at Belém, Brazil.” 18 November 2025.

India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 fluently demanded global finance and justice but its own record on coal expansion, underfunded adaptation, and toxic air quality reveals a widening gap between rhetoric and reality. This article argues that India cannot credibly lead on climate justice while failing to deliver its most basic form at home: the right to clean air.

1. Introduction

For many Indians who grew up in the 2000s and 2010s, environmentalism arrived in a neat, schoolfriendly package. “Reduce, Reuse, Recycle” sat at the center of every Earth Day activity. We drew the three chasing arrows on chart paper, pledged to avoid plastic straws, and were praised for bringing steel bottles to class. Climate change, as it was presented to us, floated in a morally uncomplicated space: no villains, no political economy, no reference to the infrastructure that powered our cities. Responsibility lived in our habits, not in the systems around us.

In 2025, this narrative no longer holds. COP30 in Belém is over, and the chasm between India’s global rhetoric and its domestic reality has never been wider. The Indian delegation spoke

fluently about justice, demanding that the Global North meet its climate finance obligations and labeling the existing $100 billion goal “suboptimal.” This critique is diplomatically sound. The rich nations have indeed failed to deliver. However, the singular focus on finance abroad allowed the government to sidestep confronting a lack of ambition at home.

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2.1 Context and History

Three measurable failures mark India’s position at COP30.

The first failure is our 2035 target. The Glasgow agreement set a clear expectation for countries to commit to a strengthened Nationally determined contribution (NDC) which basically stipulates a time bound roadmap for mitigation.¹ Despite our climate strategy being classified as “Highly Insufficient” by the Climate Action Tracker,² India is one of the major players that postponed this submission until after the conference. Our current framework for keeping the global temperature increase below 1.5 degrees celsius is severely lacking.

The second failure is our attitude towards coal. More than 130 nations supported a resolution to phase out fossil fuels, but India insisted on the term “phasing down of unabated coal.” The statistics reveal that India is planning more than 92 GW of new coal capacity in addition to what is currently under construction,³ and official documents outline that the total capacity will reach 307 GW by 2035.⁴ Coal is still the main component of India’s energy policy and no peak has been declared until the middle of the 2030s at least.

Third is regarding adaptation. India often frames its climate vulnerability around adaptation needs. Yet the Union Budget shows that key schemes have declining or zero allocations: the National Adaptation Fund has been given no meaningful budget for a second successive year, and funding to the National Coastal Mission has been cut.⁵ It is difficult to demand global adaptation finance while underfunding resilience at home.

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3.1 Core Argument

What is framed as episodic winter smog, is actually chronic, structural exposure that shapes lung growth, cognitive development, learning outcomes, and long term health. It dictates whether children can play outside, whether workers can work safely, and whether cities remain liveable.

¹United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact

²Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/ ³Global Energy Monitor. (2024). Global Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/

⁴Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

⁵Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.

Despite what we were taught as kids, the fact remains that a crisis of this magnitude cannot be addressed by individual behaviour alone.

The most immediate contradiction is the air itself. The University of Chicago’s Air Quality life report shows us that most of our 1.4 billion live in places where the PM2.5 level is way above the WHO’s safe limit.⁶ Inhaling this toxic air reduces lifespan by an average of 3.5 years. In the Indo Gangetic plain, which includes Delhi NCR, the average loss is approximately 8.3 years.

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility. The world is now showing the consequences of policy decisions made by others. These are decisions made in favor of fossil fuel expansion, urban sprawl, weak industrial enforcement, and underfunded public transport among others.

We breathe the air that is decided upon in ministries, regulatory bodies, and energy plans, not with our reusable straws. Our childhood climate education did not prepare us for a world where the state normalizes air pollution levels that would be treated as a national emergency elsewhere.

3.2 Counter Arguments and Limitations

Recently, India has ranked within the first 100 countries worldwide in SDG ranking and this was mainly due to the efforts in poverty alleviation and provision of energy.⁷ SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), 13 (climate action), 14 (life below water), and 15 (life on land) remain the weakest points for India.⁸ Issues like air pollution, the loss of biodiversity, solid waste management, and climate mitigation are all far behind social sector progress. The 2030 Agenda commits India to a sustainable future, yet the air offers little evidence that we are on that path.

4. Implications

If India really wants to be an active player in climate justice, true justice that seeks to serve its citizens, then it has to surpass the stage of merely proclaiming the leadership role and indeed bring about fundamental change:

Declare a timetable for the phase-out of coal: a detailed schedule for the retirement of the current 210 GW coal capacity, and cancellation of the 92 GW pipeline.

Recognize clean air as a basic human right: Legally impose PM2.5 limits on cities with independent monitoring and actual penalties upon non compliance.⁹

⁷Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024. https://

⁸United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/

⁹World Health Organization. (2021). WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.

Support local adaptation: revive the National Adaptation Fund¹⁰ and other resilience programs to cover all the needy communities now, rather than in some distant climate finance future.

Such national planning must align with what the health evidence makes clear: air pollution is not a seasonal inconvenience but a public health emergency. My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

Key Takeaways

• India’s climate diplomacy at COP30 prioritised demanding finance from the Global North while failing to submit a strengthened NDC or commit to a coal phase-out timeline.
• Air pollution in India is a structural public health emergency, not an individual responsibility — the Air Quality Life Index shows PM2.5 levels reduce average lifespans by 3.5 years nationally and 8.3 years in the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
• True climate justice requires domestic action: a coal retirement schedule, legally enforceable clean air standards, and a revived National Adaptation Fund.

5. Conclusion

The environmentalism that was predominant in our childhood simply cannot cope with this new scenario. We were led to believe that the lessening of our individual impact on the environment which we practiced would be the summation of the world’s environmental responsibility.

My generation was raised on the belief that environmentalism starts with us. By 2025, we know that the air we breathe is a product of decisions elsewhere. If India wishes to speak for climate justice on the global stage, then it must first deliver the most basic form of it at home: the right to clean air.

References

• Climate Action Tracker. (2023). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2021). Glasgow Climate Pact. COP26 Outcomes. https://unfccc.int/glasgow-climate-pact
• Global Energy Monitor. (2024). Global Coal Plant Tracker. https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-coal-plant-tracker/
• Ministry of Power, Government of India. (2023). National Electricity Plan 2023–2032. Central Electricity Authority.

¹⁰Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

• Government of India. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25. Ministry of Finance. Demand for Grants: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.
• Greenstone, M., et al. (2024). Air Quality Life Index Annual Report 2024. Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago. https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/annual-report/
• United Nations. (2023). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023. UN Statistics Division. https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/
• Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). (2024). SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2024.
• World Health Organization. (2021). WHO Global Air Quality Guidelines: Particulate Matter (PM2.5 and PM10), Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide, Sulfur Dioxide and Carbon Monoxide. Geneva: WHO Press.
• Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. (2022). National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC). Annual Report 2021–22.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

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India’s booming gig and platform economy continues to operate with restricted social and legal safeguards. This article aims to examine whether the Union Budget 2026-27 makes any meaningful advancement in areas of social security of gig workers, allocations to the Welfare Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020, welfare design and accessible protection mechanisms, while questioning the role of platform companies in ensuring accountability and the welfare of workers.

Introduction

The rapid expansion of food and grocery delivery platforms such as Zomato and Swiggy have reshaped urban labour markets in India. Despite the humorous Blinkit hoardings highlighting what the nation shopped the most in one year, or Zomato’s regular pop-up notifications attracting

the consumers to order more from the platform, there lies a deeply exploitative nature of employment that is meted out to the gig workers. In absence of any legislation on minimum wages, regulated hours of work, social security codes that are existent on papers and a rapidly growing economy that demands you to get along, the gig workers have no option but to succumb to their situations. While the world celebrated the coming of a new year, the gig workers protested for their rights, logging out of their respective platforms. The nationwide strike made its way to the Parliament when it caught the attention of Mr. Raghav Chaddha, a Member of Parliament, who from the floor of the Parliament called out the exploitative nature of work being performed by the gig and the platform workers today.¹

The silver lining lies in the fact that the State for the first time unequivocally called out the exploitative nature of the quick delivery models, putting a stop to them. The approach was lauded by labour unions, domain experts and the workers themselves, and further invoked enthusiasm and hope from the Union Budget for the Financial Year 2026-27. It is in this backdrop that the Budget was viewed with much hope and expectation for the gig and platform workers.²

Defining and Measuring the Gig Workforce

The gig workers were first defined by the Code on Social Security, 2020, which is a central law that aims to extend social security benefits to unorganized, gig, and platform workers across India. The legislation defines a gig worker as “a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside of a traditional employer-employee relationship”. A report by NITI Ayog titled, “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy”, has

¹ Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

² Ani. (2026, January 13). Ban on 10-minute delivery: CAIT welcomes move to protect gig workers – The Tribune. The Tribune.

projected it to reach 23.5 million by 2029-30, up from 7.7 million in 2020-21.³ However, the attempts at enumerating the gig workers through surveys remain inefficient. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions.⁴

The Gap between Policy and Protection

The Union Budget fell short of meeting the expectations of the workers involved in the gig economy. The current Union Budget draws our attention to the striking gap between the legal recognition and the actual fiscal assistance for the workers who sustain this sector. One of the major expectations from the budget was that it would effectuate the social security safeguards for the gig workers through appropriate funding. But in reality it just reinstated its earlier policies such as health coverage under Ayushman Bharat and registration through e-Shram portal, without allocating any new fiscal support for their welfare. Therefore, social security protection still remains a far-fetched ambition for the gig workers as it is a mere reality on paper without any legal enforcement⁵.

