Source: Creative Commons

Why do we need Infrastructure?

The United Nations Office for Project Services states that infrastructure is not merely just building roads and railways, but is the creation of an interconnected system, which connects people to employment opportunities, education and is essential for progress towards the sustainable development goals (UNOPS, 2024). Infrastructure provides the basic underpinning physical facilities which are essential to both businesses and societies (Thacker et al., 2018). It is not too hard to understand why economic growth itself is a function of the economy’s infrastructure- without vast road-networks, logistics hubs, airports, sea-ports, railway lines etc, large scale economic activity is almost impossible. Urbanisation too requires large scale infrastructural projects such as metros and other public transport systems, which in turn boost employment levels, increase connectivity and expand the opportunities available to citizens. The Government of India for instance states that for every rupee spent on infrastructure, the GDP of India is boosted by 2.5 rupees to 3.5 rupees (Invest India, 2023). From a more theoretical view, infrastructure boosts the ‘p���ǻ�ܳ��پ������ٲ�’ of private capital and labour, which leads to an increase in the overall output in the economy (Huntley, 2021).

Why should the Government spend on Infrastructure?

Seen from the lens of public finance, governments are required to step into the infrastructure market for three major reasons. To begin with, several infrastructural projects happen to also be public goods i.e. goods which are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in nature- which implies that neither can we stop anyone from consuming these goods, nor does the consumption of these goods by one person, reduce the amount available to another person (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). Due to this unique feature that several infrastructural projects have, it becomes essential for governments to step in and undertake infrastructural projects, either by building the project themselves or through public private partnerships, as the private sector may not have enough incentive to produce these goods. It is important to note that not all infrastructure projects are strictly public goods, and several exceptions can be pointed out.

The second reason is that infrastructure creates several positive externalities in the economy. Positive externalities are ‘benefits’ that people who are not involved in an economic transaction receive, without having to pay for the benefit (the construction of a metro line in a city for instance, could lead to increases in the property prices of areas through which the metro line runs). The concern with positive externalities is that societies generally tend to under consume or under produce goods that have positive externalities (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). This under-consumption and under-production on the supply and demand side, requires the government to step into the market, either through subsidies (to boost production), or tax cuts (to boost consumption). The Viability Gap Funding provided by the Government of India to certain types of infrastructural projects built using a public private partnership, can be used as an example of such a subsidy.

 The third reason why spending on infrastructure projects by the government is seen as an important activity is that all spending on creating infrastructure within the country essentially falls under the bracket of ‘Capital Expenditure’ or ‘Capex’ as it is commonly called. Capital expenditure in the union budget or any state budget, would be expenditure that impacts the asset-liability status of the government (Karnam, 2022). Infrastructure expenditure is asset creating expenditure, and is therefore seen as an essential component in boosting a country’s productivity levels and economic growth through government spending (fiscal policy).

Public Private Partnership Projects

Infrastructure projects however are complicated projects, requiring a huge amount of initial investment to get them going. Most infrastructural projects take several months to be completed and require a huge amount of manpower. It is in this context that a new innovation in the realm of public service delivery emerged with the concept of a ‘Public Private Partnership’ (PPP). A PPP project can take many forms and shapes, but the core of any PPP project is to leverage the skills, expertise and efficiency of the private sector, to boost the capacity of the government to provide services and public goods for all citizens.

 A PPP project usually involves a contract between the government department or ministry and a private firm, usually selected through a competitive tendering process. The agreement (called a Concession Agreement) spells out the obligations and scope of work of both parties. In some instances, a new company is incorporated (called a Special Purpose Vehicle), to facilitate the successful completion of the project. PPP projects can take many forms and shapes, with varying degrees of risk and responsibility sharing between the selected private sector firm and the government. Some popular models of PPP projects in the realm of infrastructure development include: Design, Build Operate Transfer (DBOT), Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM), Build Operate Transfer (BOT) etc. In its very rudimentary form, a PPP project could just mean that the government requires the private firm to simply just aid in the operations and maintenance of a project (an O&M contract). More complex PPP projects could require the firm to not just build, operate and transfer the project back to the government, but could also require the firm to finance the project with some support from the government.

The private firm who enters into a PPP project would recover their investment in the project (along with a profit margin), either through tolls/user fees or through mandated payments from the government, according to the agreement. In case the private firm is unable to meet the obligations under the agreement, the government would have the right to withhold payments or terminate the agreement. In some PPP contracts, the payments would be linked to certain performance parameters (such as reducing the leakage in municipal water networks).

In several ways, PPP projects in India have revolutionised the infrastructure sector of the country. From early successes in highway projects, the scope and complexity of PPP projects in the country have expanded, along with the expanding definition of ‘infrastructure’ itself. The Bangalore International Airport (BIAL), was one of the first PPP based greenfield airports in the country, which led to several other similar projects coming into focus. Recent years have also seen several PPP projects in different infrastructure sectors such as skill development, tourism, logistics, renewable energy etc. Several states in India have developed their own dedicated PPP units/departments, and in 2020, the National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP) was launched by the Indian government, which envisions around 111 lakh crore rupees to be spent in the sector over the next five years. India also has a dedicated Viability Gap Funding Scheme, that provides extra government funding for certain projects done in a PPP model, which are termed as being important, but fall short of being economically lucrative for private firms to invest in. There is no doubt that the next few years will see an increased amount of PPP projects in the country, as India gets ready to move towards a five trillion-dollar economy, while also meeting several obligations under global climate pacts that require us to promote climate friendly infrastructure projects.

