Abstract

India and Afghanistan share a history of cultural, historic, and strategic ties. Both nations share a diverse history of bilateral relations and regional collaboration. The paper looks into the evolving nature of rising powers in South Asia and how India and Afghanistan can collaborate. The paper tries to find out how the IMEC can open up new possibilities for collaboration between the countries. What are some challenges and opportunities that arise with the development of the collaboration between diplomatic ties of the nations? The paper tries to analyze the present and future possibilities of trade and collaboration between Afghanistan and India using secondary sources. The paper delves deep into how India deals with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and tries to balance the global expectations as well as regional aspirations. The paper shows how the possible development of the IMEC could indeed strengthen the ties between India and Afghanistan and lead to better collaboration.

Introduction and evolution of bilateral engagement between Afghanistan and India

India and Afghanistan share a long history of cultural, historic, and strategic ties. Over the past two decades, the diplomatic relationship between the countries has developed further and evolved as their governing rulers change with time. Diplomatic engagement, economic ties, security and intelligence collaboration, and people-to-people connections have all strengthened in the past few years.

The history of the modern-day ties between India and Afghanistan can be traced back to the year 2001, when the Taliban regime broke down. In 1990, India, like other nations, did not recognize the Taliban. In the year 2021, with the return of the Taliban regime after the United States’ troops exited Afghanistan, India re-established its ties with the Taliban. While India does not formally recognize the Taliban regime and rule in Afghanistan, it establishes ties in terms of collaboration, trade, and humanitarian work. From a constructivist point of view, it may be seen as an attempt by India to deal with the existing regime. As the constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt also explains in his work ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It,’ anarchy is present in the current international order. (Wendt 1992) States can either see this culture of anarchy in the Hobbesian manner, where they are constantly in a state of potential conflict. Which, in Afghanistan’s case, could be countries of the global north, such as the United States, causing an instability in the rule. In the Lockean viewpoint, Pakistan may view Afghanistan as a rival, but may execute trade and cooperate occasionally as well. (Pakistan Announces to Upgrade Ties With Afghanistan, Appoint Ambassador to Kabul 2025) In the Kantian viewpoint, in which states view each other as partners and engage in collective security and peaceful resolution of disputes, Afghanistan and India have tried to collaborate in order to establish peace in South Asia. Diplomatic relations with the democratic government in Afghanistan were established, and a new chapter started in India-Afghanistan relations. India became a partner in the reconstruction of infrastructure, health, and education. Establishing ties with Afghanistan also increases India’s reach in South Asia and the Middle East. While establishing ties may have meant an increase in presence, there have been some contentions by the global order concerning India engaging with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Although the relationship between India and Afghanistan has been multifaceted. Even in the present, India began its conversation with the Taliban recently this year. Strategically, Afghanistan can collaborate with India on the issue of cross-border terrorism that India faces from its bordering nations. On the humanitarian aspect, India had helped Afghanistan during the COVID-19 Pandemic and had supplied it with 1 Lakh Paracetamol tablets and tons of wheat. Establishing ties with Afghanistan indeed makes the South Asian region more stable.

Collaboration between India and Afghanistan

In 2016, India invested in Chabahar Port, which is situated in the southeastern part of Iran and connects with Central Asia and Afghanistan. The port helps India bypass Pakistan and enables trade with the Central Asian region. This project, contrary to China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) in the CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor), does not function on a model of debt diplomacy wherein infrastructure is built on debt, yet indeed focuses on increasing regional connectivity and development. India’s support for Afghanistan has been constant even with the regime changes. India aims to connect the Chabahar port with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal route that connects India to Russia via Iran and Central Asia. If this can be connected successfully, the cost of trade would significantly reduce. The Chabahar port has also been connected with multilateral forums such as the SCO and the BRICS. Iran has also entered these forums currently. What this may lead to is an increase in regional trade by ensuring stability in supply chains and also unlocking new streams for collaboration and trade. (Jahanzeeb 2025)

Recently this year, on May 15, 2025, the External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, spoke to Amir Khan Muttaqi, the “Acting Afghan Foreign Minister,” marking it as the first minister-level outreach to Afghanistan after the takeover of the Taliban. (Bhattacherjee 2025) The telephone conversation was initiated days after the Pahalgam attack. Jaishankar thanked Afghanistan’s Minister, Muttaqi, for condemning the terror attack that took place in Pahalgam. (Vashistha 2025) This showed support from the recent rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan and their support towards the anti-terrorism cause of India. The engagement also showcases a shift in how India’s foreign policy decides to deal with the Taliban and Afghanistan. While earlier there was no interaction with the government of the Taliban, this may begin a trend of conversation and collaboration that is in the national interest of both nations. (Ghosh 2025)

IMEC: Weaving a new thread of connectivity, yet with challenges

With the strengthening of the ties, what future opportunities emerge is something that India can explore. Be it the collaboration towards combatting terrorism or be it towards building connectivity through the IMEC. The IMEC is the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, which is a project to connect India to the Gulf and the Gulf to Europe. A challenge that the idea faces is the instability in the Middle East to execute the development of infrastructure. What good is developing infrastructure only to have it destroyed by a weapon? However, if the project can be executed, it would certainly increase connectivity with Afghanistan. The proximity to Afghanistan and its trade channels would decrease. The collaboration with Chabahar Port and the IMEC can help cut down the cost of trade and also make trade more sustainable in the region. The IMEC can focus on capacity building and facilitating trade to Afghanistan in return for collaboration on security. This would also reduce the dependency of Afghanistan on China and Pakistan for trade connectivity. The engagement with Afghanistan can be seen as a double-edged sword. On one hand, the engagement with Afghanistan can curb the use of Afghanistan’s territory for terrorism against India, and on the other hand, the radicalization in Afghanistan further threatens the security of South Asia by the spread of radicalization.

Some possible challenges that emerge with the collaboration of India and Afghanistan can be seen as the lack of recognition of the Taliban government, but this is dealt with by focusing on the trade collaboration rather than recognition. Also, India would not appreciate Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for terrorists against India, such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba and even the presence of terrorist groups like Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al-Qaeda. Hence, India can not completely put its guard down while dealing with Afghanistan. The engagement with Afghanistan may get backlash from the international community and also international forums, as Afghanistan lags in providing rights to women. To deal with these challenges, India can engage with Afghanistan strategically, focusing more on trade and development. (Pratap 2025)

Amongst the challenges, the opportunities that emerge through the connection of the IMEC overpower the challenges. Collaboration in terms of security, through which

India’s interest in collaborating with Afghanistan also emerges from the desire to counter China’s rise and Pakistan’s anti-India terrorism. The rise of anti-Pakistani groups such as the Baloch Militants and the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) is something that may give India some leverage against terrorism emerging from Pakistan as well.

Conclusion

India and Afghanistan have shared a long thread of history. Both nations in South Asia deal with their own set of challenges but collaborate on some common goals. The collaboration has increased with the collective stance on India’s anti-terrorist stance. While IMEC may emerge as a trade route, the significance of the Indian-Afghanistan partnership in trade and development is bound to increase as well. India sustains a pragmatic approach to dealing with Afghanistan and the Taliban, balancing the immediate security concerns and the border implications for the regional security dynamics in South Asia with strategic calculations. In conclusion, while challenges and issues do persist between the evolving collaboration between both countries, interaction may lead to better collaboration, regional stability, and the possibility of collective development and security in South Asia.

References

Bhattacherjee, Kallol. 2025. “In a first, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar talks to Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi.” The Hindu, May 16, 2025, -.

Ghosh, Dr. Anwesha. 2025. “Breaking the Ice: India’s First Ministerial Engagement with the Taliban.” Indian Council of World Affairs. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12941&lid=7908#_edn21.

Jahanzeeb, Syed. 2025. “Opinion | Indo-Iran-Afghanistan Connectivity: Revisiting the Chabahar Project.” The Global Kashmir. https://globalkashmir.net/opinion-indo-iran-afghanistan-connectivity-revisiting-the-chabahar-project/.

Pratap, Sharmistha. 2025. “India’s diplomatic ties with Taliban.” CENTRE FOR JOINT WARFARE STUDIES. https://cenjows.in/indias-diplomatic-ties-with-taliban/.

Vashistha, Aashish. 2025. “In a 1st, Jaishankar speaks to Taliban minister, welcomes J&K attack condemnation.” India Today, May 16, 2025, -.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” JSTOR 6 (2): 391-425. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1.

Also known as Mullah Baradar Aakhund, Abdul Ghani Baradar is an Islamic militant and one of the founding members of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Born in 1968 in the central Afghan province of tribal Uruzgan, Baradar was raised in Kandahar which was the birthplace of the Taliban movement.1 Baradar hails from the Popalzai Tribe and is Durrani Pashtun. Married to Mullah Omar’s sister, Baradar served the Taliban Tehrik in significant positions and is in day- to-day command of the Taliban insurgency and its funding.

Taliban, which means ‘religious students’, was founded to fight the warlords who had brought about a civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviets left the country. Abdul Ghani Baradar’s life growing up was significantly impacted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which is said to be monumental in his becoming an insurgent. Like many others who were involved in the Taliban movement, Baradar fought alongside the Mujahideen in the Afghan War (1978-92) as 1 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Abdul Ghani Baradar”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 May. 2024, h@ps://www.britannica.com/biography/Mullah-Abdul-Ghani-Baradar . Accessed 12 September 2024.