The budget also highlights the absence of addressing the concern related to income instability that workers in this sector face due to irregular demand cycles and delayed payments. It fails to incorporate a legal framework that could regulate or set the bar for minimum wages earned by an informal worker. This makes the labor force solely dependent upon the platform which can unilaterally alter their incentives, commission and daily targets. While the Economic Survey 2025-26 recognises the urgency of skill based programmes for gig workers, the budget formally fails to accommodate this urgency and only takes into account the youth skilling programmes

3 Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.

IMPRI INSIGHTS.

4 Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

5 Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).

concerning developing technologies and artificial intelligence. Hence, making the gig workers more prone to economic vulnerabilities.⁶

Other major concerns associated with the gig economy are the absence of meaningful heed to the working environment and the lack of effective regulatory framework governing platform labour. Delivery partners and riders engaged with various platforms have to spend longer hours outdoors and directly bear the brunt of adverse weather conditions along with occupational risks. In a report published by Telangana Gig and Platform Workers’ Union (TGPWU), which surveyed a total of 166 workers, only eleven respondents confirmed the availability of heat-protective gear, while just 31% out of the total respondents verified having access to clean washrooms. Yet, the budget has failed to acknowledge any public investment in improving the working condition of the gig workers specifically.⁷ Moreover, it also failed to allocate funds for enhancing the enforcement mechanism for the labour codes which could help empower the gig workers by making aggregators liable for the fair labour practices. An Effective Enforcement mechanism encompasses enhancing grievances redressal system, inspection rules and monitoring mechanism within the labour department. In the absence of such a mechanism, the gig economy will be exposed to greater exploitation in the face of algorithmic control and arbitrary decision making by the aggregators.⁸

The Codes on Social Security of 2020 propose the formation of a National Social Security Board focused on formulating and monitoring welfare schemes for unorganized, gig, and platform workers. As per the Codes, the Board would recommend schemes for life/disability cover, health benefits, and old-age protection.The Board is mostly just a symbol because there is

6 Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.

7 Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024, August 17).

8 Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.

no budget or plan for how to put it into action. This makes it less effective as a way to protect gig and platform workers. The composition of the Board is as depicted below in Table1:

Table 1: Composition of the National Social Security Board as mentioned in the Codes on Social Security, 2020 for gig and platform workers

The Path Forward

The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) continues to register the gig workers under categories such as ‘self-employed’, ‘own-account workers’, or ‘casual labour’. This poses significant challenges while framing policies for the gig workers, as mere budgetary allocations without evolved and up-to-date statistical mechanisms would result in ineffective policy solutions. The first and foremost priority of any policy that aims to empower the gig workers should be to integrate the workers in the wider ambit of social security schemes, as promised under the new Labour Codes of 2020. Furthermore, several critical issues persist such as those related to

algorithmic controls, arbitrary account suspensions, opaque payment systems, exploitative and unsafe working conditions- topped with little to no accountability witnessed from the platforms’ end. Details on creating a dedicated fund as part of the law for gig and platform workers to cover life, disability, health and old-age benefits are still awaited, which is a key component in safeguarding the rights of the gig workers, while holding the platforms accountable for the same.

Therefore, rule-making must ensure independent worker representation, diversify and stabilize funding, require algorithmic audits and platform data-sharing, and implement robust monitoring in order for the policy to be effective. Absent these measures, the statute’s impact will remain limited; with them, it could become a scalable model for protecting gig workers.

Key takeaways:

• India’s gig and platform economy is undergoing rapid expansion, still workers lack basic social security provisions, fair wages and safe working conditions.
• The Budget of 2026-27 largely reiterates the existing provisions, while any funding to the Social Security Board was absent.
• The questions of income stability, platform accountability and grievance redressal mechanisms still loom large over the gig and platform workers of the nation.

Conclusion

The Union Budget, while recognizing the unorganised workers through schemes like e-Shram Portal, largely remains silent on providing tangible policy solutions such as social security benefits. In order to achieve a more dignified and secure workspace for the workers, the Government must move beyond empty promises and depict its commitment to equality and fairness through enforcing the provisions chalked out in the Social Security Codes, 2020⁹ for the gig and platform workers. Given the backdrop and the complexity of the issue, both the central and state governments need to reconsider whether the policies actually elevate the social standing of the gig workers or act as a mere band-aid?

9 Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

References

1. Mukherjee, S. (2026, February 5). Budget 2026 counts gig workers, but stops short of protection | Policy Circle. Policy Circle.
2. Impri. (2026, February 24). Employment, Livelihoods and Union Budget 2026-27 – IMPRI INSIGHTS.                                                          IMPRI                                                                              INSIGHTS.

• Himanshu Nitnaware. (2026, January 29). Economic Survey 2026: India’s fast-growing gig economy needs       an                       overhaul.                       Down                       to                                Earth.
• Impact of extreme heat on gig workers: A survey report – Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union. (2024,                                                                     August                                                                17).
• Ministry of Labour and Employment. (n.d.). Notes on demands for grants, 2026-2027. In Ministry of Labour and Employment (pp. 224–226).
• Das, N. (2026, February 11). India’s gig workforce is expanding rapidly, but the policy response still reflects a gap between recognition and real commitment. LinkedIn.
• Factsheet details: (n.d.).

• Review, I. D. (2026, January 20). What the data reveals about India’s gig workers | IDR. India Development Review.

• Narayan, D. (2025b, October 25). Are gig workers a part of India’s labour data? The Hindu.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

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Amidst the AI fanfare, it becomes extremely important for budding policymakers, scholars and researchers to debunk the myths surrounding AI and to treat it as a technological tool capable of effectively performing some chores, while being equally likely in creating errors. The article examines the Union Budget to reflect on the status of AI’s progress in India, alongside the Impact AI Summit.

The Rise of AI and India’s Policy Agenda

Until now, 2026 has proved to be a pivotal year in India’s AI journey. The Budget Speech made by the Hon’ble FM in February invoked the use of the term “AI” eleven times, the highest till date, an indication of its growing importance. Later that month, India hosted the five-day Global AI Summit which brought forth serious discussions about AI, policy and society to the general public. Both developments indicate the country’s enthusiasm for the development and deployment of AI technologies across sectors. Artificial Intelligence technologies, however, are fraught with grave faultlines such as biases within the technology, hallucinations, environmental and safety concerns; governing the same, therefore, poses serious policy questions that governments across the globe are currently grappling with.¹

1 India Budget | Ministry of Finance | Government of India. (n.d.).

Union Budget vis-à-vis AI:

The Union Budget 2026-27 envisions the integration of AI across various domains, from agriculture and education, to the scaling up of production of assistive devices for persons with disabilities. The India AI Mission, as per the Budget Estimates for the year, is allocated Rs.1000 crores for the FY, which is a direct 50% cut in light of the Ministry’s limited absorption capacity and past trends. As per a response to a question on Lok Sabha in December 2024, over 85% of the ₹1,100 crores in subsidies disbursed under the compute pillar of the IndiaAI mission has been directed towards the development of indigenous generative AI models like Sarvam, BharatGen, Zenteq, SoketAI, Gnani.ai, and Avataar AI, which have been the recipients of these subsidies- all of which will result in increased demand for domestic data centres.²

When asked to generate the image of an Indian in May 2024, MetaAI displayed a peculiar predisposition to generating a ‘man with a turban’ – almost four out of five times.³ This depicts an inherent bias in the model, despite India’s rich cultural and demographic diversity, a fact ostensibly attributable to the biases present in the training dataset. Whether indigenous models could counter the bias that Western models display is yet to be determined. Pratyush Kumar, the co-founder of Sarvam, called for the development of such indigenous technologies to protect our citizens from data colonialism.