References

D’Souza, R. (2023, February 10). Budget 2023: Inside infrastructure spending. Observer Research Foundation.

Government of India, Invest India. (2022, August 3). Growth of infrastructure sector in India.

Huntley, J. (2021, June 15). The economic effects of infrastructure investment. Wharton Budget Model, University of Pennsylvania.

Karnam, G. (2022). Public expenditure in India. Oxford University Press.

Stiglitz, J. E., & Rosengard, J. K. (2015). Economics of the public sector (4th ed.). W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Thacker, S., Adshead, D., Morgan, G., Crosskey, S., Bajpai, A., Ceppi, P., Hall, J. W., & O’Regan, N. (2018). Infrastructure: Underpinning sustainable development. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), Copenhagen, Denmark.

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). (2024, October 21). Infrastructure.

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Source: Hindustan Times, and the Mint.

The state of Rajasthan, known for its rich cultural heritage and diverse landscape has witnessed notable changes over the last decade in governance under the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC). As the state alternated between these two political parties forming the government, each brought unique approach to development, taking India’s largest state by area to new heights.

The people of the state voted BJP into power in 2013, choosing Mrs. Vasundhara Raje as the Chief Minister for the state from 2013-18. The Raje government prioritized infrastructure development and business-friendly policies in Rajasthan to boost trade and economic growth. This was the period during which the state emerged as a leader in solar energy production, making remarkable achievements in the renewable energy sector. Along with this, several initiatives were launched to promote tourism and industrial development, which began to attract investments. Additionally, law and order were also focused upon and monitored to enhance investor confidence. The BJP-government under the leadership of Raje implemented welfare schemes such as the Mukhymantri Rajshri Yojna, which targeted to promote maternal health, and the Bhamashah Yojana, which was a direct cash-transfer program designed to empower women through economic resource.

However, the political pendulum swung back to Congress in 2018, bringing Mr. Ashok Gehlot to power. The shift in government and the party led to significant re-direction of policy priorities, with the government placing greater emphasis on social welfare and rural development. The Congress-government also focused more upon farmer’s concerns. The tenure of the government coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, necessitating a renewed focus on healthcare assistance, improved infrastructure, and economic recovery. Following this the Chiranjeevi Health Insurance Scheme was introduced in 2021, demonstrating a commitment to making healthcare more accessible to the poor.

Over the years, irrespective of the government, the prevalence of welfare politics has one way or another often overshadowed the development of a robust welfare state. Both the major parties have heavily relied on populist measures and social-welfare schemes to strengthen and expand their existing vote-bank. While most of the initiatives provide relief to the target populations, these are often temporary, falling short of addressing structural issues requiring long-term action and well-planned systematic solutions for crucial areas like education, unemployment, and poverty. Hence, the focus on politically advantageous, short-term relief measures has many a times hindered the development of strong institutional frameworks for sustainable progress in the state.

Nevertheless, some of the initiatives have shown promising results, one of them being the solar energy development, which stands as a proof of successful policy implementation. Similarly, other policies focusing on healthcare, employment like NREGA, have provided crucial support to the vulnerable population in the state. The infrastructural development, including improvements in highways and rural electrification also contributed positively to the state’s development narrative. However, significant challenges exist in the form of unemployment of the youth, water scarcity and inadequate irrigation infrastructure hampering the productivity of agricultural sector and growth of the farmers.

As Rajasthan looks forward to the future with massive heritage restoration, establishing a stronger stance as a tourist destination. It requires focused attention towards balancing industrial development that could have significant impact on the environment, along with agricultural productivity. Additionally, it also needs to balance creating employment opportunities for the youth while supporting the traditional artisans and craftsmen. The disconnect between policy proposals actual implementation also needs to be addressed through improved governance mechanisms and transparency. The agriculture sector requires comprehensive solutions for water scarcity, irrigation infrastructure, and fair crop prices to support the farming community.

Looking ahead, Rajasthan must pivot from short-lived welfare politics toward building a solid welfare state capable of tackling systemic issues and promoting lasting development. This shift calls for strong political will, administrative efficiency, and—most importantly—a long-term vision that goes beyond party agendas and election cycles. Ultimately, Rajasthan’s progress will depend on how future leaders balance immediate needs with the pursuit of sustainable solutions that truly benefit its people.

References

1. Indian Express. (2023, October 20). A political history of Rajasthan: A Congress-BJP revolving door. Retrieved from
2. Business Standard. (2024, November 12). Rajasthan’s tourism industry seeks a dedicated board in new policy. Retrieved from
3. The Hindu. (2023, August 15). Rajasthan set to emerge as hub of solar power components with changes in renewable energy policy. Retrieved from ������

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Introduction –

The map depicts the population density of Karnataka. The map shows the people living per km^2 and the areas in yellow marks the densely populated areas of Karnataka. As illustrated in the map, Bangalore is covered in yellow depicting how densely populated the city is. This article aims to analyse how one of the most densely populated areas of Karnataka navigates it sewerage system.

Bangalore, the capital city of the state of Karnataka, and is one of the most dynamic and rapidly growing cities in the country. Known as the “Silicon Valley of India,” Bangalore has earned a global reputation as a leading hub for information technology (IT), research and innovation. This cosmopolitan city seamlessly blends a rich cultural heritage with cutting – edge modernity, and on the top of its weather makes it one of the most attractive urban centres in India. Bangalore’s infrastructure has evolved significantly over the past few decades in response to its increasing demand and rapid urbanization. Over the years the city has got well connected by an extensive road network, metro rail and public transportation systems and through railways and airways with the rest of the country and the world.