2 “Database.” Afghan-Bios.info, 2018, www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?opNon=com_afghanbios&id=323&task=view&total=5130&start=899&Itemid=2. Accessed 8 September 2024.a guerilla fighter. It is believed that Baradar fought with the Soviets together with Mohammad Omar who was an Afghan Mujahid commander. He also operated a madrassa along with Mohammad Omar located in Maiwand in the Kandahar Province.

The dissatisfaction and dissent among the radical Afghan populace against the Soviet occupation culminated in events whose repercussions are still visible in the country. The name ‘Baradar’ meaning ‘brother’ was given by Mullah Muhammed Omar owing to their close friendship. Omar is the spiritual head of the Taliban, and Baradar acts as the operational head. Baradar served in several important positions during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996- 2001) and held several reputable offices, such as the Governor of the provinces of Nimruz and Herat and the Corps Commander for the region of Western Afghanistan. While Omar remained inaccessible and out of the public eye, Baradar held audiences with the Pashtun civilians, Taliban leaders and even the press. He asserted control over military strategies and organised the Taliban’s funding. While the nucleus of the group had been Kabul, Baradar was mostly based out of Kandahar and handled his affairs from the southern city, all while not having an official government role. Amidst talks to end the US-led 17-year war, Baradar was named the leader of the Qatar political office, as talks between Taliban representatives and a US convoy to Afghanistan increased substantially. Abdul Ghani Baradar fought against the prominent presence of the international forces and the government of Afghanistan. He was found fleeing Afghanistan in 2001 to Pakistan shortly after the US invasion, from where he directed the insurgency. Along with Baradar, several other prominent Taliban leaders, such as Omar and others too, fled to Pakistan. In the following years, the Taliban organised a powerful insurgency by operating along the border. Despite his history of involvement in military activities, Baradar was to initiate several peace talks as an attempt for a larger peace deal negotiation.It is believed that Baradar approached then-President Hamid Karzai with a letter on a potential deal. A joint US-Pakistan operation tracked Baradar and arrested him in Karachi in 2010 because Baradar reached out to Karzai to initiate talks, which was done independently of Pakistan. This led to his imprisonment and detention in Pakistan. He was imprisoned in Pakistan for eight years, from 2010-2018, by the ISI or Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and the CIA.

3 This arrest of Baradar is seen as a strategic action to hinder his negotiations because an agreement would deny Pakistan influence in Afghanistan. During his imprisonment in Pakistan, he was allegedly tortured and treated very badly. This move emboldened the radical leaders of the Taliban, who were less open to Baradar’s inclination towards peace and diplomacy. Baradar was eventually released in the month of October 2018. He was now authorised to head the political team and make decisions, as released by the Taliban. This was done on the special request of the US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad who believed that Baradar was essential to the Afghan peace talks. Peace talks seem essential for the country as the graveyard of empires had not seen such hope for peace in the last 20 years. In February 2020, Baradar finally signed the Doha Agreement, which finalised the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. He was the ideal person for peace negotiations due to his influence in the region and pragmatic mindset. Under this negotiation, the Taliban were persuaded to stop attacks on international militaries and not harbour any terrorist group in exchange for a full U.S. withdrawal. Along with a complete withdrawal, the US would also lift sanctions on the militant group. After 20 years of exile, Baradar finally returned to Afghanistan in 2021 with the rumour of him becoming the President of the country.4 Celebrations and cheers marked his welcome 3 “Mullah’s Rise Charts Taliban’s Long Road back to Power.” AP NEWS, 18 Aug. 2021, h@ps://apnews.com/arNcle/afghanistan-taliban-abdul-ghani-baradar-e80165eb6c65fc7ea8fae50212ba56c8. Accessed 8 September 2024.

4 “Mullah’s Rise Charts Taliban’s Long Road back to Power.” AP NEWS, 18 Aug. 2021, h#ps://apnews.com/ar1cle/afghanistan-taliban-abdul-ghani-baradar-e80165eb6c65fc7ea8fae50212ba56c8. Accessed 8 September 2024.into the country, and his reputation as a moderate in the insurgent group during exile popularised him as well. Abdul Ghani Baradar has been bestowed a legendary status as he is the only surviving leader of the Taliban who was appointed personally by Mullah Mohammed Omar. More visible than the Taliban’s current leader, Baradar is the most public face of the Taliban. He is currently the Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and heads the political wing of the Taliban. Despite the West investing billions of dollars in Afghan security forces, it took the Taliban only a week to capture almost all of Afghanistan. During the final phases of the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban launched offensive attacks that overwhelmed the Afghan forces and led to an easy victory.

After the capture of Kabul, Baradar said, “It was never expected that we would have victory in Afghanistan”. His military prowess has culminated in him becoming a very refined, prominent and successful guerilla commander. The Taliban government also claims that it seeks an “inclusive and Islamic” government and that they have become more moderate since they last held power. Baradar claims that now their work is on rebuilding Afghanistan for a peaceful life in the future. Baradar’s return to power emboldens Afghanistan’s inability to escape the bloody shackles of its past, but the hope of him being on the side of peace bodes very well for the country.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Profile: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.” BBC News, 21 September 2013, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20582286. Accessed 8 September 2024. “Database.” Afghan-Bios.info, 2018, www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=323&task=view&total=5130&start=899&Itemid=2. Accessed 8 September 2024.

Doucet, Lyse. “Afghanistan: A New Order Begins under the Taliban’s Governance.” BBC News, 8 September 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58495112. Accessed 8 September 2024.

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Abdul Ghani Baradar”. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 May. 2024, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mullah-Abdul-Ghani-Baradar. Accessed 8 September 2024.

“Mullah’s Rise Charts Taliban’s Long Road back to Power.” AP NEWS, 18 Aug. 2021, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-abdul-ghani-baradar-e80165eb6c65fc7ea8fae50212ba56c8. Accessed 8 September 2024.

“TNIE Explainer: Who is Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar?” Youtube, 2024, https://youtu.be/omjUfnt3oHs?si=zF9sVVm0jDNBSR-t. Accessed 8 September 2024.

“Afghanistan | Crowds gather to cheer return of Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar” Youtube, 2024, https://youtu.be/W9vsCwABXSU?si=GyQosEDB4L7qp7ky. Accessed 8 September 2024.

“Who is the de facto Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar?” Youtube, 2024. https://youtu.be/yarEnHHjmLg?si=QFiA19Nps4UkjSql. Accessed 8 September 2024.Staff, ToI, and Agencies. “Who Is Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Man Who Led the Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan?” Www.timesofisrael.com, www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-abdul-ghani-baradar-the-man-who-led-the-taliban-takeover-of-afghanistan/. Accessed 8 September 2024.

Jazeera, Al. “Profile: Abdul Ghani Baradar, Taliban’s Political Head in Qatar.” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 25 Jan. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/25/profile-abdul-ghani-baradar-talibans-political-head-in-qatar. Accessed 8 September 2024.

“The volume of trade between Afghanistan and India has increased up to $1 million (US) in the past few years, but both countries feel that it can achieve greater trade benefits by increased trade across the borders, as the productivity of Afghanistan’s goods has significantly increased.”In order to expand and strengthen economic and commercial ties between both countries, and to promote Afghan Agriculture exports to India and South Asia, more than 50 Afghan firms participated in the two-day event,

‘Made in Afghanistan; Nature’s Best’, hosted by India in its capital city in July 2018. Another event, ‘India Afghanistan Trade and Investment Show’, organized in New Delhi, by USAID (United States Agency for International Development) on September 27-30, 2018, exhibited a comprehensive outline for potential investors willing to invest in emerging economic opportunities in Afghanistan’s market. These growing joint efforts of both the countries in the economic arena can be seen as strategic effort to stabilize their relations and ensure that Afghanistan emerges as a strong regional stabilizer and ally for India.

Afghanistan – India Trade and Investment Show, Source: Khaama Press Agency India and Afghanistan have shared a strong relationship based on historical and cultural links, and India has played a symbolic role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. In the recent past, both countries have signed a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ in 2011 focusing on political, cultural and economic cooperation. India has always been interested in Afghanistan as Afghanistan is an important junction of trade routes connecting Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia. Afghanistan is also adjacent to the Middle East, which is rich in natural resources like oil and natural gas, and having Afghanistan as an ally can help India gain inexpensive access to these resources via trade routesthrough the strategically located neighbouring country. While India does not intend to meddle in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and is quite firm on its stand that an Afghanistan dominated by external extremist force will never be a part of India’s geo-strategic and political goals, it believes that improved economic relations will lead to economic well-being of Afghans, stability of polity, and modernization of the country which can help free Afghanistan from the shackles of extremist power structures.

As an important member of SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) India’s active role in the region is essential in tackling China’s growing clout. Both Afghanistan and India are committed towards promoting and strengthening regional cooperation. Afghanistan is hostile towards Pakistan who seems to have funded the growth and spread of Taliban in Afghanistan. India feels that Afghanistan can also play a key role in monitoring the actions of Pakistan. India has always been on opposite ends with Pakistan and China. This similarity is also one of the reasons behind the close association and cooperation between India and Afghanistan.

“India feels that Afghanistan can also play a key role in monitoring the actions of Pakistan. India has always been on opposite ends with Pakistan and China. This similarity is also one of the reasons behind the close association and cooperation between India and Afghanistan.”

The agricultural sector of Afghanistan is the strongest and the revenue generated from it is the largest contributor to the nation’s GDP. Afghanistan sees India as the largest market for its agriculture and crafts products. Therefore, due to strategic and security concerns, India- Afghanistan relations promote the interest of both the nations, forming a symbiotic relationship.