Incepted at Bletchley Park in the UK in 2023, the first Impact AI Summit began with a clear agenda of understanding the risks that frontier AI models pose, and designing strategies to counter them. With AI developing as quickly as the models themselves, the governance of AI becomes all the more vital. The Indian PM, alongside other world leaders, thus called for a more inclusive, trusted and collaborative AI, while positioning India as the tech leader of the Global South.⁴ The Summit poses larger questions about the deployment of AI revolving around safety regulations, the impact on marginalized communities, labour, and attempts to ‘govern’ it.⁵

2 Decoding the budget for India’s AI priorities – Takshashila Institution. (n.d.-b).

3 Mehta, I. (2024, May 8). Meta AI is obsessed with turbans when generating images of Indian men. TechCrunch.

4 India AI Impact Summit 2026. (n.d.). India AI Impact Summit 2026.

5 Kahekashan, & India, H. (2026, February 18). India pushes for sovereign AI at global AI summit. The Hans India.

The Limits of Technological Solutions

In the Budget presented by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, the government announced a High Powered Standing Committee meant to look at possible pathways from education to employment and entrepreneurship, which will identify services sub-sectors with growth potential, assess the impact of emerging technologies including AI on jobs and skills requirements, while proposing “specific measures” for including AI in the education curricula from school onwards and upgrading State Councils for Educational Research and Training Institutes for teacher training.⁶ While many AI-skilling programs are run by the government and private tech companies, their impact needs to be critically analysed keeping in mind the nature of the use to which AI will be deployed, or even whether AI as a technology is ready to be rolled out to young adolescents who might unintentionally inherit its biases, jeopardizing their safety as well. Further, in the Indian context, marginalized communities are often excluded from such programs due to inadequate infrastructure, accessibility and affordability constraints. Thus, will AI bridge the digital divide prevalent in India or widen the same remains to be seen.

The implicit concerns underlying these models can be understood through an example. Described as a multilingual AI tool that shall integrate the AgriStack portals and the ICAR package on agricultural practices with AI systems, the Bharat-VISTAAR model will enhance farm productivity, enable better decisions for farmers and reduce risk by providing customised advisory support.

While the initiative promises to empower farmers with real-time, multilingual information on insurance procedures, weather risks, and claim status, it ignores the array of concerns that shadow the Indian agricultural space today. From divided digital literacy among farmers to challenges such as fragmented landholdings, the exclusion of landless farmers from databases, inconsistent data sources, unclear land ownership and legal disputes, the initiative fails to recognize the grassroot reality of Indian farmers, who are a diverse community.⁷ The solution to the more pervasive concerns among farmers may not lie in technology-based solutions, but rather in questions of adequate minimum support prices and subsidies. Data heterogeneity, which is a defining feature of the diversity of Indian agriculture, does not speak in standard codes. Pearl millet is bajra in Hindi, bajri in Gujarati, kambu in Tamil, and sajje in Kannada.

6 Lakshman, A. (2026, February 1). Education and skilling get Budget push; high-power panel to look at education to employment pathways. The Hindu.

7 Garg, R. (2022, February 22). #StandWithFarmers: Joint Letter by 55 groups | Hold the Agriculture Ministry and Microsoft India accountable. Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF).

Such heterogeneity could be misinterpreted by AI models or they may even fail to generalise across regions if such linguistic and regional nuances are not considered.⁸

The Way Ahead:

India needs to develop technologies tailored to its own socio-economic needs which solve the problems of the nation, rather than deploying AI technology wherein deeper structural issues exist (such as agriculture).⁹ This creates a risk of misallocation of public resources. A better approach moving forward is to examine the actual need for the deployment of AI technologies, rather than taking a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.¹⁰ India, therefore needs a people-centred AI policy that exhibits the spirit of democratic and participatory governance. With more emphasis on locally-built AI models like Sarvam-AI, India can compete on the global stage while safeguarding its users’ data and interests. Models like Sarvam can be designed keeping in mind a techno-legal framework wherein legal frameworks and safeguards are embedded within the technology itself. India has the potential to lead global AI development by prioritizing purposeful AI, built around societal welfare, rather than competing for technological power. Existing initiatives such as E-Mitra chatbot for farmers or the eSanjeevani telemedicine platform are major breakthroughs in the agriculture and healthcare sectors respectively, and are useful guides for AI developed for aid in specific fields.¹¹ Deployment of Small Language Models (SLM) based for specific purposes can be cost effective, efficient and flexible as per that particular domain. While doing so, the country’s environmental and resource constraints should be constantly evaluated so as to not put the strain of technological advancement on the environment. In a resource-constrained and climatically vulnerable context as that of India, it is of crucial importance to regulate the expansion through adequate safeguards, efficiency standards, and sustainability assessments.¹²

8 Contributors, E. (2026, March 6). Artificial intelligence in Indian agriculture: The bus India cannot afford to miss.

The Economic Times.

9 Frontline News Desk. (2026, February 23). India AI Summit 2026: Who controls future tech order? Frontline.

10 Vipra, J. (2024, October 10). What would a people-centred AI policy for India look like? Economic and Political Weekly.

11 Contributors, E. (2026, March 6). Artificial intelligence in Indian agriculture: The bus India cannot afford to miss. The Economic Times.

12 Renu Khandelwal, “Small Language Model: LLM that Does More with Less,” Medium (12 August 2025), available at:

Key takeaways:

• India’s AI policy must prioritise people, keep in mind the unique context the country is placed in and develop technologies that align with local realities.
• Sustainable AI leadership for India would mean balancing between technological ambition and its socio-economic and ecological constraints.
• Therefore, a snake-oil approach towards AI may lead to misallocated resources and overlooking deeper socio-economic issues.

Conclusion:

AI technologies are dynamic and so are the challenges that come embroiled with it. Thus, as India posits itself as a leader of the Global South in AI technologies, it should do so keeping in mind that the technology facilitates in alleviating the problems of the people on ground. This would require a shift in the policy orientation- one from promoting AI as an end in itself to the one that helps in achieving the broader goal of public welfare, well-being of the citizenry and sustainable development.

Other references:

1. Das, K. (2026, February 1). Budget 2026: Big infra, AI data centres, defence push, cheaper cancer drugs.                                                                India                                                                          Today.

• AP, B. (2026, March 5). From data to Decisions: What Bharat-VISTAAR needs to transform Indian                           agriculture                 –                 The                 Wire.                 The                           Wire.
• Deep, A. (2026, February 23). What are the key takeaways from the AI summit? | Explained. The Hindu.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

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India’s push for Atmanirbharta in defence marks a strategic shift which aims at reducing long-standing dependence on foreign imports. While rising capital expenditure and indigenous programmes signal progress, continued reliance on external technology exposes critical gaps in self-reliance. This article examines how far India has come in achieving defence Atmanirbharta, and what challenges still stand in the way of true strategic autonomy.

Introduction

India’s defence policy has undergone a significant transformation in recent years. From steady increases in defence budgets and initiatives such as the Agnipath scheme to expand joint military exercises with partner countries and a more assertive response to terrorism, India’s security approach has evolved considerably. Yet one idea appears to connect many of these developments: the aspiration of Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) in defence.

In the last few years, this aspiration has increasingly found expression in the rising capital outlay for defence modernisation and investments in indigenous defence production. It is noteworthy that despite having one of the largest armies in the world, it has heavily relied on imports of defence equipment. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India accounted for 8.2% of global arms imports between 2021 and 2025, making it the second-largest arms importer in the world, just behind Ukraine¹.

1 Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI, March 9, 2026,

.

India’s continued position as the world’s second-largest arms importer highlights the gap between the policy objective of defence self-reliance and the current structure of its defence procurement.

Russia has traditionally been India’s largest supplier of defence equipment, accounting for around 40% of India’s arms imports in the same period^2[2], although this share has declined compared to previous years as India diversifies its suppliers towards countries such as France, Israel and the United States.

These imports helped maintain internal security and military capability. However, this dependence on external suppliers has also created vulnerabilities during times of geopolitical tension and a kind of reliance on foreign imports. For example, the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted Russian defence production and export commitments. India’s $5.5 billion S-400 deal signed in 2018 illustrates this vulnerability (Press Trust of India, 2025; United24 Media, 2026): only three of the five systems have been delivered so far, with the remaining two expected by 2026. This shows how geopolitical conflicts can directly affect defence procurement timelines. And this is where the idea of self-reliance came–to build a kind of system that focuses on boosting local manufacturing that would eventually reduce the over-reliance on imports. This is when the government launched the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative in 2020.