Alongside, Bangalore is investing urban infrastructure to address the challenges posed by its growing population and corporate developments. This includes initiatives such as water supply, sewage treatment and waste management systems. One of the remarkable projects include the development of sewage treatment plants (STPs) to protect the city’s lakes and rivers from pollution, a pressing issue given Bangalore’s rapid expansion and environmental concerns.

Background –

The uneven distribution of the STPs across Bangalore is a consequence of a combination of historical patterns, rapid urbanization, fragmented planning, land constraints, and policy gaps. This imbalance leads to certain areas being underserved, which results in untreated sewage being discharged into water bodies, causing pollution and health risks. Growth in Pockets, as in areas such as Malleswaram, Basavanagudi, and the Central Business Districts (CBD) were among Bangalore’s early developed regions and hence the sewage management system also got concentrated here and the newer areas that got developed later couldn’t have the same infrastructure. The IT Boom and Migration made Bangalore experience unprecedented population growth, leading to growth and development of newer areas and the STP’s development got outpaced. The city’s infrastructure planning has often been reactive rather than proactive, with STP’s being built to address existing issues rather than anticipating future growth leading to uneven distribution.

Analysis –

The map provides a visual representation of the sewage treatment plants (STPs) distributed across Bangalore, marked by blue triangles, with corresponding treatment capacities (in MLD1). STPs are concentrated in certain regions, especially in the eastern and central parts of Bangalore. Notable clusters include areas around Bellandur, Kadubeesanahalli, and KCC valley, where multiple STPs with large capacities (e.g. 150 MLD and 90 MLD) are located whereas the western and southern parts of the city appear to have fewer STPs with smaller in capacity compared to those in the eastern region showing disparity. Eastern Bangalore which includes areas like KCC Valley and Bellandur, high population density, industrial zones and IT parks in this

1 MLD – Million Liters per Day.

region. This distribution likely aligns with areas experiencing rapid urbanization and economic activity.
One of the emerging themes over here, is how the uneven distribution of the sewage treatment plants corresponds so evenly with the area of Bangalore that defines it in today’s time, i.e. the central and eastern Bangalore where all the major IT companies and professionals reside, underlining the fact that to avail the basic governance facilities, one needs to belong to certain class and profession. It also highlights that how the preferential treatment to economic activities is being given more weightage over the social dimensions.

The map highlights the distribution of sewerage pipelines within Bangalore. The orange lines indicate where these pipelines are concentrated.

The map shows a dense network of pipelines in the central Bangalore, indicating significant infrastructure dedicated to managing waste in this core urban area. Areas such as Koramangala, Indiranagar and Jayanagar show a high density of pipelines. The area is known for its commercial activities. The outskirts of Bangalore, represented by lighter shading have fewer pipelines. This could be due to less development or lower population density in these regions.
The concentration of pipelines in central and major localities highlights the emphasis on servicing densely populated and commercially active areas as analysed in the above provided map.
The visual representation also highlights that how the uneven distribution of the pipelines across the city could lead to public health and environmental hazards. Areas with dense pipelines network likely benefit from better sanitation and lower risk of disease spread as compared to areas that lack.

The map titled “Sewerage Treatment Plants and Sewerage Pipelines: Bangalore illustrates the layout of sewerage pipelines and treatment plants in Bangalore and how both developments has taken place in a concentrated zone only.

Elevation and Sewerage Pipeline Distribution Elevation Ranges:

Low Elevation (50 -13110 meters): Represented in pink, these areas generally have a no network of sewerage pipelines. These regions might be less populated or still under development, leading to less extensive sewerage infrastructure.

Medium Elevation (13110 – 37650 meters): Shown in light blue, medium elevation areas also contain significant sewerage infrastructure, though perhaps less dense than high elevation zones. These regions may have a mix of residential, commercial and undeveloped areas.

High Elevation (37650 -66040 metres): Marked in purple, high elevation areas trend to have fewer pipelines. High elevation zones are often more densely populated and developed, necessitating robust sewerage infrastructure.

This map illustrates the relationship between sewerage pipelines and population distribution in major towns within Bangalore, focusing on a 3 km buffer zone around each town. The map highlights key towns around Bangalore with their population as per 2011 Census. The BBMP Municipal Corporation has the 84,43,675 which is the largest population. It is pertinent to note over here that this area is also that area which are highly concentrated with the sewerage treatment plants as well as pipelines. On other hand, densely populated areas/towns include the Anekal Town Municipal Council and Hebbagodi Census Town which have population of 44,260 and 34,827 respectively are those areas, where even within the radius of 3 kms, there are no pipelines and treatment plants despite of high population. This outlines the high disparity with the distribution of the sewerage pipelines and populations.

Conclusion –

Urban planning in Bangalore requires a shift from reactive to proactive strategies. Which will ensure sustainable and inclusive growth. By decentralizing wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), upgradation of existing STPs C public – private partnerships through
incentives, Bangalore can become a successful example for equitable urban development and environmental stewardship.

Data Source –

Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Google Earth Pro, Urban City Open Data Portal, Bhuvan, Population Census 2011.

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Introduction –

Uttar Pradesh is known for its diverse caste composition, with various communities exerting political influence at both local and national levels. Traditionally, caste like Brahmins, Thakurs (Rajputs), Yadavs and Jatavs have had a stronghold over different regions within the state. Political parties have historically relied on caste – based support, often selecting candidates based on their caste to appeal to the dominant groups in each constituency. This caste-based approach to politics reflects deep – rooted social structures and has shaped UP’s political landscape for decades. Over the years UP has played an important role in the national politics, eventually leading it to get the title of King Maker in the political realm of India, thus it becomes interesting to analyze the voting behaviors of voters of Uttar Pradesh in the recently concluded Lok Sabha elections of 2024 by deriving the relation between dominant caste in the constituency and dominant caste of the winning candidate and identify any emerging patterns.