Afghanistan is a country which is rich in natural resources, craftsmanship and agricultural produce. Some of the goods which are exported to India by Afghanistan include dry fruits, nuts, spices, fresh fruits, medicinal plants and handicraft. Afghanistan has opened up new air corridor connections with India, increased the ease of doing business in the digital age through new manufacturing technology and new agricultural techniques, and technology has led to increased agricultural productivity. This has marked the renaissance of the silk route legacyand has provided new opportunities of investment to investors (private companies, MNC’s, public sector companies) to invest in the Afghan market. It has provided the country with an opportunity to diversify its economy, which has consequentially increased its economic development.

The Afghan Marble is one of the richest natural resources of Afghanistan and is being used since ancient times. Due to investment in new technologies like the cutting and shaping equipment of marble, its export has increased and spread to countries like Italy, India, China, Turkey and USA. As a result of the dwindling supply of marble deposits in other West Asian countries, Afghanistan’s marble has emerged as a star in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan has always been the largest producer of lapis lazuli (deep blue metal or gem), which is one of most sought after gems in the world for crafting jewellery, wearable art and sculptures. Its demand has gone up as manufacturing techniques have improved because of increased investment in new mining technologies.

Cashmere is another sought after fashion garment and Afghanistan is the largest producer of this textile. Over the few years its demand has skyrocketed, especially in the European and Asian fashion industry. This has brought in huge income in the form of revenue generated from its exports. Afghanistan rightfully boasts about its 2000-year-old silk production and local producers are now enjoying international market success as the newly established silk weaving and processing centres have increased its capacity and know how to meet the constant demand for fine quality silk. The Afghan saffron is establishing reputation of its uniqueness and excellence which sets it apart from other saffron manufacturing nations.

“Afghanistan is also exploring its partnership and investments in India in health, education, clean energy and innovation and technological realms.”

In addition to its food and consumer goods, Afghanistan is also exploring its partnership and investments in India in health, education, clean energy and innovation and technological realms. There have been notable improvements in trade and technology with the support of USAID and other international donors. This has cultivated an investor friendly environment for doing business, which has helped Afghanistan in diversifying its economy, thereby providing exciting opportunities to both large and small foreign companies.

REFERENCES

1. Kaur B. 2017, ‘India- Afghanistan: An Analysis of Security and Strategic Concerns’, Mainstream Weekly, Volume NO. 9. 18 February 2017 [Accessed 25th October 2018] http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article6978.html
2. ‘Afghanistan eyes $2 million trade with India by 2020’, Times Now, 13 July 2018 [Accessed 24th October 2018] https://www.timesnownews.com/business-economy/world-news/article/afghanistan-eyes-2-billion-dollar-trade-with-india-by-2020/254087
3. Embassy of India, Kabul Afghanistan, ‘Indo-Afghan Relations’ [Accessed 25th October 2018] https://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000

The status of women all over has been in question for centuries now. Scholars have conducted researches, debated and have tried to understand the dynamics related to gender in every society. Afghanistan, rugged in its topography with multiple ethnic and tribal group, has never experienced a strong centralized state with a common legal system to ensure women’s rightsi.

The largest ethnic groups are Pashtuns at 40 percent and the Tajiks at 201 percent. The next largest groups are the Hazaras, Uzbeks and Aimaq. Both spatial and ethnic 1 Dr. Huma Ahmed-Ghosh. May 2003. A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future Or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan. Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 4 #3impassibility has prevented Afghanistan from ever forming a consensual and coherent sense of nationalism. “Both spatial and ethnic impassibility has prevented Afghanistan from ever forming a consensual and coherent sense of nationalism” In addition, interference by western countries and countries bordering Afghanistan have contributed to the fragmentation of the Afghan polity. Tribal politics is still determined by ethnic loyalties to bordering states. Although there have been occasional tries to bring tribes together, at no point has the state experienced a strong centralized state with a common legal system. Instead, rival ethnic groups have had political ambitions to capture Kabul and, through well-armed tribal leaders (supported by external funds), created their own sovereignties. Ethnically based rivalries, combined with open and varied interpretations of Islam, have created fractious cultures.

It is said that history is the lens through which one must learn about the future. If that is so, then the matter of women’s rights in Afghanistan has been historically confined by the patriarchal nature of gender and social relations deeply embedded in traditional communities. Tribal laws and sanctions have routinely taken precedence over Islamic and constitutional laws in deciding gender roles, especially through kinship hierarchies in the rural regions. Tribal power plays, institutions of honour, and inter-tribal shows of patriarchal control have put women’s position in jeopardyii.

“Tribal power plays, institutions of honour, and inter-tribal shows of patriarchal control have put women’s position in jeopardy” However, today, there are numerous organizations working towards women empowerment and in building the capacity of women and youth in order for them to articulate their needs in the development, peacebuilding and democratic processes. Equality for Peace and democracy (EPD)2 is one such organization. EPD was established in 2010 by Ms. Nargis Nehan, the Executive Director of EPDiii.

The aim of EPD is to mobilise women to further the cause of a stable Afgha “Women, as a common denominator, are particularly at risk across all demographic groups, especially if disabled, widowed, or coming from female-headed households (FHH)3.

The possibility of fear lies in the fact that FHHs are usually not favoured when it comes to land, livestock, education and health services4.” Another such associations the Revolutionary Association of the Women in Afghanistan (RAWA). RAWA represents a political 2 EQUALITY for Peace and Democracy (EPD) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to empowering women and youth at the community and policy levels in Afghanistan. 3 Among the main causes of FHHs are male migration, the deaths of males in civil conflicts. 4 Status of Women in Afghanistan, The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2015.movement that connects feminist and nationalist politics, where women are active, rather than symbolic, participants within the organization, and help to shape an ideological construction of the Afghan nationiv.

RAWA is a doctrinal sample for counter-patriarchal and nationalist feminist politics that enquires patriarchal definitions of the nation and its citizenry by redefining gender relations in the family as a mirror of the nation.

In reality today, 39.1% of the population of Afghanistan lives under poverty stricken conditions5 which fails to meet the Costs of Basic Needs (CBN). This threshold in Afghanistan represents the minimum cost of obtaining 2,100 calories based on the consumption patterns of the poor6.

Women, as a common denominator, are particularly at risk across all demographic groups, especially if disabled, widowed, or coming from female-headed households (FHH)7.

The possibility of fear lies in the fact that FHHs are usually not favoured when it comes to land, livestock, education and health services8.

The quality of women’s health has generally improved since 2001, but the country’s health indicators remain poor from an international perspective and improvements are progressing slowly. Lack of 5 ALCS (2014). Kabul: CSO.

6 D’Souza and Jolliffe (2012). Conflict, Food Price Shocks, and Food Insecurity: The experience of Afghan households. Kabul. 7 Among the main causes of FHHs are male migration, the deaths of males in civil conflicts. 8 Status of Women in Afghanistan, The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2015.education linked with poverty, has created a chronic state of vulnerability for women and children of the state. “In terms of economic empowerment, Afghanistan is ranked 150th in the world, placing it at the bottom” When it comes to education, girls and women have been always disadvantaged and have fallen behind the male population. The primary long term aim of the government is to strengthen human capital through education and improve one of the lowest literacy rates in the world, where only 32 % of total population is functionally literate. Only 19% of women are functionally literate, in comparison to the 49.1% of males. The lack of sufficient support to impact women’s illiteracy is areflection of social attitudes and stereotyping gender roles9 . Though, there has been considerable progress from 2001 in girls’ enrolment. As of 2014, some 8 to 10 million Afghans are enrolled in school, of which a third are girlsv . In terms of economic empowerment, Afghanistan is ranked 150th in the world, placing it at the bottom10 .

The female labour force participation rate is at 29% whereas its 81% for males11 .

Only a small number of female enterprises and workers have achieved economic growth but even this has not transpired to all sectors, including the rural areas. The gap between rural and urban women is increasing with different situations factoring to geography, culture and local customs which more often than not, do not support female activities in the economy. In rural areas, the trend to exclude females from the public space has hardly changed12 .

Nevertheless, females are significant contributors in the agricultural sector, given that 76% of women are living in the rural areas. Women advancement in the social or economic field cannot be achieved without them having access to the resources which needs to divided equally. This can only take place through political participation. 9 Ibid. 10

Human Development Reports, Table 4: Gender Inequality Index, hdr.undp. org/en/content/table-4-gender- inequality index. 11 ALCS (2014). Kabul: CSO.

9 EPD (2014). Afghanistan Gender Equality Report Card. Kabul: Equality for Peace and Democracy.Female representation in political institutions is at 35% locally. The new constitution also introduced reservations in the National Assembly. In the Meshrano Jirga, 50% of the members elected by the President should be womenvi. Though, this commendable reservation for women indicates a degree of gender equality and support for women in public life, social institutions that promote gender equality, or the general social attitudes do not support this. They also face tremendous amount of hardships, relating to security, which eventually hamper female representation. Given this, the central task of the government and MOWA then becomes to transform the mainstream mindset through campaigns and by raising awareness to sharpen attitudes towards equal rights“One cannot disregard the change which, even if slowly, is taking into shape. The change has given rise to the hope that social advancement can take place and proven that women from all classes of the society can attempt change in their lives”.