Evidence and Analysis

Capital outlay refers to expenditure on acquiring, upgrading, or maintaining defence assets such as aircraft, ships, and equipment. It does not include revenue expenditure, which covers day-to-day operational costs such as salaries, allowances, rations, and maintenance. Since 2020, the capital outlay of defence services has steadily increased.

2 Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI.

India’s Defence Capital Expenditure Trend (Data from )

This near doubling of the budget (from 2019 to 2026) shows that the country is focusing on modernising its military and is prioritising the integration of advanced systems. This rise in capital investment is evident through a number of major defence projects focused on enhancing the country’s indigenous military capabilities.

The aircraft and aero engines alone are receiving a budget allocation of ₹63,733.94 crore out of the total capital outlay of ₹219,306.47 crore. This accounts for nearly 29 percent of the total capital expenditure, making it quite visible that a significant portion of defence spending is being directed towards strengthening India’s aerospace capabilities and aircraft development.

One of the most prominent examples of this push towards aircraft development is HAL Tejas, a light combat aircraft often described as a 4.5 generation fighter and considered one of the lightest in the world, with growing export interest in global markets. This is followed by the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), a fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft currently under development. If developed successfully, it may also see demand in the global market, especially considering that at present only three countries possess operational fifth-generation fighter aircraft: the United States, Russia, and China.

Keeping indigenous projects in mind, self-reliance does not necessarily have to come only from isolated projects; it can also emerge from collaborative projects with other countries. For example, BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile which can travel at a speed of Mach 3, nearly three times the speed of sound, is a joint venture between India and Russia. In recent years, BrahMos has also begun to attract international buyers. After the Philippines, Indonesia has also shown interest in acquiring the missile system³, highlighting the growing export potential of jointly developed defence technologies.

Meanwhile, India’s defence industry is slowly opening up to not only foreign entities but also private enterprises. This is because the Indian government is gradually opening up its rules on direct foreign investments (FDIs) in defence manufacturing, especially to obtain high-end technology and finance through joint ventures with Indian companies. At the same time, private companies such as Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Adani Defence & Aerospace have entered defence manufacturing, especially in segments such as aircraft structures, missile parts, drones, small arms, and ammunition. This is a clear indication that India’s quest for self-reliance in defence manufacturing is likely to take a hybrid form.

3 Manoj Kumar, “IMF Raises India FY26 Growth Forecast to 7.3%, Sees Slower Pace in next Two Years,” India, Reuters, January 19, 2026,

Despite all the efforts towards self-reliance in defence production in India, significant challenges still remain. India is not only successful in exporting more arms compared to its past but is currently ranked among the top 30 arms exporters in the world. Also, a larger share of defence equipment is being inducted into the armed forces. Nevertheless, the country continues to depend on foreign imports.

Policy Recommendations

India has already been gradually stepping up its defence expenditure; nevertheless, the productivity of such expenditure is subject to the effectiveness with which these resources are utilized. Greater priority needs to be given to enhancing research and development (R&D) activities and expediting indigenous defence initiatives. Presently, India allocates ₹6,30,000 crore on R&D activities, which is substantially less compared to other prominent technological nations like the United States, which spends around ₹78,00,000 crore on R&D activities alone.

More investment in defence R&D activities will strengthen India’s technological capabilities in areas like jet engines, avionics, and aerospace, in which India is compelled to depend on foreign technology at present. Evidence of the benefits of such investment can already be seen in programmes like BrahMos, which have generated defence exports to the Philippines and strengthened India’s presence in global defence markets. A strong indigenous defence sector will not merely add to the strategic strength of the government and its defence forces but also generate employment and technological and economic growth for the nation at large.

Conclusion

Currently, India is facing challenges in its defence ecosystem, such as the indigenous programme’s delay in completing HAL’s Tejas and the dependence on imported technology such as jet engines and avionics. Despite the increase in capital spending and investments in indigenous programmes such as the Tejas, AMCA, and collaborative programmes such as BrahMos, the dependence on technology makes it clear that the process of achieving defence Atmanirbharta is still ongoing.

References

Global Arms Flows Jump Nearly 10 per Cent as European Demand Soars | SIPRI. March 9, 2026.

“India Doubles Down on Russian S-400s Despite Years of Delivery Delays.” UNITED24 Media, March 3, 2026.

Kumar, Manoj. “IMF Raises India FY26 Growth Forecast to 7.3%, Sees Slower Pace in next Two Years.” India. Reuters, January 19, 2026.

Madhvendra. “India’s Defence Exports Hit Record High — 4 Companies Emerge as the Biggest Winners.” The Financial Express, October 7, 2025.

“Military Size by Country 2026.” April 17, 2026.

Moneycontrol. “Indonesia Inks BrahMos Deal with India amid Defence Export Push, Second Buyer after Philippines- Moneycontrol.Com.” March 9, 2026.

Shukla, Vinay. “Russia Will Complete Deliveries Of S-400 Missile Systems To India In 2026.”

Www.Ndtv.Com, September 22, 2025.

The Economic Times. “Indonesia Says It Has Entered Agreement with India to Procure BrahMos Missiles.” March 10, 2026.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

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India’s capex has surged from ₹4.39 lakh crore to ₹12.2 lakh crore in less than half a decade, with the government betting that building public infrastructure like roads, railways and highways will lead to job creation and draw in private investment. It hasn’t worked. The jobs that are being created by the Indian economy are, for the most part, informal and low-quality. Private firms are not investing more, and social programs like MGNREGA are being cut to fund it. The government needs to shift towards spending on housing, rural roads and local services, sectors where every rupee creates far more jobs, or India will end up infrastructure-rich and employment-poor.

Background

India is building itself faster than it is employing. Since FY2020-21, the centre has redirected union expenditure towards capital investment, from Rs. 4.39 lakh crore capital expenditure in RE 2020-211 to about Rs. 11 lakh crore capital expenditure in RE 2025-262, Budget 2026-27 further extends this to about Rs. 12.2 lakh crore3 which is an increase of 11.5% over the revised estimates of 2025-264. The stated strategy of the centre is the “crowding in” effect: public investment (through government capital expenditure) in infrastructure will catalyse capital from the private sector and generate employment while simultaneously sustaining GDP growth. This article interrogates this thesis by examining whether the strategy’s sectoral composition is aligned with its stated employment objectives and what fiscal tradeoffs it has created.

The scale of expansion of capital expenditure is unparalleled in recent Indian fiscal history. Capital expenditure as a share of GDP has roughly doubled in the last decade or so, driven mostly by allocations to roads and highways by way of allocations to the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), railway modernisation, and defence capital procurement. The centre has supplemented its own capex with ₹1.5 lakh crore in 50-year interest-free loans5 to state governments for infrastructure spending in FY2025–26 alone.

Capital Intensity and the Job Creation (Gap)

Yet these headline numbers obscure the capital intensity of the investments being made by the centre. Highways, railway corridor upgrades, and metro transit systems are increasingly built through large engineering contracts that rely on inexpensive, efficient heavy machinery rather than expensive, inefficient manual labour. This means that jobs created per rupee spent are fewer than they were in earlier generations of infrastructure building, which is a problem further compounded by weak linkages to small domestic businesses and suppliers. The government has assumed that building more infrastructure automatically means employing more people. The data suggests otherwise.
The most recently conducted national labour survey, the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2023–24, carried out by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), does capture some improvements: the share of people working or looking for work

1 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2021, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2020-21 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

2 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2026-27 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

3 Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Union Budget FY 2026-27: Capital expenditure allocation [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

4 PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

5 Pti. (2025, February 1). Union Budget provides ₹1.5 lakh cr. outlay for interest-free loans to States for infrastructure development. The Hindu.

rose to 60.10%6 nationally, which is a real gain, but a closer look reveals a more problematic story. The unemployment rate remains stagnated at 3.20%7. Self-employment, much of it in the informal sector with no real job security or social protection, rose to a whopping 58.40% of all employment8, while only a mere 21.70% earned regular wages or salaries9. The construction sector, supposedly the main channel through which infrastructure spending creates jobs for our economy, is overwhelmingly informal10 and migrants11 dominated. More people may be counted as “employed”, but the quality of work available to most Indians has not improved in step with the scale of public spending on capital infrastructure, public spending that could have been put to use in improving, say, healthcare or education.