Background –

The correlation between the dominant caste in a region and the caste of winning candidates in PCs1 is a critical factor in understanding the political landscape in Uttar Pradesh (UP). Dominant castes often wield significant socio – economic power and have a strong influence over political outcomes, including candidates’ selection and electoral success. The caste of the winning candidate is often aligned with the dominant caste in each constituency, as political parties leverage caste alliances to secure votes. For instance, candidates from the Yadav community who are numerically superior in certain areas are often fielded in constituencies where Yadavs are dominant.

Parliamentary Constituencies

However, this also raises questions about the inclusivity and representation of the democratic process. When the dominant caste repeatedly secures political power, it can marginalize smaller or non-dominant castes, perpetuating inequalities and limiting political diversity. This trend not only affects the quality of representation but also influences policy priorities, often sidelining the needs and concerns of underrepresented castes.

For instance, the western part of the state has a significant presence of Muslim – dominant constituencies while the central and eastern regions show a mix of General, OBC and SC dominant areas. Study suggests the mix of dominant castes differs between the urban and
rural areas. The OBCs are scattered throughout the state with notable clusters in both central and eastern regions, highlighting the widespread presence of OBC communities.

The caste demography plays an instrumental role in defining the policy issues, representation and building the narrative for the constituency and for the state in the larger picture.

Analysis –

The map titled “Correlation between Winning Candidate and Dominant Caste”, presents the relationship between the caste of winning candidates and the dominant caste in various
Constituencies for the Lok Sabha Elections, 2024 in the State of UP.

In many constituencies, the caste of the winning candidate aligns with the dominant caste of the constituency. A case in point, constituencies with a dominant OBC population have elected an OBC candidate, similarly, general category candidates often win in constituencies where the General Category is dominant.

Out of 80, 23 constituencies with dominant general caste have parliamentarian from the general caste, showing 100% correlation between the dominant caste and caste of the winning candidate. Whereas there were 15 constituencies who have OBC as their dominant caste and their MP too comes from the OBC. On the other hand, there are 3 constituencies where Muslims are dominant, and the winning candidate too comes from the same. Whereas there are 6 constituencies where the dominant caste was not general, yet the winning candidate comes from the general category. On the other side there are 9 constituencies were the dominant caste is not OBC yet the winning candidates from these constituencies are OBC. With respect to Muslims, there are only 2 seats where the candidate is from Muslim community and the dominant caste is not from the said community. Thus, based on above data there are more than 50% of seats where the dominant caste and caste of the winning candidate aligns very well hence highlighting the relevance of caste in UP’s politics and how after decades it still dominants the political realm despite of advocacy for social reforms and equal representation.

Out of the 19 winning candidates who won the 2024 parliamentary elections and come from the schedule caste background, 17 comes from those seats which were reserved for the schedule caste in the elections, thus out of 80 there were only 2 seats where the winning candidate was from the schedule caste and the seat was not reserved. This highlights the social disparity that persists within the political and social realm of UP.

This also remarkably underlines along with establishing the fact that caste does play an important role in the politics of UP, in case of no reservation; how difficult it would be for the people coming from the marginalized section to secure their representation in the Parliament of the country. Lack of representation can have significant and multi – layered effects on the individuals and community of the vulnerable caste. It could lead to limited policy advocacy for the caste specific issues, reduced access to government resources and development, weakened voice in national debates, perpetuation of Caste based inequalities and so on. It could also imply that the people might lose in contributing from their perspective on building of policy issues and narrative.

Data Source –

Election Commission of India, Caste Census 2011, Indiavotes.com, Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and Centre for the study of Developing Societies (CSDS).

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Ambitious welfare programs and promises have long been central to the functioning of the Indian governments at both central and state levels. Over the past decade, a drastic change has been observed in terms of how the welfare benefits are delivered to the citizens. The shift from a ‘welfare state’ to a government driven by ‘welfare politics’ is a significant transformation witnessed by India. State capacity coupled with technological advancements has facilitated the central and the state governments to transfer benefits directly to the voters, thereby dissolving the role of middlemen.

Madhya Pradesh has been playing a pivotal role in national politics, serving as a battleground for major political parties (BJP and Congress). The state has been under the dominance of BJP, witnessing Mr. Shivraj Singh Chouhan serving as the Chief Minister for almost 13 years, until Mr. Mohan Yadav swore in during the recent state elections. Over the years that were governed by Chouhan, he became popular as ‘Mama’, for the young population, and tried to live up to them through that name. Eventually, with the ‘Ladli Behna’ scheme he also turned ‘Bhaiya’ for all the women in the state. “I don’t run a government, I run a family”, was what he would say in the 2023 poll rallies.

The BJP government has been following the concept of ‘Swayampoorn Parivar’ in Madhya Pradesh, which is a full circle in terms of welfare schemes. This initiative is aimed at supporting families living below the poverty line by ensuring access to essential services and resources. For instance, a family in need of housing can benefit from the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana. Employment opportunities will be provided through the MNREGA scheme. Food security will be ensured via the Public Distribution System (PDS) and Mid-Day Meal scheme. Healthcare needs will be covered under Ayushman Bharat, while education support will come from the Seekho Kamao Yojana (SKY) scheme. Additionally, access to clean cooking fuel will be facilitated through the Ujjwala Yojana, ensuring a comprehensive safety net for vulnerable families. Above all this, the government has also been providing Direct Benefit Transfers (Cash Transfers).  Mr. Chouhan, having served the longest tenure as the Chief Minister, was able to emerge victorious due to the influence these schemes had on the people. 