One cannot disregard the change which, even if slowly, is taking into shape. The change has given rise to the hope that social advancement can take place and proven that women from all classes of the society can attempt change in their lives. The solution to the problem lies in strengthening ethnic bonds by insisting on women’s economic participation. The idea is that, along with laws, educated women in the future will be able to negotiate their roles in the family and society through their heightened economic and political participation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Moghadam, Valentine M. 1997. Nationalist Agendas and Women’s Rights: Conflicts in Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century. In West, Lois A. (ed). Feminist Nationalism. New York: Routledge.
2. Dr. Huma Ahmed-Ghosh. May 2003. A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future Or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan. Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 4 #3
3. EPD (2014). Afghanistan Gender Equality Report Card. Kabul: Equality for Peace and Democracy. https://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/Gender%20Equality%20Report%20Card%20Mar15.pdf
4. Fluri Jennifer L. 2008. feminist-nation building in Afghanistan: an examination of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) in Feminist Review, No. 89, pp. 34-54. Palgrave Macmillan Journals.
5. “Universal Primary Education by 2020: In Peril for Afghan Girls?” United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 58 Parallel Session, 12 March 2014, http://www.ifuw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/UN-Website-Version-Final. pdf.
6. Mona Lena Krook, Diana Z. O’Brien and Krista M. Swip. Military Invasion and Women’s Political Representation. International Feminist Journal of Politics 12, no. 1, 2010: 66-79.

Reviewed by: Yashh Golechha and Praagya Singh Deepshikha Shahi work ‘Understanding Post 9/11 Afghanistan’ offers a critical insight into Samuel Huntington’s famed thesis on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Powerfully written, well- resourced and well-referenced, it serves as a large mainstream addition to understanding the political situation of Afghanistan post 9/11.

Huntington’s civilizational thesis has become some of the most widely quoted and translated analyses of the post-Cold War international order. Shahi writes, civilization as a significant unit of analysis and locus of debate in contemporary International Relations is largely an intellectual contribution of Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington forewarned, civilizations were primeval entities that would replace ideology and geopolitics as the animating sources of cooperation and conflict in the post-Cold War world. Shahi believes Huntington’s attempt to provide a new mental map for the renovated civilizational realities of post-Cold War world politics, led to the generation of two critical by-products: first, the lofty picture of Western civilization; second, the tarnished image of Islam. Huntington believed, “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence.”

In the post-9/11 world, Deepshikha opines, ‘civilization’ has filled the vacuum left by religion in the West’s secularized environment. Western civilization has emerged as a paradigm that is to be emulated either by will or by force. The west has developed the ‘axis of evil’, this term was often used by former US President George W. Bush to describe governments that he accused of harboring terrorists. The ‘good’ embodied in Western civilization has been highlighted in contrast to the alleged ‘evil’ intrinsic to Islam. To a great extent, the unscientific nature of Islamic faith was held responsible for the backwardness of Muslim societies. The Author states, that a simplistic understanding of 9/11 and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan as exemplifications of a clash of civilizations which seems to be thoroughly misleading and dangerous. According to the author, It is misleading as it omits various crucial factors that refute the applicability of Huntington’s thesis in the context of post-9/11 Afghanistan, it is dangerous as it reinforces the overly elevated status of the West in comparison to a maligned portrait of Islam, thereby provoking violent exchanges between the fanatic sympathizers of the two ‘civilizations. Deepshikha deduces Huntington’s clash of civilization thesis an endeavor to offer a new paradigm of world politics, which in contrast to state-centric realist theory and the system dominated neo–realist model, focused on civilizational- cultural religious factors. Huntington believed that ‘inter-civilizational’ issues were replacing inter- superpower ones. Hisarguments revolved around what he called ‘civilization identity’ and the interaction among seven or eight major ‘civilizations’ of which the conflict between two of them, ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, got the lion’s share of his attention. Deepshikha writes, Huntington’s thesis and his provocative thoughts drew massive criticism. Despite the copious criticisms targeting Huntington’s epistemology, methodology and ethics – the clash of civilizations thesis flourishes throughout the globe. Deepshikha believes the purpose behind Huntington’s choice to present reality in a particular way and the people’s choice to accept it lies in their respective conditions of existence. Though Huntington’s dangerous motive becomes quite apparent as soon as he activates his abstract idea of ‘civilizational identity’ by awakening a hatred for other civilizations, it is well-received by the people who find it relevant and useful in their living conditions. The cascading effect of the abstract idea of ‘civilizational identity’ totally obscures the complexity of human identity formation and thus weakens the effort at human emancipation. However, according to Deepshikha the humanistic-existential model is optimistic in its assertion that Huntington’s thesis acquires receptivity, not because it discloses some identifiable ultimate truth about innate human nature or emits provocative stimulations to which human beings are bound to succumb. The popularity of it is largely an outcome of the personal choice of human beings who are embedded in their respective conditions of existence as free agents.

Deepshikha reflects that prior to 9/11, Afghanistan was trapped in a civil war which was essentially an ‘intra-civilizational’ rather than ‘inter-civilizational’ conflict. The author deduces though Huntington’s thesis admitted the possibility of ‘intra-civilizational’ conflict, it clearly ruled out the probability of its global escalation. Huntington’s claim that only the violence between states and groups from different ‘civilizations’ carried with it the potential of global escalation, is negated by the author when Huntington’s assertion proved mistaken in the context of Afghanistan. Deepshikha believes that though the declarations made by Osama bin Laden possessed religious overtones, they indicated that his basic grievance was not religious/cultural/civilizational, but ‘political’. A careful reading of Osama bin Laden’s statements reflects his confused stance on the ‘religious’ motivations behind American political moves.

Deepshikha maintains her opinion that Huntington’s thesis stands discredited in the light of contradictory historical evidence drawn from 9/11 and its aftermath. Nevertheless, the intellectual explosion caused by his idea continues to capture attention in both the US and Afghanistan. She writes, ‘Huntington’s thesis has been quite popular among the Islamic fundamentalists’. The author also mentions Asta Olesen, who has provided a theoretical and, therefore, generalized understanding of the process of ‘political reception’. While discussing the determinants of the reception of a political discourse, Olesen wrote: ‘What determines the reception of a political discourse cannot be determined purely based on the content of the discourse in question. Circumstantial factors have a great bearing upon the receptivity and interpretation of the discourse.’

Further Deepshikha gathers that the factors explaining the influential impact of the Taliban/al-Qaida discourse also provide clues for understanding the popularity of Huntington amongst the Afghans. In fact, the discourses generated by the Taliban/al-Qaida and Huntington reflect a striking resemblance. Like the Taliban/al-Qaida discourse, which established the West as the enemy of Islam and was intended to mobilise Muslims around the world to safeguard their pious Islamic lands from Western intervention, the Huntingtonian discourse of civilizational clash inversely matched these propositions by presenting Islam as the most intolerant and aggressive civilization that posed the greatest threat to the West.Huntington advised the West to protect itself from Islamic demons by exploiting the differences between non-Western civilizations and by maintaining the superiority of the West. While the Taliban and al-Qaida appealed for Islamisation, Huntington called for Americanisation.

The author suggests the civilizational identity emphasized by Huntington has granted the US a profound ideological-political-diplomatic gain by enabling it to subordinate the UN and to create an ‘international coalition’ of states, many of which are themselves guilty of practicing terrorism. It has also allowed the US to have a military-political entry in Central Asia on a depth and scale that it never before had. Those Afghans who believe in the Taliban/al-Qaida discourse are bound to succumb to the intellectual insights of Huntington’s thesis which endorses the same worldview in a reverse guise. The popularity of al-Zawahiri’s text, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that presents a worldview comparable – but in reverse – to Huntington’s thesis, supports this argument. According to the Author, The Afghans are trapped in a vicious cycle generated by these two destructive discourses. The lack of an alternative theoretical/political discourse largely accounts for the absence of an alternative and peaceful way of life for Afghans.

Deepshikha further attempts to establish Critical International Theory (CIT) as a more commendable theoretical framework than Huntington’s thesis. The CIT is often understood as a combination of two distinct paradigms concerning two distinct concepts and processes. These two paradigms are: the production paradigm, developed by Antonio Gramsci and applied to IR by Robert Cox, which tends to focus on the concept of work and struggles over redistribution. And the communication paradigm, developed by Frankfurt School and applied to IR by Andrew Linklater, which is concerned with the concept of interaction and identity struggles. Richard Jones argues that though both paradigms have different approach but are united, in terms of attaining the final objective of emancipation. The common emancipatory objective originates from a common broad intellectual project wherein the themes of hegemony, reason and transcendence play a central role. The comparative edge of CIT against the clash of civilizations thesis can be traced to its superior methodological base. The positivist methodology of Huntington mistakenly treats ontology not as a dynamic construct but as a static entity which is essentially deterministic, ahistorical and immobile. The historically and geographically determined causal mechanisms underlying the dominant ontology of civilizational clash remain undiagnosed by Huntington. It has been debated that whether the Huntington’s mistake was deliberate or accidental. CIT certainly argues that Huntington’s mistake was intentional as theories were always meant for serving particular purposes. CIT uncovers the hidden purposeful designs of Huntington and his supporters and argue that the acceptance of his thesis is at least partly an outcome of personal motivations. The author also provides us an alternative perspective of understanding post 9/11 Afghanistan. Shahi believes that the combined application of both the paradigms constituting the overarching framework of CIT can reveal the linkage between hegemonic shifts and dialogic tensions in Afghan politics. The alternative understanding constructs the post-9/11 Afghan scenario not as an instance of clash of civilizations, but as a clash of hegemonic aspirations. The shifting of perspective from ‘civilizational’ to ‘critical’ not only presents a finer vision of the post-9/11 Afghan crisis but also suggests a way out of it. In its effort to find a solution to the troubling state of affairs in post-9/11 Afghanistan, author explores the possibility of organising an effective ‘counter-hegemonic struggle’ that in turn would require designing an ‘alternative knowledge-base’, organising the critical social forces along ‘alternative social relations of production’ (production paradigm) and creating an ‘all-inclusive speech community’ (communication paradigm). Due to the dominance of the realist emphasis on international systemic constraints on the tension between power and morality, and on the dangers of idealist praxeology, the question of how states and other social actors could create new political communities and identities has never been adequately addressed. Providing an adequate answer is a central requirement for the critical theory of international relations. Critical theory analyses the effects of power and the differential ability of actors to control their own circumstances. It also goes beyond that theoretical contribution to provide impetus for practical political action in challenging, confronting, and disrupting existing relations of power. Thus, in the contemporary era, critical IR theory is relevant, among other ways, as a stimulus to resist empire in its many guises.