The Failure of Crowding-In Private Investment

The crowding-in strategy, the idea that government investment will draw in private investment from companies, has also largely failed to materialise. According to data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), new project announcements fell 22% year on year in the December 2024 quarter12. A Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP)

6 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

7 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

8 The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

9 The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

10 Wells, J. (2007). Informality in the construction sector in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 25(1), 87–93.

11 Srikanth, G., & Jabbar, M. (2025). Impact of migrant workers on construction projects, labor markets, and industry development [Research Article]. International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT), 13(7), c619–c620.

12 Bureau reporter. (2025, January 2). New projects unveiled down 22 per cent in Q3: CMIE. Financial Express.

analysis found that the investments that drive industrial growth by private nonfinancial corporations dropped sharply by 17% between 2011-12 and 2023-241314.

Additionally, the analysis found that investments are failing to translate into actual capital formation, roughly 40% of planned investments were translating into tangible assets over the four decades leading up to 201115. Since then, that conversion rate has fallen sharply to about 15%, and since 2016–17 it has stagnated at roughly 10%16. RBI data further shows that, despite an increase in total investment announcements, project completion rates have steadily declined to just 9% in 2022-2317.

Capex at the Cost of What?

Rather than investing in new factories or machinery, large firms have been buying back shares and paying higher dividends18, a sign of confidence in their own balance sheets, not in the broader investment climate of our country. This matters because fiscal space is always constrained, with Budget 2026-27 targeting a fiscal deficit of 4.3% of GDP19, meaning that every rupee spent on constructing a road is a rupee not spent elsewhere.
These trade offs are not far off and abstract, they are tangible. MGNREGA which is the rural job guarantee scheme that has for nearly two decades provided income security for India’s poorest households has had its central allocation cut from 86,000 crore to 30,000 crore20 in the current budget, even as its replacement scheme VB-G RAM G, whose central allocation

13 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

14 Disaggregated, year-wise data on private non-financial corporate investment is not consistently available in the public domain. The estimate cited here (17%) is drawn from a recent analysis by the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP, 2025), one of the few credible consolidated sources currently available.

15 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

16 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

17 Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

18 Patil, A. K. P. (2022, March 28). India’s rising buyback tide doesn’t raise all boats equally. The Ken.

19 PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

20 Bureau reporter. (2026, February 1). VB-G RAM G gets Rs 95,000-plus crore allocation under Union Budget 2026-27, MGNREGA funds reduced. The Print.

according to experts falls far short21 of what’s needed to fulfil its promise of 125 days of guaranteed work per eligible household.

Rebalancing Capex

The deeper problem is one of composition and not merely scale, the government is spending on the right thing – infrastructure, but in the wrong mix. Highways and rail corridors produce economic gains in the long run but generate fewer jobs per rupee than affordable housing, rural roads or municipal urban services. If the government’s goal through capex remains increasing employment, it must rebalance the capex towards these labour-intensive sectors without necessarily having to spend more in total. The rebalancing has not happened with Budget 2026-27, and until it does, India risks possibly building itself a future which is infrastructure-rich and employment-poor.

References:

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2021, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2020-21 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Summary of Union Budget 2026-27 [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

Government of India, Ministry of Finance. (2026, February 1). Union Budget FY 2026-27: Capital expenditure allocation [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

PRS Legislative Research. (2026, February). Union budget analysis 2026-27. PRS India.

Pti. (2025, February 1). Union Budget provides ₹1.5 lakh cr. outlay for interest-free loans to States for infrastructure development. The Hindu.

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS): Annual report, July 2023 – June 2024 [Press note]. MoSPI.

21 India Development Review. (2026, February). Budget 2026-27 fails to address the reality of employment insecurity. IDR Online.

The People’s Archive of Rural India. (n.d.). Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report: July 2023-June 2024. People’s Archive of Rural India.

Kohli, R., & Bhapta, K. (2025, November 6). Between expectation and realisation: India’s private investment paradox. CSEP Blog. Centre for Social and Economic Progress.

Bureau reporter. (2025, January 2). New projects unveiled down 22 per cent in Q3: CMIE. Financial Express.

Bureau reporter. (2026, February 1). VB-G RAM G gets Rs 95,000-plus crore allocation under Union Budget 2026-27, MGNREGA funds reduced. The Print.

India Development Review. (2026, February). Budget 2026-27 fails to address the reality of employment insecurity. IDR Online.

Jindal Policy Research Lab ( JPRL)

The Policy Research Lab provides non-partisan facts that will create informed public opinion and enhance appropriate decision making for citizens at large. The lab’s principal objective is to provide policymakers and organisations with empirically supported guidance on policies that will improve people’s lives.

The Policy Research Lab aims to provide robust data and analyses on various aspects of policy making, through survey research, interviews, focus-group discussions, case studies and any other methodology conducive and appropriate for lab settings. The lab adopts a non-advocacy approach, and its data are factual and as they exist.

The post Assessing India’s Capex-Led Growth Strategy appeared first on 91̽��.

By Sneha Chakraborty

Executive Summary

The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025 seeks to amend the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017, which granted substantial academic, administrative, and financial autonomy to the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs). By designating IIMs as Institutions of National Importance, the 2017 Act enabled these institutions to independently appoint directors, confer degrees, frame academic regulations, and manage their internal affairs through autonomous Boards of Governors.

The Amendment Bill reintroduces a stronger role for the central government, particularly in the appointment and removal of key leadership positions such as directors and chairpersons. The stated objective of the Bill is to enhance accountability, ensure consistency in governance practices, and safeguard public interest in institutions that receive substantial public funding. However, the proposed changes have generated significant debate within academic and policy circles. Critics argue that increased governmental oversight risks diluting institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and global competitiveness. One of the other biggest turnpoints of this Bill is the administration and set up of an IIM in Guwahati, which is the first of its kind in the north-eastern part of the country.

Background

The Indian Institutes of Management were established to support India’s economic development by producing highly trained managerial and administrative professionals. Over the decades, IIMs have emerged as globally recognised institutions, contributing to both the private and public sectors. Historically, however, these institutions operated under significant government control, particularly through the Ministry of Education.

The Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 marked a turning point in higher education governance. It granted IIMs autonomy over academic, administrative, and financial decisions, including the authority to award degrees and appoint directors through their Boards of Governors. This autonomy was widely regarded as essential for maintaining global standards, fostering innovation, and attracting international faculty and collaborations.

Despite these gains, concerns emerged regarding uneven governance practices across IIMs, lack of standardised accountability mechanisms, and limited oversight over the use of public funds. The government has argued that full autonomy without adequate checks may weaken transparency and alignment with national education objectives. Against this backdrop, the IIM (Amendment) Bill, 2025 has been introduced to recalibrate the governance framework.

Key Issues

Institutional Autonomy vs Government Control

A major issue raised by the Bill concerns the restructuring of governance mechanisms. The Amendment proposes greater government involvement in the appointment and removal of directors and chairpersons, thereby reducing the discretionary powers of Boards of Governors. While the government maintains that such involvement is necessary to ensure accountability, critics fear that it undermines the spirit of autonomy established by the 2017 Act.

Excessive centralisation of authority may weaken institutional independence and expose leadership appointments to political or bureaucratic influence. This could affect long-term academic planning and erode confidence among faculty, students, and international partners.

Academic Freedom and Global Competitiveness

IIMs operate within a competitive global education ecosystem where flexibility in curriculum design, faculty recruitment, and research priorities is crucial. Increased bureaucratic oversight may slow decision-making processes and constrain academic innovation. There are concerns that the Amendment could indirectly influence academic agendas, thereby affecting academic freedom and institutional credibility at the global level.

Accountability and Public Funding

As publicly funded institutions that charge relatively high fees, IIMs face scrutiny regarding accessibility, inclusivity, and financial transparency. The Amendment Bill seeks to strengthen accountability mechanisms but does not clearly outline how increased oversight will translate into improved social inclusion or affordability. Without parallel commitments to enhanced public investment or equity-focused reforms, accountability risks becoming synonymous with administrative control rather than public responsibility.

Key Recommendations

First, governance reforms should focus on transparency and performance-based accountability rather than direct administrative intervention. Independent search-cum-selection committees with limited government representation can ensure credible leadership appointments while preserving institutional autonomy.

Second, accountability frameworks should be strengthened through mandatory public disclosures, independent audits, and periodic parliamentary reporting. These measures would ensure responsible use of public funds without compromising academic freedom.

Third, autonomy must be linked with social responsibility. The government should incentivise IIMs to expand need-based scholarships, improve regional and socio-economic diversity, and strengthen engagement with public sector institutions. Increased public funding tied to inclusion objectives can reduce over-reliance on high fees.