Wooing women voters makes electoral sense. They constitute almost 48% of the state’s population. Thus, the government aimed to target them through these welfare schemes. Not only did they introduced Ladli Behna Scheme, but also transferred Rs. 250 into the bank accounts of women on the day of Raksha Bandhan. It eventually also announced that the gas cylinders would be provided to the beneficiaries for Rs.450 only during the Shravana months (July-August). These measures definitely have attracted a lot of women voters to vote for BJP.

The Ladli Behna Scheme was launched on January 28, 2023, six months prior to the Assembly elections. The scheme provides monthly financial aid to the women in families with annual income less than 2.5 lakhs per annum, by transferring Rs. 1000 in their bank accounts during the first three months of the scheme, until the amount got increased to Rs.1250. According to research conducted by the State Bank of India (SBI), the beneficiaries of the Ladli Behna Scheme increased their spending by Rs. 9300 (approx.) as compared to the non-beneficiaries.

Political parties in India have constantly been competing to offer freebies to the people. The populist promises that helped the Congress win Madhya Pradesh in 2018, Himachal Pradesh in 2022 and Karnataka in 2023 has forced BJP to rethink its strategy. For instance, Kamal Nath, state Congress chief and the party’s Chief Minister candidate had announced 11 poll promises including a monthly allowance of Rs.1500 for women, LPG cylinders for Rs.500 each, resumption of farm loan waivers and many more. (The Week)

However, the Prime Minister has often made a remark on the opposition parties that they are trying to ‘buy the people’ by distributing freebies. Mr. Modi refers to this as ‘revdi culture’ – metaphorically referring this to waggish distribution of sweets. Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, A BJP leader, even went to the Supreme Court in order to seek action against political parties for free distribution of resources from public funds. There seems to be a hypocrisy in the ideological front of the party. Claims have also been made that at the state level, the prime minister’s advice has been overlooked in this regard.

As much as these schemes benefit the people and bring votes for the party, they do not really solve the core problems – price rise, unemployment and the fatigue of incumbency. Schemes like Laadli Behna are only limited to providing certain financial benefits, and do not compensate for the problems plaguing the state.

“We cannot be bribed with a small compensation. The Rs 1250 from the Laadli scheme comes and goes in a flash. Our lives have not changed. In the last ten years, my husband’s earnings have increased by Rs 3000 but the cost of groceries, cylinder and electricity have all soared in this period,” says Kalavathi Rana, a homemaker in Mhow. (The News Minute)

When the cost of living itself is skyrocketing, the government must ideally focus on reducing the burden on people. Such schemes being introduced a couple of months prior to elections raises eyebrows. As electoral cycles continue to shape the nature of these welfare initiatives, the question remains whether they are truly addressing the problems at the grassroot level or simply serving as tactical tools to gain voter loyalty.

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On a recent field visit to Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh as a part of my coursework for Policy Action Lab, I had the chance to survey residents on the democratic condition of India, particularly in light of the results of the latest Lok Sabha elections. The survey was meant to understand individual opinions about democracy and capture the person’s thoughts and experiences. While conducting surveys on gender in the field, one interaction left me thinking deeply about the dynamics of autonomy, gender and voice. It was a moment that brought Slyvia Walby’s concept of patriarchy, which she defines as ‘a system of social structures and practices, in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.’ vividly to life.

I was surveying a middle-aged woman who replied, “Fill my survey the same as what my husband said because my opinion is the same as his.” At first, I assumed it might just be a matter of convenience, maybe even a gesture of deference. But as I probed further, she explained, “He knows politics best and hence, whatever is his opinion is also my opinion.”

This response seems unusual for a survey that aims to understand personal perspectives. Still, in that brief conversation, I witnessed a nuanced example of what Walby expresses in her book ‘Theorizing Patriarchy’ (1990). Slyvia Walby’s theory of patriarchy emphasises that men not only dominate the formal structure of power in society (politics, economics or law) but also shape the very framework of thought and agency in private spaces, creating a system of “public” and “private” patriarchy. Through this lens, even deeply personal matters, such as individual opinions on democracy, are often underpinned by the structure prioritising male voices as more credible or informed.

This woman’s political opinions had become an extension of her husband’s perspective. Her faith in his political knowledge went beyond respect, and it reflected a norm that she internalised over time, that his political understanding was somehow more legitimate and valuable. While she spoke with warmth, trust and respect, this situation highlights how patriarchy can reach deeply into the private lives. This was not just about who had more on-ground political and economic information, it was more about who had the power to hold and express an independent opinion.

Walby identifies the household as one of the six primary structures where patriarchy operates alongside the State, paid work, violence, sexuality and culture. What stayed with me about this interaction was how the two of these structures the household and the state, intersected here. The household and the State (the subject matter of the survey) were interwoven in a way that subordinated her voice to his. The woman’s trust in her husband’s perspective had subtly but powerfully shaped her sense of political agency, just as Walby argues that these structures do not function in isolation; instead, they intersect and overlap, reinforcing patriarchal norms.