The work began with the objective of providing a critical insight into the civilizational approach and offering an alternative understanding of post-9/11 Afghanistan. The attempt to fulfil this objective has been carried out in four stages: (i) Designing a ‘psychological critique’ of the civilizational approach; (ii) Explaining the ‘popular receptivity’ of Huntington’s civilizations thesis amongst the Afghans and demonstrating its harmful implications for post-9/11 Afghan politics; (iii) Establishing Critical International Theory (CIT) as a more meritorious theoretical framework in comparison to Huntington’s civilizations thesis; and (iv) Providing an alternative and more accurate vision of post-9/11 Afghan politics from the critical-theoretical standpoint.

CIT not only provides an alternative and finer vision of the post-9/11 Afghan crisis, but also suggest a way out of it. Cox’s production paradigm was activated to demonstrate the hegemonic shifts in Afghan politics. Linklater’s communication paradigm was operationalised to trace the linkage of these hegemonic shifts with the dialogic tensions in Afghan society.

In conclusion, the book talks about the hegemonic shifts in Afghan politics in terms of the dialogic tensions between Islamists and the West on the one hand, and between various Afghan ethnicities on the other. The first hegemonic phase appeared when Mujahideen joined hands to fight against the Soviets. The second hegemonic phase emerged when the Pashtuns reorganised under the Taliban to fight against US led forces.

Imagine coming from a country known just for Terror and Taliban, but being able to break all such stereotypes on an international stage. That’s how 20-year-old Rashid Khan felt when he became the first Afghan cricket player to join the Indian Premier League (IPL) in 2017. It’s important for Afghan players to participate in tournaments like the IPL because such platforms provide them the opportunities to be recognized internationally and strengthen their skills further. Even in the state of turmoil and the ever-spreading conflict in their homeland, the Afghan national team’s rise has been spectacular and its popularity amongst the youth has made it even more remarkable considering the insecurity and lack of infrastructure in the country.

Unlike any other nation, the birth of cricket in Afghanistan was the result of Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet occupation to Pakistan in the 1980s.

The refugees growing up in Pakistan subsequently learned to play ‘TAPE-BALL’ cricket and thus, cricket became a popular amateur sport for Afghan refugees living there. Among these refugees, Taj Malik and Allah Dad Noori, who lived in Peshawar set up the Afghanistan Cricket Federation in the 1995.The initial donations (both logistics and financial assistance) to the federation were facilitated by one of the oldest cricket clubs, Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC).

During Taliban era, the cricketers used to play in Kabul with prior permission. The golden years for Afghan cricket came with the fall of the Taliban. The return of millions of refugees boosted the game on Afghan soil and it began to develop rapidly. In May 2003, the federation conducted its first trials in Kabul, with players coming from across the country.

The proudest moment in Afghan cricket journey was during the opening match of the ‘First Olympia Lube Oil Cricket Tournament’, when an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) team lost to Malik’s Kabul Academy.

The first international victory was marked in the Asian Cricket Council Elite Cup, 2004, when all ICC members competed and Afghanistan beat Bahrain. By winning their first international trophy, which was the Asia Cup in 2007, the Afghan National Cricket team showed the world that the situation in their country could never affect their talent. The year 2012 was a milestone in their cricketing journey as Afghanistan played its first ever one Day International against Pakistan in Sharjah. The importance of the moment in Afghan cricket history was highlighted when even the Taliban’s spokesperson sent a message of support to the Afghan team. Since then, the Afghan National Team has been winning titles and trophies, marking their status in the international arena.

Afghan players have received training in Bangladesh along with technical support from Australia and the MCC in England. They even had an opportunity to train under the Pakistanibatting legend Inzamam ul-Haq before the Pakistan Cricket Board recalled him to be the chief selector for the Pakistani national cricket team. In terms of financial assistance, India has been funding to build a national cricket stadium in Kandahar. Assistance has also been offered by non-cricketing nations like Germany with funding worth €700,000 to build a stadium in Khost. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and the government of UK have also led development strategies to support the construction of cricket pitches in 20 schools in Kabul, Kunduz, Laghman, Nangarhar and Wardak. Another NGO called Afghan Connection, founded by Dr Sarah Fane, which is British and supported by the MCC, has made its presence felt in twenty-two provinces. It has nurtured cricketing talent and built local cricket facilities. Therefore, it is evident that cricket is one field where international cooperation has truly been working.Initially, cricket in Afghanistan was associated with Pashtuns ethnic group, particularly easterners who live in border with Pakistan. However, players from Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Pashai and Nuristani ethnicity have been playing cricket recently, making their way into domestic cricket teams. So, now cricket is considered a sport that brings national unity among youth from different ethnicities.However, the country still has a long way to go in creating opportunities for women’s cricket. Diana Barakzai created and captained a women’s team in 2009 and the following year, the Afghanistan Cricket Board (ACB) established its women division to encourage women’s participation the sport. In 2014, On the other hand, Diana Barakzai resigned from the team claiming that the Board had obstructed its progress because of a belief that women should not leave home and be given the chance to play sport.

She said to Reuters, “Afghanistan’s cricket board does not support cricket for women, even though I have 3,700 girl cricketers across Afghanistan.” If Afghanistan Cricket Board wishes to become a full time member of the International Cricket Council and be eligible to play test matches, it will have to uplift and support women in its cricketing structure.

Finally, Afghanistan’s cricket future depends on number of factors i.e. financial means and creating an environment of support to reach to the international level. However, we must salute the spirit of the Afghan players. Cricket has been helping Afghans in healing their pain amid constant strife. In a country ravaged by decades of war, and facing possibility of civil conflict, the development of cricket is no less than an achievement.

China’s role in Afghanistan has expanded with economic and hegemonic interests in the region. China has enjoyed the benefits of US presence economically and securing the territory against real and perceived threats posed by radical Islamists who might have otherwise challenged China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. With US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the future prospects for Beijing look beneficial due to the friendly ties with Pakistan and subsequently with the Taliban. By legitimizing the Taliban, courting them as a sovereign diplomatic delegation in July 2021, China gave the Taliban the recognition that it aspires for. The validation by China will benefit the Taliban in adding momentum to its efforts for garnering international legitimacy. China is an emerging hegemon in the region. The Taliban has massive support from Pakistan, and the Chinese influence over Pakistan is another major factor for the Taliban’s ties with China. In the coming weeks, China, with its economic and military advantage, can further influence the Taliban’s support in the region. Taliban requires monetary funds to govern the country that China has the potential to provide.

Image Source: The Heritage Times In her response, Hua expressed Beijing’s willingness to develop a good relationship with the Taliban, stating that “China respects the will of the Afghan people.”

China, unlike its neighbor India has been able to retain diplomatic presence in Kabul owing to close ties it cultivated with the Taliban leadership as well as their patrons in Pakistan. The Chinese government requires the Taliban’s cooperation to ensure security for its massive connectivity projects in the region and attempts to isolate and flush out Uyghur separatists and dissidents. China’s role in Afghanistan will be watched carefully as it seeks to wrestle with key challenges in its immediate neighborhood in its quest for superpower status. At the decided press conference of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the day President Ashraf Ghani fled Afghanistan, spokesperson Hua Chunying was inquired if the Chinese government plans to recognize the Taliban as the valid government of Afghanistan. Some speculators deducted Hua’s response as an allusion to the fact that China will soon recognize the Taliban regime and become fully involved in Afghanistan. However, the matter is extremely nuanced and complicated, therefore, Beijing will approach Afghan affairs more cautiously than is perceived by many. China’s role in Afghanistan can also set new standards of world order by the east. The Chinese authorities have long criticized the west for its interventions. China’s role in Afghanistan in the coming years would reflect upon the ideals that China stands for. Unlike the United States that sought to justify intervention on the plank of ‘war on terror’ and furthering agenda of ‘democracy’ and human rights, China proclaims a policy of non–intervention in determining political values of other countries.

China’s calm reaction post the Taliban’s takeover indicates towards a country that was prepared for the changed geo–political reality in a bid to assuage its concerns stemming from radical Islamists. In particular China has security concerns with the situation in Xinjiang. Taliban’s takeover will create a radical shift in regional ideology and hence impact secure borders of China. The strategically planned approach of China in Afghanistan has limitations if the situation in Kabul deteriorates.