Conclusion

The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025 marks a significant shift in India’s higher education policy. While strengthening accountability in publicly funded institutions is a legitimate objective, the proposed approach risks undermining the autonomy that enabled IIMs to achieve global excellence. The success of the Bill will depend on its implementation and the safeguards it provides against undue interference. A balanced governance framework—one that combines transparency, accountability, and academic independence—is essential to ensure that IIMs continue to serve as institutions of national and global significance.

References

Bio:

Sneha Chakraborty is a student, who is currently pursuing her Masters in Social Work from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Her research interests lie in gender, climate change and livelihood.

The post The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Bill, 2025: Rebalancing Autonomy and Accountability in India’s Premier Management Institutions appeared first on 91̽��.

By Sneha Chakraborty

Executive Summary

The National Mission on Natural Farming (NMNF) is a centrally-sponsored scheme launched to promote chemical-free, agroecology-based farming practices across India. Announced with an initial budget allocation in Union Budget 2023-24 and subsequently expanded, the mission aims to transition farmers toward sustainable agricultural practices that reduce input costs, improve soil health, and enhance farm incomes while addressing environmental concerns associated with chemical-intensive agriculture.

The mission builds upon existing natural farming initiatives, particularly the Bharatiya Prakritik Krishi Paddhati (BPKP) program and state-level movements like Andhra Pradesh’s Zero Budget Natural Farming. By promoting indigenous cow-based preparations, on-farm biomass recycling, and biological pest management, NMNF seeks to create a farmer-led movement toward agricultural sustainability. The mission aligns with India’s climate commitments, food security objectives, and the broader vision of doubling farmers’ incomes while reducing agriculture’s ecological footprint.

Background

Context and Rationale

Indian agriculture faces a critical juncture characterized by soil degradation, water depletion, declining biodiversity, and increasing farmer indebtedness due to high input costs. The intensive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides over decades has resulted in diminishing returns, health hazards, and environmental degradation. Against this backdrop, natural farming emerges as a viable alternative that aligns with India’s traditional agricultural wisdom while addressing contemporary challenges.

What is Natural Farming?

Natural farming is defined as a chemical-free farming system that applies ecological principles to agricultural practices. It is an agro-ecology-based diversified farming system integrating crops, trees, and livestock while promoting functional biodiversity. Key principles include:

• Exclusive use of inputs produced from livestock and plant resources
• Cultivation of 15-20 diverse crops with living roots present year-round
• Minimal human intervention aligned with natural processes
• Use of native or traditional seeds
• Integration of animals utilizing their dung and urine as resources
• Focus on soil microorganisms to ensure independent soil fertility
• Adherence to local agro-ecological conditions

Key Features of the Mission

• Promotion of Natural Farming Practices: The mission emphasizes four pillars—Jivamrita (microbial culture), Bijamrita (seed treatment), mulching, and Waaphasa (soil aeration and moisture management). These practices eliminate synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, relying instead on on-farm biological inputs prepared from cow dung, urine, and locally available materials.
• Institutional Framework: Implementation occurs through a three-tier structure involving the central government, state governments, and Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVKs). Community Resource Persons (CRPs) and natural farming master trainers provide grassroots-level technical support and peer-to-peer learning.
• Cluster-Based Approach: The mission adopts a cluster development model, creating demonstration farms and farmer clusters to facilitate knowledge sharing, collective input preparation, and economies of scale in certification and marketing.
• Financial Support: Farmers receive financial assistance for transitioning to natural farming, including support for training, certification, input production units, and market linkages. The mission provides incentives for maintaining natural farming practices over multiple cropping seasons.
• Integration with Existing Schemes: NMNF integrates with programs like Paramparagat Krishi Vikas Yojana (PKVY), Mission Organic Value Chain Development for North Eastern Region (MOVCDNER), and PM-KISAN to create synergies and avoid duplication.

Key Issues

• Scientific Validation Concerns: The efficacy of natural farming techniques in maintaining yields, particularly for water-intensive crops like rice and wheat, remains contested. Limited long-term scientific data on productivity, nutritional outcomes, and scalability raises concerns among agricultural scientists and policymakers about food security implications if adopted at scale.
• Cow Availability and Economics: Natural farming methods promoted under NMNF rely heavily on indigenous cow-based inputs. However, declining indigenous cattle populations, high cow maintenance costs, and the impracticality of cow ownership for landless or marginal farmers create significant barriers.
• Market and Price Premium Uncertainty: While natural/organic produce theoretically commands premium prices, actual market infrastructure remains underdeveloped. Most farmers lack access to premium markets, and price premiums are often captured by intermediaries rather than producers.
• Regional Suitability Variations: Natural farming practices show variable results across different agro-climatic zones, soil types, and cropping patterns. Techniques successful in rainfed, low-input regions may not translate effectively to irrigated high-productivity zones without significant adaptation.

Key Recommendations

• Strengthen Scientific Research Infrastructure: Establish dedicated natural farming research centers across different agro-climatic zones to conduct rigorous, long-term studies on productivity, soil health, nutritional quality, and economic viability. Develop evidence-based protocols adapted to regional conditions and cropping systems.
• Enhanced Transition Support: Increase financial assistance during the critical 2-3 year transition period through direct income support, crop insurance with reduced premiums, and guaranteed market purchase arrangements. Create dedicated transition funds that compensate for yield declines.
• Build Comprehensive Market Ecosystem: Develop farmer producer organizations (FPOs) specifically for natural farming products, establish dedicated natural farming mandis in major consumption centers, strengthen e-marketing platforms, and create institutional purchase mandates for government agencies, schools, and hospitals.
• Alternative Input Production Models: Establish community-level input production centers where farmers can access natural inputs without individual cow ownership. Promote biogas plant integration amongst the small and marginal farmers.

The National Mission on Natural Farming represents an important step toward sustainable agriculture, but its success requires addressing fundamental constraints in research validation, market infrastructure, extension capacity, and policy coherence. A pragmatic, evidence-based approach that acknowledges both opportunities and limitations while providing robust transition support will determine whether natural farming can scale meaningfully to contribute to India’s agricultural sustainability and farmer welfare objectives.

References

Bio:

Sneha Chakraborty is a student, who is currently pursuing her Masters in Social Work from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Her research interests lie in gender, climate change and livelihood.

The post Seeding Change: Policy Perspectives on India’s National Mission on Natural Farming appeared first on 91̽��.

By Sneha Chakraborty

Executive Summary

India’s income tax framework has undergone significant modernization through two major developments: first, the introduction of revised tax rates and relief for middle-income earners; second, the replacement of the Income Tax Act, 1961 with the new Income Tax Act, 2025. Core changes include a higher basic exemption (Rs. 4 lakh), enhanced tax rebates, and a raised threshold for the top tax rate bracket. The new law, effective April 1, 2026, improves clarity, structure, and digital adaptation, all while maintaining overall tax policy stability. These reforms aim to balance taxpayer-friendly simplification with ongoing government revenue requirements and economic growth expectations.

Context and Rationale

For over six decades, India’s Income Tax Act, 1961 shaped taxation policy, but continual amendments rendered it complex, lengthy, and hard to interpret. Legal jargon and outdated provisions made compliance difficult for citizens, boosting dependence on professionals and increasing administrative burdens. Recognizing these concerns, and inspired by global tax best practices, the government embarked on a twofold overhaul—simplifying direct taxes for both taxpayers and administrators, and modernizing the legal text for 21st-century realities.

Key Features of the Income Tax Act, 2025

1. Enhanced Exemptions and Rebates

1. The basic exemption limit was raised to Rs. 4 lakh, with a rebate up to Rs. 60,000 for incomes up to Rs. 12 lakh, creating zero effective tax liability for a large section of middle-income taxpayers.
2. The 30% slab now begins at Rs. 24 lakh (previously Rs. 15 lakh), providing further relief to professionals and salaried classes.

2. Structural Reorganization

1. Reduction in number of sections (over 700 in the old law to 536 in the new), with consolidation and logical sequencing (e.g., all TDS sections together). This will bring about transparency for people and also help them access the various legalities around the tax easily.
2. The “previous year” is now officially called “tax year” for clarity and alignment with global practice.

3. Language and Accessibility

1. Plain language and shorter sentences replace legalistic and archaic terminology. One of the better signs of policymaking has been
2. Complex sentences split into separate clauses, making the law easier to understand and apply for people without legal backgrounds.

4. Retention of Policy Continuity

1. Tax rates, thresholds, and most substantive rules remain unchanged, to ensure stability and continuity for taxpayers.
2. Definitions, offence provisions, and penalty structures are substantively retained. The law incorporates all amendments from Finance Bill 2025.