This particular encounter stayed with me because it reminded me that democracy, in theory, thrives on diverse, independent voices. However, in practice, the individual agency, especially that of a woman, is often shaped by a complex mix of power dynamics within families, communities and societal norms. The above interaction serves as a testament to the way patriarchy operates not only within formal political spaces like government halls or public offices but also how it seeps into the fabric of everyday life. Patriarchy, in this sense, doesn’t just dominate political structure; it also governs the politics of daily life.

Through this experience, I realised that field surveys are more than just a collection of responses. It was a reflection of layered identities, experiences and sometimes silences. Slyvia Walby’s work has been invaluable in helping me understand that democracy, as a system, is only as inclusive as the individual voices it allows to be heard. In a world where individual voice can be a shared opinion, Walby’s insights remain as relevant as ever and prompt us to examine who holds the right to speak and who is genuinely heard.

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With assembly elections in Jharkhand scheduled to be held in on November 13 and November 20, the NDA and INDIA’s fates hang in the balance.

The burning issues in the upcoming assembly elections are shaping up to be, the “illegal infiltration, as the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) alleges, in the Santhal Pargana region, as well as a contest of welfare and development.

Although the Lok Sabha elections held earlier this year strengthens BJP’s bid to form a government in the state, one dominant factor remains – no poll in the state has ever given a single party an outright majority.

This means that the state has been prey to several weak coalition governments, with three instances of the President’s rule being imposed on the state, which has seen seven Chief Ministers across 11 governments since being carved out of Bihar in the year 2000.

In the context of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), which is contesting the assembly polls in alliance with the Congress, Hemant Soren’s party suffered a major setback with the chief minister, who is also the party’s working president, tendering his resignation anticipating his arrest in February this year,.

Soren was taken into custody by the Enforcement Directorate on charges of corruption. This was the latest blow to the party.

Following this, party leader Champai Soren replaced Hemant for the time that he was in custody. Champai is a veteran politician and JMM leader and was a close confidante of the party patriarch and Hemant’s father, Shibu Soren.

However, with Hemant’s release after being granted bail in July, he again returned to the chief ministerial position, with Champai being replaced. While claiming that this was “humiliation”, Champai rebelled against this move, showcasing his reluctance to step down as the CM, and left the JMM, later joining the BJP.

The switch over is supposed to have a huge impact on the upcoming polls.

Presently, the BJP will be gearing up to forge an alliance which would embolden its chances in the polls, and lower the chances of the incumbent INDIA bloc government by building  a narrative that would play against it.

The party has contacted the All-Jharkhand Students Union and the Janata Dal (United) to form a pre-poll alliance. Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma, who is also BJP’s election-in-charge for Jharkhand, had earlier clarified that the AJSU might be given nine to 11 seats, while the JD(U) could contest on two. Apart from these, the BJP is also trying to take Chirag Pawan’s Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) in the wagon.

The JMM-Congress, which has already announced the seat-sharing agreement, seem to be on the backfoot, with the third party in their alliance, the Rashtriya Janta Dal, expressing their dissatisfaction with the distribution.

The one region which could be a difficult task to conquer for the BJP is the 14-seat Kolhan area in southern Jharkhand, where it had seen a complete wipeout in the previous polls. There is a silver lining with the induction of Champai Soren, who has been fielded from the Saraikela assembly constituency in the Kolhan region. This could help the party make a comeback in the area.

The party is also looking to field senior leader Arjun Munda from Kolhan, highlighting the BJP’s focus to win majority seats in the region.

Another region which has turned into a battleground of narratives is Santhal Pargana, wherein the BJP has alleged “land grabbing by Bangladesh infiltrators”. The JMM has hit back at the BJP with claims that the party is trying to “hide its own failure” and pass it off as the current government’s.

The primary poll plank of the JMM is welfare, with the tribal party listing out the main projects it has carried out during its tenure. The JMM has spoken about – the increased beneficiaries of pension schemes, Sarkar Aapke Dwar camps, Rs 1000 for underprivileged women of the 18-50 age group and employment opportunities.

It is also important to look at the previous polls to gauge the results for this one. With the ‘Modi wave’ playing a role in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, the BJP won 12 out of the 14 seats that the saffron party contest, with no alliance. It took more than 40 per cent of the vote share in the state.

The Opposition, with the Congress, JMM and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in alliance, could only bag two seats, with a vote share of 24.6 per cent. The Congress was contesting on nine seats, the JMM on four, and the RJD fielded its candidate in one constituency.

Local and regional parties, namely the All Jharkhand Students’ Union (AJSU), as well as former CM Babulal Marandi’s party – Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) – contested independently. They could not win any seats, and their vote share remained at  3.8% (AJSU) and 12.3%  (JVM), respectively.

However, for the Assembly polls, despite having formed a coalition government in the state from 2013 to 2014, the JMM, Congress and RJD could not reach on an agreement for alliance. Similarly, the BJP too could not form an alliance with the AJSU, despite holding talks.

The results gave the BJP the edge, with the saffron party winning 37 seats in the 81-member Jharkhand Assembly. The party had, however, underperformed in comparison to its Lok Sabha performance. The BJP tied up with the JVM, which had bagged nine seats and held a vote share of 9.99 per cent.

Their combined wins of 45 seats helped the alliance cross the majority mark and form a government.

The BJP then gave Jharkhand its first non-tribal chief minister, Raghubar Das, who then led the state’s first government that went on to complete its full term.

The tables turned in the 2019 Assembly elections, which witnessed the JMM-Congress-RJD alliance gaining an upper hand, with 47 seats, and crossing the 41-seat majority mark. The alliance had a vote share of 35.4 per cent.