It is true that China is ready to step into the void in Afghanistan, but not necessarily to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal. Beijing is poised with economic inducements and “cooperative relations” to redraw the region’s geopolitical map. Image Source: Financial Times

After the Taliban’s take over, The Global Times, amouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, statedChina’s stand as, “China doesn’t have a feud withAfghanistan…No matter who is in power, we’reready to be Afghanistan’s friend”. China’s interest inAfghanistan is limited to economic profits, and evenwith an unstable region, China does not plan tointervene or solve the conflict. But China’srecognition of the Taliban government will benefitthe Taliban and increase its legitimacy. After the July2021 meeting with the Taliban, China’s stand in thisregard was made abundantly clear in a statement released after the meeting:” Afghanistanbelongs to the Afghan people, and its future should be in the hands of its people,” indicates alot about its foreign policy and world view as a superpower, which differs drastically from thewest superpowers. “Our leadership has a very rational outlook,” said Qian, the TsinghuaUniversity professor. “So that we don’t follow the tracks [of the U.S.] and make the samemistakes.” The United States botched up exit and the Taliban’s rapid ascent has created avacuum of leadership in the region that China may seek to fill. Image Source: TRT World

The lack of security and military around Afghanistan will draw China’s active participation. China’s role in infrastructural development in the region, coupled with its deep pockets and UNSC seat can help it shape contours of political developments in Afghanistan. The relationship between the Taliban and China can be beneficial for both, but can this benefit the people of Afghanistan?

References

• A (2019, August 17). Understanding China’s Afghanistan policy: From calculated indifference to strategic engagement. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-chinas-afghanistan-policy-from-calculated-indifference-strategic-engagement-54126/?amp Bhattacharyya, S. (2021b, August 18). Taliban takeover: How the Chinese shadow looms large over Afghanistan. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/amp/news-analysis/story/taliban-takeover-how-the-chinese-shadow-looms-large-over-afghanistan-1842518-2021-08-18
• Comms, E. (2021, August 17). After the withdrawal: China’s interests in Afghanistan. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/article/after-the-withdrawal-chinas-interests-in-afghanistan/?amp Frayer, J.M. (2021, September 6). For China, Taliban rule in Afghanistan brings both opportunity and risk. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-taliban-rule-afghanistan-brings-both-opportunity-risk-n1278553
• Hass, R. (2021, August 19). How will China seek to profit from the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/18/how-will-china-seek-to-profit-from-the-talibans-takeover-in-afghanistan/amp/Krishnan, A. (2021, August 22). ‘China will not get drawn into serious security role in Afghanistan.’ The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-will-not-get-drawn-into-serious-security-role-in-afghanistan/article36046175.ece/amp/Parker, G. (2021, August 22). Johnson to host emergency G7 talks on Afghanistan with role sought for China and Russia. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/3073164b-43c5-45ec-bda5-f62f7107a747
• Patranobis, S. (2021, August 20). China can play a very big role in rebuilding Afghanistan: Taliban. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-can-play-a-very-big-role-in-rebuilding-afghanistan-taliban-101629434642969-amp.html
• Schuman, M. (2021, August 24). Watch How China Handles Afghanistan. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/08/china-afghanistan-taliban/619866/Small, A. (2020). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Reprint ed.). Oxford University Press.
• 5Yang, J. (2021, August 19). China’s Political Calculations and Potential Options in Afghanistan. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/chinas-political-calculations-and-potential-options-in-afghanistan/

Introduction: A Beacon of Justice in the Ruins

“Don’t assume that just because women are veiled we have no voice,” she said, speaking out as an Afghan activist at the United Nations in 2001, expressing a lasting reality: justice in Afghanistan tends to arise from the strength of its people more than institutions (Jamila qtd, in Wired). Outside Kabul’s shiny Supreme Court, reality is sobering, long lines, corruption, and delays disenfranchise many, especially rural communities (Human Rights Watch). However, in dusty village courtyards, justice is alive through jirgas, shuras, and youth assemblies. These grassroots councils hold cultural legitimacy and provide swift answers. But their rulings frequently disappear, never influencing individual rights or formal institutions. This paper, jointly authored, presents a new vision by engaging community judgments within civil records, maintaining their legal effect beyond cycles of aid, and strengthening the voice of citizens through legal literacy, Afghanistan is able to build a pluralistic justice system centered on hope and inclusion. In contrast to previous research where informal justice was viewed as stopgap measures, we envision a comprehensive justice framework that brings together tradition, administrative stability, and people’s agency into a lasting and optimistic future.

Community Driven Justice: Supplementing Formal Law

Afghan villagers often reject courts overwhelmed by nepotism, expense, and inefficiency. Community-based mechanisms settle an estimated 80% of conflicts due to their accessibility and culturally relatable processes, according to a study in the Asian Journal of Law and Society (Cambridge, 1). Legal academics Ibrahim and Maidin characterize jirgas as “swift, accessible, and affordable,” pointing out their use of local customs (Ibrahim & Maidin, 50). These choices are enforced by Arbaki, volunteer enforcers who are respected by the community (ICRSS).

These local tribunals are not extralegal; they are restorative justice courts restoring social equilibrium instead of meting out punishment (USIP). Although the Supreme Court, under the Afghan Constitution (Article 121), has final legal jurisdiction, most villagers find formal courts out of touch. In reaction, in 2010, the government suggested formally recognizing conciliatory shuras to operate alongside courts, although gender justice worries held up official adoption. We believe that formalization of these local councils for civil litigation, with an apparent appeals process up to the courts, could construct a sustainable model of legal pluralism.

Embedding Justice: From Oral Verdicts to Civic Record

Without records, even judicious judgments are lost to history. The Internet Silk Road Initiative, or M‑Jirga pilot, employed cell phones to convene elders for conflict resolution in outlying villages (Wired). But judgments were forgotten, lost to spoken memory. We advocate for integrating these judgments into civic systems through community legal registries. Whether via solar tablets or SMS sites, CDC-based kiosks would record conflict resolutions, which would then feed district registries and individuals’ e‑Tazkiras.

Written resolutions convert traditional choices into accepted legal entitlements, land ownership, marriage, and inheritance, thereby enhancing individual legal agency. This closes the gap between informal resolution and administrative validation, allowing rural citizens to cite written results in formal courts. Such incorporation converts transient justice into lasting civic order, combining grassroots effectiveness with national unity.

Legal Literacy: Translating Rights into Community Agency

Confidence in justice is in vain without a sense of rights. IWPR research reports that women are usually excluded and assumed guilty in jirga proceedings, whereas the presence of youth enhances fairness. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)  province in Pakistan, integrated peace committees composed of elders and police suppressed violent traditions like baad by sensitizing them to statutory legislation (openDemocracy).

Our vision is legal literacy centers in CDCs, local facilities providing modular instruction on property rights, family law, constitutional requirements, and protocols for settling disputes. The centers would render higher-court rationales into understandable language, keeping citizens informed about their rights and recourse from the judiciary. When villagers, particularly women and children, understand the jargon of law, they can reinforce or counteract judgments within communities, strengthening accountability and harmonizing decisions with constitutional protections.

Toward a Justice Ecosystem: Interweaving Custom, Record, and Awareness

The breakthrough lies in weaving these threads into a Justice as Community Infrastructure narrative. Imagine a land conflict in Helmand: a shura is held, women and youth steer judgment through literacy workshops, and a repayment plan is negotiated. The judgment is registered on a solar tablet and feeds into the district registry, tracing through property deeds and e‑Tazkiras. A party aggrieved initiates a formal appeal, starting at the provincial court and going all the way to the Supreme Court with credible documentation. Its decision subsequently becomes part of the literacy schoolbooks. Such a system takes tradition into documentation, democracy into custom, and inclusion into governance, connecting village-based justice connect with national legal architecture.

Our Perspective: Drawing from Proven Approaches

Our paper synthesizes proven advances, existing in the real world, into a unified vision consistent with the legal and cultural dynamics in Afghanistan. The 2010 M-Jirga pilot, which was reported on in Wired, proved that mobile phone conferencing can surprisingly galvanize traditional leaders and government representatives to settle disagreements from a distance. By not formally documenting results, the experiment demonstrated that communal structures are flexible and technology can be integrated into them (“Can Cellphones Bring Justice…”).

At the same time, literacy programs in provinces such as Logar and Herat, supported by UNESCO, have helped over 25,000 girls and women acquire skills in reading, writing and accounting, key skills that allow informed engagement in communal justice and civic life. A tailor named Bi Bi described how literacy allowed her to handle order receipts on her own, showing how education can be immediately reflected in economic and social power (UNESCO).

To this, openDemocracy reported on Pakistan’s Muslahathi Committees, mixed reconciliation mechanisms that include both police and elders, who institutionalized processes and brought in women’s voices without abandoning cultural legitimacy (“The Jirga in modern day Afghanistan”). Others, such as Women for Afghan Women, have offered legal advice, even under Islamic codes, to women desiring divorce or demanding rights, demonstrating how rights-awareness can support legal empowerment even in customary systems (Women for Afghan Women).

Individually, each of these programs- mobile justice, literacy, hybrid justice committees, and rights-based legal aid- works. The contribution of our paper lies in combining them into one ecosystem- think of community verdicts being entered through an SMS kiosk, being examined by literate women and youth, and thereafter stored with code for appeal to the Supreme Court, under Article 121 of the 2004 Constitution. Combining them brings informal justice into being a permanent civic infrastructure, legally legitimated, administratively resilient, and socially participatory.