5. Digital Integration

1. Explicit recognition of faceless and digital assessments, appeals, and compliance checks.
2. Provides a robust framework for digital filings and automation, including adaptation for electronic records and notices.

6. Sector-Specific Innovations

1. Dedicated chapter introduced for taxation of non-profit organizations (NPOs).
2. Presumptive taxation schemes expanded, making compliance easier for small businesses and professionals, with simplified reporting norms and higher applicability thresholds.

7. Mapping and Transition Tools

1. A digital utility allows easy mapping between the old 1961 Act and the new 2025 Act, helping taxpayers and professionals transition smoothly.

Comparative Analysis: Income Tax Act 1961 vs. 2025

Key Issues and Criticisms

1. Dual-Regime Complexity

1. 1. Both the old and new regimes remain for taxpayers to choose between, requiring separate yearly assessment and increasing complexity.

2. Missed Opportunity for Deep Reform

1. 1. Tax base remains narrow; wealth taxation, agricultural income, and corporate tax disparities remain unaddressed.

3. Transition Burdens

1. 1. Taxpayers and preparers must familiarize themselves with new section numbers, formats, and transitional inconsistencies during the initial implementation year.

4. Substantive Continuity

1. 1. Many archaic and structural features persist; the reforms are viewed as “modernization” rather than fundamental rethinking.

5. Public Awareness and Education

1. 1. Significant awareness campaigns and taxpayer education will be needed to realize the act’s full benefits.

Policy Recommendations

1. Emphasize Taxpayer Education and Guidance:

1. There needs to be proper investment in information campaigns through schools, colleges, social media, and civic outreach.

2. Monitor Transition Closely:

1. The government should provide support for tax professionals and filers through digital mapping tools and helplines. Even as they have made attempts to

3. Strengthen Digital Inclusion:

1. The government has to ensure robust digital support for rural and digitally excluded sections of the population. The Bill does attempt to bridge the digital divide, but more efforts have to be made to build the digital gap between the rural and urban areas.

The Income Tax Act, 2025 represents a pragmatic step toward a modern, accessible, and transparent fiscal framework. While simplification and digital adaptation offer palpable benefits, deeper challenges such as dual-regime complexity and tax base narrowing persist. Thorough implementation, education, and ongoing reform will be essential to realizing the full gains of this legislative overhaul. For students and citizens alike, these reforms underscore the ongoing evolution of India’s tax landscape as the nation moves toward developed-economy standards.

References

Bio:

Sneha Chakraborty is a student, who is currently pursuing her Masters in Social Work from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Her research interests lie in gender, climate change and livelihood.

The post Income Tax Policy 2025: A Comprehensive Analysis appeared first on 91̽��.

By Sneha Chakraborty

Executive Summary

The National Sports Governance Bill, 2025 is a historic bill in the sports landscape of the country, which legitimizes and provides recognition to the sports bodies of the country. Introduced in the Parliament on 23rd July of the Monsoon Session of the Budget and passed on the 12th of August, this Bill has had a longer history as conversations about its implementation had been active since 2011. The Bill allows for accountability in the form of three national sports bodies being formed, namely a National Sports Body, a National Sports Tribunal and the National Sports Election Panel. With the institution of this Bill into an Act, the government and sporting bodies shall have the right to look into the administrative and financial matters of the various Sports Federations, which have also been mandated to be created by this Bill. This landmark Bill is set to replace the National Sports Code.

Background

Even as India is a vast country with a plethora of people, who have the potential to be exceptional sportspersons, the regulations and administration regarding the sporting authorities in the country have not been very robust. The country has the world’s largest youth demographic, around 65% of whom are below the age of thirty-five years and are at an age, where they can take active participation in sports.  It was in 2011 when Sports Minister Ajay Maken wanted to introduce a Bill that would create a set of rules and conducts for the ill-functioning sports administration in the country. Even though the law could not be passed then, it was in the Monsoon Session of 2025 that the National Sports Governance Bill came to life. This Bill is also set to replace the National Sports Code, 2011. According to the Union Minister for Youth Affairs and Sports Mansukh Mandaviya, this Bill was drafted only after recommendations received from the concerned stakeholders. The Bill comes at a time when India is preparing to be bidding for the Olympics. Another significant change can be seen in the Budgetary allocation for the Sports Department this year. The Khelo Bharat Niti 2025, which has been joined with the National Education Policy aims to promote women empowerment as well as increase the Budgetary Allocation. For the Financial Year 2025-2026, the Union Government has put aside INR 3,794 Crores to the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, which showcases a 130.9% increase from the Financial Year 2014-15. Hence, the provisions outlined in the Act along with the budgetary allocations is an example of the government showing commitment towards the promotion of sports and transparency in the system.

Key Features of the Bill

The National Sports Governance Bill is set to replace the National Sports Policy of 2001. This Bill shall provide a comprehensive and detailed structure of how there shall be a centralization of the sporting bodies in the countries. This will give transparency with regards to how the various sporting bodies in the country operate, in relation to their election procedure, administrative structure, etc.

• Centralization of Structure: The Bill calls for the establishment of three National Sports Governing Bodies, namely the National Olympic Committee, the National Paralympic Committee, and the National and Regional Sports Federations for each designated sport. One of the most distinguishing features of this Bill is the creation of a code of ethics, which was never mentioned in the previous National Sports Policy. These bodies will have affiliate units at the state and district level, while also having corresponding bodies at the international level. Every national body will have a President, Secretary General and Treasurer. 
•  Replacement of Existing Policies :The Bill supplants the National Sports Policy of 2001 and the National Sports Code of 2011 with an integrated legal framework that reigns in ad hoc administrative practices across the nation.
• Introduction of Code of Ethics: The Bill mandates a code of ethics for the functioning of all sporting bodies—a first in Indian sports legislation—which seeks to standardize fairness, non-discrimination, and integrity in sports governance.
• Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms: Sporting bodies are now subject to administrative, electoral, and financial scrutiny by government entities and tribunals, with mandatory reporting for budgetary allocation and operational outputs. Interestingly, even the Board of Cricket Control in India (BCCI), which has been far away from scrutiny all these years, also has to provide a detailed explanation of its financial turnover.
• The Budgetary Expansion and Women Empowerment: The Union Government’s allocation for youth and sports for FY 2025-26 has increased to INR 3,794 Crores, signalling renewed investment aligned with the objectives of Khelo Bharat Niti 2025—fostering gender empowerment, inclusive participation, and infrastructural growth.
• About the Age Limits: The National Sports Governance Bill sets an age cap of 25-70 for its members if they want to be a part of the executive body. But for certain “extraordinary” circumstances, an individual can also continue till 75 years.

Key Issues

1. Implementation and Bureaucratic Challenges

While the Bill provides a framework for centralized governance, effective roll-out across diverse regional, local, and sport-specific contexts may face friction due to entrenched interests and complex stakeholder dynamics. The Bill does have some ideal standards, which if realized shall prove to be revolutionary in the sports landscape of the country but considering the vastness of the nation, there could be certain initiatives mentioned in the Bill, which would help to promote sporting facilities in the far reaching parts of the nation.

2. Resource Distribution and Equity

Ensuring equitable resource allocation—especially for rural districts and non-mainstream sports—remains a concern, as federations may prioritize established sports with greater visibility and funding. As has already been noticed, cricket receives way more viewership and sponsorship amongst the other sports in the country. Hence, more funding could have been allocated for the promotion of other sports.

3. Electoral Integrity and Autonomy

The establishment of the National Sports Election Panel is a positive step, but its independence and ability to regulate transparent elections for state and central bodies will require vigilant monitoring. The age cap being kept at 70, but also allowing for certain individuals to keep their position till 75 brings a dichotomy.

4. Code of Ethics Enforcement

The new code of ethics stands as a progressive measure, yet legal enforcement mechanisms and periodic audits will be necessary to avoid tokenistic compliance. With the National Anti-Doping Bill also being formed, the code could have become a supplement to it.

Key Recommendations

1. Phased Implementation and Stakeholder Engagement
   Launch a phased, regionally-sensitive roll-out of the Bill’s provisions, involving athletes, federation officials, NGOs, and local government units to foster ownership and adaptation.
2. Inclusive Allocation Strategy
   The government should develop clear guidelines for budgetary allocation to marginalized regions, grassroots initiatives, and women’s sports, monitored by certain centralized bodies. There has to be an equitable division of resources in certain areas of the country and promote sports, which do not receive equal amounts of funding from the private corporations.
3. Strengthening Oversight Bodies
   The Bill must empower the National Sports Tribunal and Election Panel with functional autonomy, judicial powers, and access to independent audit mechanisms to reinforce their regulatory roles.
4. Continuous Policy Review
   Institute a biennial policy review committee composed of representatives from sports federations, athletes, civil society, and legal experts, ensuring adaptive updates to the Act in response to evolving needs.