Hemant Soren became the Chief Minister of Jharkhand for the second time. If not for his arrest, he was set to become the second CM to complete his full term in the state.

On the other hand, the BJP again contested the elections independently, and won 25 seats, gaining 33.4 per cent of the vote share.

The JMM became the single largest party in Jharkhand, with 30 seats. The BJP and Congress bagged 16.

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Introduction

The Department of Economic Affairs, under the Ministry of Finance, runs the ‘Viability Gap Funding’ scheme, which was notified initially in 2005, and was later revamped in 2020. The scheme enables PPP projects which are socially and economically desirable, but may fall short of financial viability for private firms to invest in (as public infrastructure projects usually have longer gestation periods and may not always give high financial returns). The VGF Scheme allows for the expansion of public infrastructure projects into the provision of goods and services in the social sector, including waste water management, education, healthcare etc. In its present state, the scheme allows for up to 60% of the total project cost of projects in the social sector to be subsidised and up to 80% of the total project cost of pilot projects in education and healthcare to be subsided by the central government. For all other sectors, projects are eligible for up to 40% of the total project cost as viability gap funding. The scheme is administered by an empowered committee and proposals need to be approved by this committee before funds are disbursed (Department of Economic Affairs, 2020). Most recently in 2024, the union government launched a separate VGF scheme for off-shore wind energy projects, in a bid to boost the generation of renewable energy production in the country (PIB, 2024).

The economic tools which work in favour of a VGF scheme

The argument in favour of a VGF scheme stems from an economic concept called an ‘externality’. An externality is when someone who is not a part of an economic transaction, either gains a benefit or suffers a loss due to the economic transaction, without having to pay for the benefit or being compensated for the loss. Externalities can negative or positive, and it is the positive externalities that are produced by infrastructure projects that justify the VGF scheme. An example of this could be the construction of a metro line within a city, that would increase the property prices across its route. Owners of property along the route would have greatly benefitted from the increase in property prices, without having to do anything. The problem however is that societies generally would tend to under-produce goods which provide positive externalities. This problem of under-production can be boosted through subsidies from the government, which would push the supply curve rightwards, leading to an increase in the production of the good. The basis of this comes from the work of noted welfare economist Arthur Cecile Pigou- a subsidy which corrects a market failure that occurs in the under production of goods that provide positive externalities are commonly referred to as ‘Pigouvian Subsidies’.

Social Marginal Cost and Private Marginal Cost

Whenever there is a good that produces a positive externality, on the supply side there would be under-production, as the private marginal cost curve (which shows us how much it costs a private firm to produce one extra unit of a good), would be left of the social marginal cost curve (which tells us how much it costs to the society to produce one extra unit of a good). The aim of the subsidy would be the push the private cost curve towards the right, which would increase the total quantity produced (As seen in Figure 1). The aim would be to reduce the under-production of the good, by lowering costs to firms. Without the subsidy being made available, there would be a deadweight loss in the economy, as the society is quite literally ‘paying’ for the lack of production of a good which produces a positive externality. The subsidy would move the market equilibrium, which occurs at E0, towards the socially optimal equilibrium at E1, thereby removing the market failure (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015 pp. 129-131). While it would be hard to bring the market equilibrium to exactly the position of the socially optimal equilibrium, it is nonetheless an effort to at least move towards the socially optimal level (Q1 and P1).

Figure 1- Market Failure in the Case of Positive Production Externalities

*Diagram has been complied by the Author

Recommendations and Conclusion

Infrastructure is an essential component in the process of growing an economy, and infrastructure projects need to be at the centre of any government’s economic policy. The VGF scheme enables the scope of PPP projects in India to expand beyond the traditional sectors in which PPP projects have normally thrived in, such as highways, airports etc and it plays an important role in correcting the market failure that occurs due to the under-production of goods that cause positive externalities in the society. Any increase in the funding and scope of the VGF scheme, would go a long way in improving the PPP eco-system in the country, apart from increasing the efficiency of the public service delivery system in India. Dedicated targeted VGF schemes for certain sectors (including climate resilient infrastructure, projects which have a direct impact on the SDG’s etc), can also be a boost for the PPP model of service delivery in the country.

References

Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. (2020). VGF Scheme Guidelines. Government of India.

Press Information Bureau. (2024). Cabinet approves Scheme for Viability Gap Funding for Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS). Government of India.

Stiglitz, J. E., & Rosengard, J. K. (2015). Economics of the Public Sector (4th ed.). W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

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The recent verdict of the High Court of Bombay struck down the Fact Check Units (‘FCUs’) established by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in a 2023 amendment to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) 2021. The primary contention of the respondents in the case was that these FCUs would regulate instances of misinformation and disinformation online- common issues plaguing our use of social media. The Court’s decision highlights the delicate balance between curbing misinformation and protecting free speech, leaving the challenge of addressing online disinformation without overreach unresolved.

In today’s digital age, words like ‘misinformation’, ‘disinformation’ and ‘fake news’ are all used interchangeably but are different. Given how rampant fake news is today- much like a viral reel or meme just stuck in our head (looking at you, Moo Deng), we must understand the difference before moving forward. Misinformation refers to inaccurate information shared without intent to deceive, such as outdated or misconstrued news. It’s like your aunt saying that only drinking green tea will make you fit into a lehenga for your cousin’s wedding. Conversely, disinformation involves deliberately spreading false information to mislead, often to influence public opinion or achieve specific goals. It would fall under disinformation when we look at it from a ‘fake news’ perspective, much like a former US President’s headline-grabbing claims.