By combining tradition with technological familiarity, documentation for permanence, and rights awareness for clarity, this justice system renews hope while adhering to constitutional law. It presents a pathway for grassroots justice to become legally grounded, for government institutions to become legitimate, and for citizens, particularly women and youth, to become empowered. This is the vision our paper puts forward- not disintegration, but a coherent, context-specific reconstruction of justice, collaboratively authored through recorded efforts and informed by the desire for an optimistic, pluralistic Afghanistan

A Constitution Without a Government? Imagining a ‘Living Legal Framework’ for the Afghan People

Imagine a constitution not crafted in a capital city or at a foreign negotiation table, but that came instead from the grassroots of society. The monarchy, republic, or Taliban rule of Afghanistan’s imposed constitutions have not managed to disrupt daily civic life completely. Afghans began envisioning a new, living legal framework, one that is built around shared agreement rather than control. This would not come from Kabul, but rather from the courtyards of Afghan homes. This describes a constitution devoid of a centralized government, emerging instead from village declarations, community values, and evolving common laws. These would then be gradually woven into a unified framework by the provincial legal councils and documented not as one definitive text, but as a dynamic corpus of norms. This approach may sound utopian, but in a context of a country that has undergone multiple collapses of the central state and constitutions which have lost their functional value, a  slow, ground-up constitutional process may be the only way to foster a tangible connection to the law. Rebecca Gang notes that it is commonly estimated that 80 to 90 per cent of dispute resolution in Afghanistan is currently conducted through community-based processes. Previous research has shown broad trends in the way dispute resolution is practiced at the community level and why it is prioritised, including an emphasis on peace-building and community stability, and factors such as speed, efficiency, minimal expense, and a preference for local autonomy. (AREU 2)

This people’s constitution wouldn’t be an abstract document. It could begin as local justice codes stored in kiosks, circulated via mobile networks, and cross-referenced by paralegals. It could evolve organically, responding to local shifts and contradictions, while eventually converging into a broader, flexible Afghan legal charter. What matters is not a fixed text but its capacity to live and adapt.

Hope in the Gaps: How Absence of the State Is Creating Space for Local Innovation

The collapse of state structures paradoxically creates a void which permits Afghans to investigate more resilient and inclusive justice systems. New grassroots models emerge without state interference: mobile mediation camps operate across provinces while women’s jirgas settle family disputes in private courtyards, and diasporic legal help lines link overseas lawyers to families dealing with domestic land issues.

Take the example of the M-Jirga pilot in 2010, it was composed of “informal” leaders — local or provincial bigwigs, for instance — linked on the calls to government agencies who enforced the decisions. Wired reported that “some people are even working on creating an SMS program where Afghans could text their grievances to the M-Jirga down the road”(Wired, 2010, pg. 1). Similarly, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting documented a dispute over land ownership between two families in Arghandab that went on for 20 years, “Both sides sustained casualties as a result” said Abdul Bari. “When they referred the issue to scholars and tribal elders, a jirga was convened. We made a decision that both sides were happy with. Both families now live calm and contented lives on their properties.”(IWPR, 2025).

Diaspora legal initiatives could take the form of Telegram or messaging platforms where Afghan legal scholars and students offer advice tailored to the unique customs and laws of different provinces. Projects like these would not only provide much-needed support but could also help connect scattered communities, creating a thread of legal continuity even in exile. What we are seeing is a shift: from survival to strategy. From makeshift resolutions to semi-formal innovations, these informal systems are not only filling a governance void but also experimenting with what justice could mean beyond the courtroom. They are not waiting for a state; instead they are becoming one.

Justice Across Borders: Building Legal Pathways from Afar

Even as Afghan institutions collapse, Afghan identity persists across oceans. In fact, they’ve started building it themselves. From legal help lines over WhatsApp to Zoom mediation sessions between relatives in different countries, these efforts aren’t just temporary fixes for displaced families. They’re becoming something deeper: simple, practical models of how justice might work when it grows from relationships, not regimes. They’re aiming to shape a future legal system that is flexible, people-first and grounded in trust rather than territorial control.

A group of Afghan law students in India, for example, created a Telegram channel offering live legal advice for divorce and property disputes under both the Afghan civil code and sharia, tailored to the caller’s province of origin (IWPR 2025). Their approach doesn’t assume universality but recognizes regional diversity. These legal hybrids maintain cultural continuity while expanding procedural fairness.

Consider the story of Zohra, a refugee living in the United States. For years, she endured an abusive marriage, trapped in a cycle of fear and isolation. Her husband’s control was all-encompassing—financially, emotionally, and physically. He did not allow Zohra to work, limited her access to money, and often told her she was worthless. The emotional abuse cut as deep as the physical abuse, leaving her with a shattered sense of self-worth. Today, Zohra is thriving. She has a steady job, a home, and is fully engaged in her children’s lives, providing them with the love, stability, and safety they deserve. (Women for Afghan Women, 2024).

Could these efforts offer a way forward for justice back home in Afghanistan? These efforts show that legal belonging need not be tied to broken government buildings or outdated ministries. It can grow in unexpected places, like in someone’s living room or over a late-night Zoom call. Even far from Afghanistan, people are still finding ways to solve problems and imagine something better for the future.

Women Between Silence and Strategy: Carving Agency in Custom

One of the hardest truths about Afghanistan’s justice collapse is that the people who are most vulnerable, especially women and girls, have often found the most creative ways to keep justice alive. Even though the Taliban enforces strict controls over what women can do, their voices have not disappeared. Instead, they have adapted. Women have found new ways to seek justice quietly, often through informal systems that feel safer and more familiar.

In places like Bamiyan, women have started their own jirgas. While these are not official courts, they are slowly gaining respect in their communities. With guidance from female elders and midwives, these gatherings help resolve family disputes in ways that are rooted in compassion and care. These assemblies operate on the margins but wield deep moral authority in their villages. One such jirga, for instance, ruled against a forced marriage and helped relocate the girl with a host family, despite the risk of Taliban reprisals (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

Such acts aren’t just resistance, but they are quiet strategies of survival. In other cases, women have turned to online literacy networks to decode legal texts and empower their arguments. In Herat, an all-female WhatsApp group shared translated excerpts from the 2004 Constitution, allowing members to cite Article 22 on gender equality in local negotiations (UNESCO, 2023).

None of these efforts are formally recognized. Yet, they are reshaping what justice means on the ground. Not by breaking custom, but by repurposing it. As one organizer from Logar said:

“We don’t argue against Islam, we argue within it, using rights our mothers didn’t know they had” (openDemocracy, 2024).

These women-centered forums also raise deeper questions. The future Afghan legal system must find ways to include these voices, not as rare exceptions but as a central part of how justice is imagined. A powerful vision emerges when we picture a constitution that begins in the courtyard of a girls’ school rather than in a donor conference hall in Doha.

Conclusion: Holding On to Hope in Uncertain Times

We understand how ambitious, even implausible, these proposals might seem in today’s Afghanistan. The Taliban’s treatment of women, suppression of dissent, and erasure of civic space are chilling realities. The prospect of constitutional renewal, legal pluralism, or diaspora feedback loops may appear distant. Yet, it is in this very darkness that the need for hope feels most urgent.

Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban government in May 2024 marked a geopolitical shift—one that lends superficial legitimacy to a regime still systematically denying rights, particularly for women (Human Rights Watch, 2024). But international recognition does not equal domestic justice. As we are trying to show in this paper, legitimacy in Afghanistan has never been derived purely from global agreements or centralized states. It has always emerged from within its community, through people, relationships, and group discussions.

Whether it is through solar kiosks recording local decisions, women gathering to learn and share their legal rights, or family members reaching out across borders for help over text, the idea of Afghan justice is still alive. Even in the quietest corners of collapse, people continue to imagine a better way forward. The road ahead is not easy. There are obstacles at every step. But it is still a road. And if justice needs to begin in dusty fields, in someone’s backyard, or over an unstable internet connection, then that is where it will begin. We do not offer this paper as a final answer. Instead, we offer it as an invitation to think differently. To see justice not just as something handed down by governments, but as something built by people, day by day, from the ground up. Because even when there is silence, even when there is exile, Afghans are still finding ways to speak.

Works Cited

“Can Cellphones Bring Justice in Afghanistan?” Wired, 6 Oct. 2010.

“From Normative Pluralism to a Unified Legal System in Afghanistan?” Asian Journal of Law and Society, Cambridge, 2024.

Ibrahim, Fazal Hadi F. A., and Ainul Jaria Maidin. “Jirga in Afghanistan: Its Functions, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Prospects.” IIUM Law Journal, vol. 32, no. 2, 2025, pp. 45–67.

“How Fair Is Traditional Justice in Afghanistan?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 2025.

“Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and Search for Justice in Afghanistan.” USIP, 2007.

“Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: We Have the Promises of the World.” Human Rights Watch, 2009.

“Jirga and Dispute Resolution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: A Critical Analysis.” ResearchGate 2023.

Periodic Supreme Court constitutional context: Article 121 of 2004 Constitution, discussed in “Laws of Afghanistan.” Northwestern Law Scholarly Commons

“Community-Based Dispute Resolution Processes in Kabul City” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)  Case Study Series,  Rebecca Gang 2011

“How Fair Is Traditional Justice in Afghanistan?” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR), 2025. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/how-fair-traditional-justice-afghanistan

“Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: We Have the Promises of the World.” Human Rights Watch, 2009 and 2024.(Referenced in Section 7 and Conclusion, pg. 3–4)

“Girls’ Literacy in Herat and Logar: A New Generation Reads the Law.” UNESCO, 2023.(Referenced in Section 7, pg. 2)

“The Jirga in Modern Day Afghanistan.” openDemocracy, 2024. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/jirga-afghanistan-legal-rights-customary (Referenced in Section 7, pg. 2)

“Women for Afghan Women Annual Report.” WAW, 2024. https://womenforafghanwomen.org/2024-report (Referenced in Sections 5 and 6, pg. 2)

“Russia Becomes First Country to Recognize Taliban as Afghanistan’s Legitimate Government.” Human Rights Watch, 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/28/russia-recognizes-taliban-afghanistan (Referenced in Conclusion, pg. 4)

In May 2025, the Taliban government announced a ban on chess in Afghanistan, citing its alleged non-compliance with the Sharia law. In the face of the ongoing human rights atrocities committed by the Taliban administration, from banning women’s voices in public (ABC News 2024) to banning live broadcasts of political programmes (Human Rights Watch 2025), the ban on chess appears trivial. However, it is reflective of a larger political agenda to exert control, enforce surveillance and cultivate a pervasive sense of fear among the people. Like the ban on kite-flying (BBC 2022) and video games (Times of India 2025), the ban on chess is one of the Taliban’s “invisible punishments” that chip away at the human spirit, in turn diminishing the capacity of critical thought in the populace while further marginalising vulnerable groups. Consequently, this leaves them subservient and resigned to a life of oppression.