Reference List

• National Sports Governance Bill, 2025. Executive Summary and Details: https://prsindia.org/billtrack/prs-products/issues-for-consideration-1754401975#:~:text=It%20also%20specifies%20that%20a,recognition%20of%20a%20national%20body.

• https://yas.gov.in/national-sports-governance-act-2025
• Khelo Bharat Niti 2025 Overview and Integration with National Education Policy:
• https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/national-sports-governance-bill-gets-president-droupadi-murmus-assent/article69950568.ece

Bio:

Sneha Chakraborty is a student, who is currently pursuing her Masters in Social Work from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Her research interests lie in gender, climate change and livelihood.

The post Codifying the Laws Regarding Sports: Parliament Passes the Long-Awaited National Sports Governance Bill, 2025 appeared first on 91̽��.

Executive Summary

The Manodhairya Scheme was launched by the Maharashtra government in 2013 with the aim of providing economic rehabilitation to the survivors of rape, acid attack and child sexual abuse. As a part of the directives issued by the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court, this scheme was launched to ensure that victim compensation in case of such heinous crimes is carried out justly. It holds the state responsible for ensuring that the victims are provided with sufficient economic resources to access the support they may require. Even as the scheme was lauded for its rehabilitative approach, there has been severe bureaucratic delays with delays in fund disbursement and limited awareness of individuals on how and who to approach for the scheme.

Background

The country is plagued with serious concerns for the safety of women and other gender minorities as news of violence and disruptions have become the mainstay. As the Supreme Court was overlooking the Nirbhaya case, the news regarding the Shakti Mill gangrape case in Mumbai broke out. After deliberations carried out by the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court, directives were issued that victims and survivors of such crimes should be compensated so that they are able to access any form of rehabilitative needs, which might be necessary. Thus, the Maharashtra Cabinet had approved of this scheme with the intention that it would provide not only monetary relief, but also any form of legal, medical and counselling aid that the victim would require.

Nuances of the Scheme

1. The Maharashtra Government has two schemes for victim compensation, namely the Maharashtra Victim Compensation Scheme and the Manodhairya Scheme. The difference between the two is that the former requires directives to be issued by the court before monetary aid can be provided, while for Manodhairya no such directive is required. The scheme is eligible for:
   • victims of Rape under the Sections of 375 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code,
   • victims of POCSO Act,
   • acid attack and
   • those rescued under Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA), those who are below 18 years of age.

2. The victims are obligated to receive amounts ranging between two to three lakhs, but can also get up to INR 10 Lakhs. The victim receives 25% of the specified amount immediately, while the other 75% gets deposited in a Nationalized bank. The other half of the money earns interest, while being in the bank and the victim has the right to that money and the entire interest acquired. If the survivor is below eighteen years old, then the money gets transferred to the account holder of their legal guardian.
3. A District Board for Criminal Injuries Relief and Rehabilitation has been constituted at the District level to oversee all the matters regarding the implementation of the scheme. As victims of POCSO and ITPA are beneficiaries of the scheme, the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) and the District Child Protection Unit (DCPU) are also often involved in the efficient implementation of the scheme.
4. The Constitution of India has laid out the rights of the accused in forms of the Fundamental Rights. Justice Malimath Committee Report, which was published in 2003 came out with instructions regarding the rights of the victims to monetary compensation and support they may require in the form of medical or legal aid. The 154th Law Compensation Report of 1996 also recorded that providing immediate support to the victim and in some cases even to the family members is an essential part of the rehabilitation process. Victim compensation is an obligation on the part of the state to provide aid to the survivor so that they are able to find avenues to rebuild their life. The Manodhairya Scheme can also be availed for foreign nationals if they have faced any kind of violation within the boundaries of Maharashtra. Thus, a major importance of the scheme is that complying with the constitution the state becomes a major stakeholder in ensuring that both justice and rehabilitation is carried out effectively and swiftly.

What Has the Scheme Achieved So Far?

• From the information recorded in the Economic Survey by the Women and Child Welfare Department of Maharashtra, 2657 victims have benefitted from the scheme till March 2016.
• Even as the number of beneficiaries here seem huge, the number of victims who end up not receiving any monetary aid is equally staggering. According to a report published by the Policy Perspective Foundation, out of the 7,934 applications from victims of rape, the authorities had accepted only 1, 144 for compensation. The report was further supplemented by the data from National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), which states that Maharashtra ranks fourth in rape cases amongst the states in the country.
• The information received from the Women and Child Welfare Department through the Right to Information (RTI) data in 2017 has shown how in Nagpur, Mumbai and Sangli amongst the total number of compensation cases filed only 84.76%, 56.1% and 78.1% cases only have received compensation from the state.

Key Issues

1. Bureaucratic Delays and Disbursement Challenges
Despite clear compensation guidelines, survivors often face lengthy administrative processes, resulting in delayed fund disbursement and additional distress. Stringent verification, procedural bottlenecks, and limited staff capacity undermine accessibility and timeliness of support, forcing victims to rely on intermediaries or external help for navigation.

2. Low Awareness and Information Gaps
Significant numbers of eligible victims remain unaware of their entitlements under the scheme or the application process due to poor information dissemination, language barriers, and lack of outreach initiatives. Many are unsure whom to approach or how to initiate claims, which restricts uptake—especially in marginalized, rural, and disadvantaged sectors.

3. Limited Psychosocial and Livelihood Support
While the scheme provides economic relief, psychosocial and livelihood support remains insufficiently integrated. Trauma counseling, vocational training, and long-term rehabilitation through community-based support are underdeveloped, leaving survivors at risk for persistent psychological distress or economic instability after initial compensation.

4. Regional and Implementation Disparities
Data shows marked disparities in compensation delivery across districts—Nagpur, Mumbai, and Sangli saw substantially different approval rates for filed claims, highlighting performance gaps based on geography and local administration efficacy. Structural inequalities persist, with victims in some regions faring better than others, undermining the universal intent of the scheme.

Key Recommendations

1. Streamline Fund Disbursement Processes
Simplify and standardize administrative procedures by digitizing claims, automating document verification, and maintaining transparent tracking of applications to minimize delays and reduce bureaucratic ambiguity. Recruiting additional staff and establishing clear service timelines can further improve promptness in compensation delivery.

2. Expand Awareness Campaigns and Outreach
Launch multi-pronged information campaigns using grassroots organizations, health workers, and social media in multiple languages to ensure victims know their rights and how to apply. Target rural, tribal, and underserved urban localities to bolster inclusivity, and collaborate with legal aid centers for survivor support during the application process.

3. Integrate Holistic Rehabilitation and Support Services
Enrich the scheme’s psychosocial component by actively linking survivors to counseling, mental health care, vocational training, and legal assistance beyond monetary aid. Establish survivor support networks at the district and community level, with regular follow-ups to assess recovery and reintegration progress.

4. Address Regional Imbalances and Monitor Outcomes
Conduct periodic audits of district-level implementation, employing data-driven evaluations to identify bottlenecks and disparities in scheme execution. Develop incentive structures for high-performing districts, and provide remedial training or resources to regions with low approval rates or delayed compensation.

5. Strengthen Interagency Coordination
Facilitate structured collaboration between the Women and Child Welfare Department, CWC, DCPU, law enforcement, and NGOs to extend comprehensive support to survivors. Regular interdepartmental meetings and shared databases can streamline case management and encourage knowledge sharing for future policy improvement.

The Manodhairya Scheme is a progressive initiative that acknowledges survivors’ right to dignity and rehabilitation beyond legal justice. While it has provided crucial financial aid, its long-term success depends on faster implementation, stronger psychosocial support, and survivor-centered delivery mechanisms. One of the major highlights of this scheme is the inclusion of compensation to be provided to girls, who are below the age of eighteen. Even as economic rehabilitation is a necessary element for the survivor, efforts should also be made for the creation of psychological and livelihood support for better future rehabilitation plans for the victims.

References:

Bio:

Sneha Chakraborty is a student, who is currently pursuing her Masters in Social Work from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Her research interests lie in gender, climate change and livelihood.

The post Manodhairya Scheme: Policy Innovation in Victim Compensation and Rehabilitation appeared first on 91̽��.