While I had forgotten about this judgment, it came back to me during a field visit to Jawahari Bazaar in Panipat as part of our coursework. One of the respondents in our survey expressed concerns about how pervasive ‘fake news’ has become, particularly through social media. This distortion, they pointed out, undermines a voter’s capacity to make informed decisions, threatening the integrity of free and fair elections. The starkness of this observation, rooted in local realities, made me reflect on the broader implications of misinformation and disinformation in our democratic processes.

A survey conducted by Social & Media Matters held that 65.2% of first-time voters encountered fake news, and 37.1% were victims of misinformation. A report by the Internet and Mobile Association of India further highlights that over 67% of Indian Internet users are exposed to misinformation daily, amplifying concerns over the influence of fake news on elections. Statistically, we’ve had more exposure to fake news than we do to Vitamin D. This is despite some governmental intervention, with an answer during the Winter Session of the Rajya Sabha reporting that between 2019 and 2023, the Press Information Bureau has flagged 1160 instances of fake news on social media in India. It’s just made work for media houses and fact-checking organisations difficult, with them having to repeatedly look into instances of fake news- created with the help of altering text, audio and video and then being spread to distort public perception. These statistics highlight the challenges in maintaining election integrity and the importance of fact-checking and media literacy.

Keeping in mind the issues faced by the common man, it is imperative to look into these instances to ensure a free electoral process and expression. There is enough literature and statements made by important people saying media is the fourth pillar of our democracy, but what are we doing to stop an epidemic distorting reality? Curbing misinformation and disinformation in India requires a multi-pronged approach. Nationwide media literacy campaigns are essential to educate the public on critically evaluating news sources and spotting fake news, particularly in rural areas. Collaborations between social media platforms and independent fact-checking organisations can help swiftly flag false information, while stricter regulations can hold platforms accountable for the content circulated.

Our democracy depends on the information, with the right to know being read as part and parcel of one’s freedom of speech and expression. How do we know what they know, and do they know what we know? Transparency and ethical reporting are the need of the hour to ensure that the information available to the general public is aware before they cast a vote, which can make or break the next five years of their life. To be the largest free and fair democracy, we need to make an active regulatory and participatory effort to curb disinformation in the media.

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The vote counting for the 90 constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir wrapped up on 8^th October,2024 Tuesday, revealing The National Conference-Congress coalition has won 49 seats.   This outcome marks a significant milestone, as it leads to the formation of an elected government after a six-year hiatus following the collapse of the PDP- BJP alliance on June 20, 2018, and the subsequent abrogation of Article 370. The majority threshold stands at 46 seats. These elections, the first in Jammu and Kashmir since 2014, were conducted in three phases. The first phase took place on September 18, covering 24 seats, followed by the second phase on September 25 which included 26 seats. The final phase involving the remaining 40 seats, was held on October 1. The primary contenders in this eagerly awaited election included the Congress- National Conference alliance, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). This electoral process also comes five years after the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into two separate union territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.  

The Indian Government framed the election as a step toward restoring normalcy and democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. For the center, the elections were a symbol of development and political stabilization, a sign that life in the region was returning to normal. However, the reality on the ground was more complex. For many in the valley, the elections unfolded against a backdrop of ongoing political disenfranchisement, the lingering presence of security forces, and an unsolved sense of loss following the revocation of the special status. While the rhetoric of ���𱹱���DZ賾��Գ�” dominated political narratives, it was not sufficient to address the deep-seated feelings of alienation and mistrust that persists in the region.

The elections carry the weight of a long history of political manipulation and disenfranchisement in Jammu and Kashmir. From the rigged elections of 1987, which triggered decades of unrest, the central governments recent reshaping of the region’s political landscape, the people of Jammu and Kashmir have witnessed the erosion of their political autonomy over the years. The once dominant regional parties, like the NC and the PDP, now find themselves navigating a drastically altered landscape, with their political influence diminished and their traditional base fractured. The rise of newer parties, perceived as being more accommodating to New Delhi’s agenda, further complicates the political dynamics.

Participation in these elections, especially in the valley, was often driven by pragmatism rather than enthusiasm. Many voters approached the process as a means of addressing immediate local concern, such as employment, healthcare, and infrastructure, rather than as an endorsement of the new political order. The turnout in some areas demonstrated a cautious engagement system, while other regions, where boycotts and low participation were more prevalent, signaled continuing discontent and a sense of alienation. For many Kashmiris the act of voting was a form of negotiation- a way of managing their immediate needs within a system they distrust, rather than a hopeful endorsement of a new future.

The election also reflects the post- Article 370 abrogation reality, where the central government’s writ largely governs the region. With the abrogation of the special status, the space for regional political autonomy has been significantly reduced. While the newly elected representatives may take office, the question remains whether they will have any real power to influence governance or policy decisions, or if they will simply function within a deeper framework tightly controlled by the center. The deeper unresolved question of Justice, Identity and Self-determination remains. The political process as framed by the center seeks to institutionalize stability, but for many Kashmiris, it feels like an extension of control rather than restoration of democracy. 

The assembly elections in Jammu & Kashmir were therefore not just an exercise in democratic function. They were a complex reflection of the region’s contested political future, caught between the pull of Co-option and resistance, pragmatism, alienation, survival and the search for justice. While the results may shape the day-to-day governance of the region, the larger questions of autonomy, dignity and identity continue to loom over Jammu and Kashmir, unresolved and urgent. The elections have offered a glimpse into the delicate balancing act between the region’s desire for self- governance and the central government’s consolidation of power, Leaving the future of Jammu and Kashmir’s political landscape uncertain. 

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