The ban is not a random decision. It stems from years of fear of chess players. In 2002, during the Taliban’s first term in power, it imprisoned two men for two days for playing chess, considering it a form of ‘gambling’. The chessboard was burnt, and the pieces were broken to bits (Counterpunch 2002). At its core, chess is a game of strategy, foresight and independent decision-making. The ability to predict an opponent’s move and outmanoeuvre them is crucial to a player’s victory. The Taliban fears that by fostering such analytical abilities, Afghan citizens might begin to question their rigid dogma and voice their dissent, ultimately threatening the regime’s fragile control. This highlights how the Taliban’s rule is inherently based on its populace’s intellectual complicity and enforced ignorance. The ban on chess is reflective of their fear of intellectually engaged citizens who are capable of organising resistance and formulate alternatives to challenge the Taliban’s authority. As a result, chess became a chilling metaphor for unspoken dissent and unformulated plans that are stifled before they can even begin.

While the official rationale for banning chess cited “gambling prevention”, the Taliban’s discomfort with the game’s powerful queen piece may also legitimise the ban. Being the most powerful piece on the chessboard, the queen can move diagonally, horizontally and vertically for any distance. Capturing this piece is crucial to a player’s victory- killing the queen effectively kills the opponent’s game. This importance carries great symbolic weight in Afghanistan, highlighting the dominance of the queen in contrast to the oppressed state of women in the country. In a regime where women are denied education, employment, freedom of movement, and even their public voice, the notion of a ‘queen’ holding such ultimate power by dictating the flow of the entire game threatens the Taliban’s radical misogynistic ideology. This ban, therefore, functions not only to keep the populace intellectually subservient but also to actively suppress any potential symbolic inspiration for women to challenge their lack of agency and freedom under the regime.

This suppression of female agency is not merely confined to the chessboard. For more than three years, the Taliban has banned women from participating in all sports (OHCHR 2024). Female Afghan athletes live in exile, usually competing under the refugee category of the Olympics and Paralympics. The Afghan women’s cricket team has been based in Australia since 2021, having been granted emergency visas by the Morrison government upon their arrival in Pakistan (Sky Sports 2024). Consequently, chess remained one of the few remaining avenues for women to compete and engage in sporting activity. With that being banned, there remains virtually no form of entertainment left for women in the country.

The impact of the ban is not merely restricted to women. It has adversely affected the social lives of the Afghan youth and chess enthusiasts. Prior to the ban, several cafes in Kabul hosted informal chess tournaments. Both café owners and players considered the game one of the few neutral spaces left to form friendships, while simultaneously engaging in silent intellectual rebellion (Hindustan Times 2025). These tournaments offered respite to socially isolated Afghans, providing them the opportunity to meet like-minded individuals in the grim, dystopian daily reality of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The ban on chess has cut the populace off from a sphere to socialise, thereby deepening their sense of isolation and fear.

Despite its ban and disappearance from Afghan daily life out of safety concerns, no clear-cut punishment has been laid out for those violating the chess ban. This ambiguity has been carefully crafted to instil a deeper fear of the Taliban administration into its citizenry. Punishment aside, it has not clearly laid down rules for what constitutes “playing chess”. The only takeaway from the ban is that an Afghan caught playing chess in public would fall victim to the draconian system of punishment, leaving the Afghans with a pervasive fear of the unknown. They are left questioning whether their pastimes, daily activities, interactions and private lives align with the Taliban’s interpretation of the Sharia law. Under ordinary circumstances, questioning authority is a sign of a healthy society; in Afghanistan, it stems from the fear of persecution and a subsequent pressure to comply. In turn, the constant feeling of being watched and internal policing takes the psychological toll on the Taliban’s subjects to an unprecedented level- thereby placing the country at the bottom of the World Happiness Index 2025.

While the pervasive situation of unhappiness cannot be easily or quickly reformed, certain measures can be taken by the international community regarding the chess ban. As a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), international organisations can call out Afghanistan on the ban, stating that it directly contravenes its commitment to enforcing both treaties. Specifically, Article 15 of the ICESCR enshrines the right of everyone to participate in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, and to benefit from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary, or artistic production (OHCHR n.d.). Similarly, Article 27 of the ICCPR protects the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture (United Nations 1966).

Thus, the Taliban’s ban on chess is more than a mere moral decree. Rather, it is a carefully crafted political strategy seeking to sow the seeds of doubt and further the fear factor among its citizens. This strategy, akin to an invisible punishment, further erodes the mental well-being of ordinary Afghans by depriving them of a valuable opportunity to socialise. In turn, the fear and hopelessness combine to create a crisis of critical thought in Afghanistan. Only by acknowledging the significance of the ban can the world truly comprehend the extent of the Taliban’s assault on Afghan society and the urgent need for sustained pressure for fundamental human rights.

WORKS CITED

• ABC News. 2024. “Afghanistan’s Taliban Ban Women’s Voices – But Some Want to Be Heard.” ABC News, September 18, 2024. .
• BBC Newsround. 2022. “What Is Life Like for Girls in Afghanistan under the Taliban?” BBC Newsround, August 22, 2022. .
• CounterPunch. 2002. “The Taliban’s War on Chess.” CounterPunch, February 7, 2002. .
• Hindustan Times. 2024. “Taliban Suspends Chess across Afghanistan over Islamic Law, Gambling Concerns; Calls It ‘Against Sharia.’” Hindustan Times, June 26, 2024. .
• Human Rights Watch. 2025. “Afghanistan.” In World Report 2025: Country Chapters. .
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2024. “Sports Bodies Must Push Back against Taliban’s Ban on Women Participating in Sports.” OHCHR, August 2024. .
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). n.d. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Accessed July 20, 2025. .
• Sky Sports. 2024. “Banned, Ignored and Still in Exile: The Story of the Afghanistan Women’s Cricket Team Who Fled for Safety.” Sky Sports, July 2024. .
• Times of India. 2024. “No Chess or Music: Life in Afghanistan under Taliban’s Bizarre Bans.” The Times of India, May 2024. .
• United Nations. 1966. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted December 16, 1966; entered into force January 3, 1976. United Nations Treaty Series 993:3. Accessed July 20, 2025. .

Although Indian airlines have stopped providing meals in their flights, the Afghan

Airlines called Kamair surprised us with their hospitality in the air. They provided us with some amazing Mughlai dishes as well as the famous Afghan green tea. This marked the beginning of our experience with Afghan hospitality.

Painting on the streets of Kabul

Landing on a cold evening in Kabul, we were taken to our guesthouse. We didn’t expect to be served with meals for the entire month that we were staying there, and in our heads, we had been planning how to manage our meals. But after another course of green tea, we witnessed Afghan hospitality yet again. We were told that we didn’t have to worry about food as they would provide us with meals three times a day. When we offered money to chip in for the groceries, they said, “Don’t worry, you are in Afghanistan, not America”.

View of Snow laden streets and buildings of Kabul in the winter month of December CharchaAfter another round of green tea and the famous Ukrainian Kovrika chocolates, we were shown our cozy room which was in the basement of the guesthouse. As the room was cold and they didn’t have extra heaters, one of the helpers of the guesthouse sacrificed his heater for our comfort. This act was considered very normal in Afghanistan, even when it was -5 degree Celsius at the time.

Left: Naan with Rice, Ghosht-E-Murgh, Sabzee (Spinach)

Right: Naan with Kabuli Pulaw, Chaka, Ghosht and salad.
Over the course of the month, we were fed meals of such large portions that it could feed four people, but had to be consumed by the two of us Indians with small appetites. While we struggled to finish the food, our hosts would come and ask if we wanted more thinking that we didn’t have enough on our plates. More so, they would take the blame on themselves, saying that they lacked in their hospitality because of which we were eating so less, which was certainly not the case.

“We were fed dishes like Tokham (Afghan Omelette), Shorba (Afghan soup), Lubia (Afghan Rajma), Chaka (Afghan yoghurt), Ghosht-E-Murgh (Afghan Chicken curry), Chopan Kebab (A famous Kebab of Afghanistan), the famous Kabuli Pulaw and Naans. All this was always accompanied by Afghan green tea and Afghan “Alokozay” cola.”

CharchaApart from serving us with food, they also came and talked to us regularly making sure that we didn’t feel bored, but we were too excited to be bored. When the temperatures dipped below -15 degree Celsius, they gave the both of us two quilts (Razai). Everyone who met us after they got to know that we were Indians, offered to take us roaming around in Kabul. Left: Harshit Pai with Hajji Basheer and Sayyad Mohammad.

Right: Rohan Khattar Singh with Sayyad Mohammad.

We were again reminded of the hospitality on the last day when we were taken to Kabul’s famous Sufi Restaurant. Our hosts apologized to us for not showing enough hospitality, when in reality they were extremely warm and welcoming towards us.

Although we are back to India now, we still feel like we are in Afghanistan. This is how deep the connection was with the friendly Afghans we met. If you are on the JGU campus and want to know more about our experience in Afghanistan over a cup of green tea, definitely reach out to us!