrity of democratic processes. It is crucial to emphasise how social media has changed polity, providing both possibilities and difficulties. Political actors may leverage the potential of social media to better democratic processes and improve citizens’ lives by understanding these dangers and taking action to mitigate them.

The usage of social media dictates how political parties frame issues and set their public agendas. By managing the narrative, parties can influence what issues get the attention and their perception. For instance, a party may employ the use of social media to promote its successes, minimize controversies, or focus on opposing the rival’s achievements. Direct and simplistic forms of communication like memes, infographics, and short videos serve the purpose of amplifying the appeal and accessibility of complex issues to the general public in the form of infotainment. A strong example of such patterned narrative management is the BJP’s focus on the “New India” vision during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. The party strategically emphasized the significance of national security to be a prominent concern by bringing the public’s attention to the Balakot airstrikes following the Pulwama attack, shifting public discourse towards patriotism and strong leadership to their advantage. By dominating social media with hashtags like #MainBhiChowkidar and videos highlighting PM Modi’s decisive actions, BJP shaped voter sentiment around national security rather than economic issues like unemployment. This controlled narrative helped the rally support and secure a landslide victory for the party, showcasing how contemporary media enables political parties to set the agenda and influence public perception.

Conclusion

As one analyses the influence of social media on political discourse, it is riveting to observe different eras in politics and how the world adapts and reacts to the constant slow-paced underlying evolution taking place around them. how people perceive information and how unknowingly, yet easily, the world can be manipulated. As one navigates through different ways of showcasing this digital landscape, it is essential to strike a balance between harnessing the potential of social media and addressing its challenges. By promoting transparency, accountability, having a rational belief system, and critical thinking, we can ensure that social media serves as a force for good in shaping political narratives and strengthening democracy.

Bibliography

Allen, Steve, and Robert J thompson. “Television in the United States – the Kennedy-Nixon Debates.” Encyclopedia Britannica,

Arguedas, Amy, et al. “Echo Chambers, Filter Bubbles, and Polarisation: A Literature Review.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 19 Jan. 2022,

Jan, Urfee. “Political Discourse .” Google.co.in, 2025, . Accessed 22 Mar. 2025

Oh, Chong, and Savan Kumar. “How Trump Won: The Role of Social Media Sentiment in Political Elections.” PACIS 2017 Proceedings, vol. 48, 19 July 2017,

Saaida, Mohammed. “The Role of Social Media in Shaping Political Discourse and Propaganda.” ResearchGate, unknown, 5 Aug. 2023,

Smith, Bruce Lannes. “Propaganda.” Encyclopædia Britannica, 21 Jan. 2024,

About the author

Abishta is a second-year economics student at OP Jindal Global University. She is enthusiastic about research and writing on diverse topics, synthesising information, and articulating insights to educate myself. Although, at the moment, her writing thus far has primarily been for assignments, she is eager to expand her horizons and explore new avenues of expression. She is committed to transforming her academic explorations into impactful narratives that resonate with a broader audience.

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