{"id":14236,"date":"2024-04-04T12:26:24","date_gmt":"2024-04-04T12:26:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/?p=14236"},"modified":"2024-04-04T12:26:24","modified_gmt":"2024-04-04T12:26:24","slug":"anilkumar-jinabhai-patel-d-v-pravinchandra-jinabhai-patel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/anilkumar-jinabhai-patel-d-v-pravinchandra-jinabhai-patel\/","title":{"rendered":"Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel (D) v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
This case comment is a part of our Annual Arbitration Review 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Judgment Name: <\/strong>Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel (D) <\/em><\/a>v.<\/a> Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel<\/em><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Citation: <\/strong>(2018) 15 SCC 178<\/p>\n\n\n\n Court: <\/strong>Supreme Court of India<\/p>\n\n\n\n Coram: <\/strong>R.K. Aggarwal, R. Banumathi, JJ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Date: <\/strong>29th March 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n Keywords: <\/strong>Arbitral Award, Memorandum of Understanding, Limitation Period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Factual Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A business of chemicals, fertilizers and real estate was run by the Petitioner (Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel) and Respondent (Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel), brothers situated in Gujarat. In the course of their business, they set up several companies and partnership concerns and acquired numerous immovable and movable properties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Both the parties and their family members decided to divide all the family assets to avoid any future litigation or misunderstandings. The Petitioner and Respondent jointly appointed their sister, Latikaben and brother-in-law, Bhikhalal Nathalal Patel as the arbitrators for the division of the family assets. The appointment of the arbitrators (Latikaben and Bhikhalal Nathalal Patel) was made through a Memorandum of Understanding which the Petitioner and the Respondent jointly signed. An Interim Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the parties, which was done in the absence of the appointed arbitrators in the matters relating to bank accounts, withdrawal power, NPK allocations, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Arbitrators subsequently passed an award, while mentioning the Interim Memorandum of Understanding, whereby some properties were allotted to the Petitioner, and the Respondent and some properties were left undivided, with equal rights of both the Parties and their respective family members. Subsequently, another award was passed, which finalized the issues between the parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Subsequently, the Petitioners challenged the afore-mentioned arbitral award under Section 34<\/a> of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on the ground that they did not receive the copy of the award in time and that their signature on the copy of the award was forged. The Arbitration Petition of the appellants was allowed by the District Judge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Respondent challenged this judgment by which the District Judge had allowed the Petitioners to challenge the arbitral award. The Respondent’s challenge was accepted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, which set aside the District Judge’s judgment. The High Court held that the challenge to the arbitral award was time-barred under the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This ruling has subsequently been challenged before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Issue<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether the High Court was right in holding that the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award was barred by limitation?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A perusal of the relevant sections is imperative to understand the ruling given by the Court. The Court observed that Section 34(3) provides that the court shall not entertain an application for setting aside an award if it is made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the applicant had received the arbitral award. The Proviso to Section 34 further provides that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed time, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days “but not thereafter.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n